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Abstract 
In a series of decisions from 1970 to 1980, the United States Supreme Court shifted from an 
"effect" standard to an "intent" standard in racial and sex discrimination cases. Every step along the 
road from the Jackson, Mississippi swimming pool closing case' to the Mobile, Alabama city 
commission case2 was criticized by professors and policymakers. 3 Indeed, the last step was so 
controversial that Congress overturned the Court's City of Mobile v. Bolden decision in the major 
amendment to the 1982 Voting Rights Act, allowing plaintiffs in voting rights cases to prevail by 
proving either a racially discriminatory intent or a racially discriminatory effect.4 
How much difference has the shift made? Do Supreme Court decisions during the century 
following the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 throw any light on the Court's more 
recent course? How, exactly, have courts said intent must be proven, and how do their standards 
comport with logic and normal professional conduct among historians? What sorts of evidence are 
relevant to proving intent, and why are they relevant? How, in practice, should one go about 
evaluating hypotheses about the motives of the framers of governmental rules? 
The best path to answers to such questions begins, it seems to me, with a detailed 
examination of one case. In August, 1988, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund and the American Civil Liberties Union filed Yolanda Garza et al. v. County of Los Angeles, 
California in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Shortly 
thereafter, the United States Department of Justice instituted a similar suit against the County. 
Having testified as a historian and political scientist in six previous federal voting rights cases, I 
served as an expert witness for MALDEF and the ACLU on the question of whether, in recent years, 
the supervisorial district lines in Los Angeles county had been drawn with an intent to discriminate 
against Hispanics. This paper is a revised and much expanded version of the one I presented to the 
court. 
As in other cases, Garza was complex enough to require the attention of a professional 
historian because no one incident or piece of evidence was, by itself, conclusive. 5 Decided in favor 
of the plaintiffs by Judge David V. Kenyon on June 4, 1990, Garza deserves detailed attention not 
only for the light it throws on the general theoretical questions noted above, but also because the 
record on motivation is extraordinarily rich, because Los Angeles county has one of the largest 
populations of any jurisdiction ever sued in a voting rights case, and because it is the most important 
voting rights suit involving Hispanics ever filed. 
I. ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION BY GERRYMANDER 
I. A. Introduction a n d  Overview 
I begin by considering, very briefly, some examples from the historical record of anti­
minority gerrymandering. Social science provides few laws of human behavior. Consequently, we 
often tum to past or present day analogies for guidance. It is instructive to note that the first time in 
American history when enough minority group members could vote to make a substantial difference 
in political outcomes, the three major techniques of gerrymandering ("packing", "stacking", and 
"cracking", to be defined below) were used by supposed allies, as well as by enemies, to dilute the 
power of minority voters. The fact that Deep South redistricters of the 1870s and 1880s instantly 
knew how to accomplish various kinds of gerrymanders creates a presumption that when we observe 
anti-minority effects in a redistricting, they were intended. Furthermore, the fact that observers a 
century ago discerned discriminatory intent, not by looking for verbal admissions of a desire to 
disadvantage minorities, but by considering the obvious effects of redistricting plans, demonstrates 
how commonsensical and historically precedented it is to determine discriminatory intent from 
discriminatory effects. 
Particular partisan and demographic traits of Hispanics in contemporary Los Angeles 
County affect the character of discrimination against them in redistricting. Predominantly 
Democratic and slightly less segregated than the African-American or Anglo populations, Hispanics 
______ al�so�haYe_a_filllaller_prop_onion of registereiLYoters to total population than the other two gmup·�-------­
Because these traits are widely known to those who draw boundary lines, they suggest that anti-
Hispanic gerrymandering is at least as likely to be accomplished by splitting areas of Hispanic 
concentration as it is by concentrating them in a few districts. 
State and county laws and guidelines that affect county reapportionment imposed severe 
constraints on the process, particularly on the 1981 redistricting. The most significant was the 
necessity for the final plan to receive the votes of four of the five supervisors, for it meant that the 
aggressive, newly-elected Republican majority on the Board in 1981 could not jam through their 
preferred redistricting plan. 
Incumbents have a large advantage in elections to the Los Angeles County Board of 
Supervisors, not only because they can raise much more money in campaign contributions, but 
because they can design their own districts to help themselves and disadvantage potential opponents. 
The third section of the paper examines in detail the pattern of redistricting from 1959 through 1971, 
and represents an attempt to determine, in key instances, why specific changes were made. The most 
important fact for the purposes of this case is the pattern of growth of the district that contained the 
largest proportion of the "Hispanic core" area from 1950 on, the Third Supervisorial District. 
Instead of taking in more of the areas in which Hispanics lived or were moving into, the Third 
District ballooned into the Anglo suburbs. The repeated rejection of cities in greater East Los 
Angeles by Third District supervisor Ernest E. Debs, often over the vociferous objections of 
colleagues who wanted to unload these areas on him, constitutes a racially discriminatory pattern of 
largely successful attempts to minimize the Hispanic percentage of the population in the most 
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Hispanic county supervisorial district. 
Because they involved the same issues of minority representation, as well as several of the 
major participants in the 1981 redistricting, the 1972 reapportionment of the Los Angeles City 
Council and efforts to expand the number of members on the Board of County Supervisors from 
1935 to the present cast light on the intent of County redistricters. In 1972, then City Councilman
Edmund D. Edelman realigned two City Council districts containing large parts of East Los Angeles 
to create a new Councilmanic district that had a Hispanic population majority. Redistricters in Los 
Angeles knew how to draw districts that would be more reflective of the will of the Hispanic 
community, and they learned, through watching the subsequent battles between incumbent Anglo 
councilman Art Snyder and a series of Hispanic challengers, what the effect of drawing a district 
with certain characteristics was. Because efforts to expand the County Board again and again raised 
the issue of Hispanic representation, it is clear that any politically aware person must have known 
and must still know that such representation is at stake each time the expansion issue is considered. 
To defeat expansion proposals, as voters did twice in the 1960s and 1970s, and as a majority of the 
Board of Supervisors has repeatedly done during the 1980s, is to deny, consciously, one means of 
giving Hispanic voters a better chance to elect candidates of their choice. 
The 1980 elections that overturned the Democratic majority on the Board and ended the 
political career of the only member of a minority group to serve on the Board since 1875 changed 
the character of the participants in the 1981 redistricting and unquestionably altered its outcome. 
Since several of those who had major roles in trying to draw boundaries in 1981 played important 
parts in the 1980 campaigns, and since those campaigns suggest a great deal about the climate of 
racial opinion at the time of the redistricting, it is necessary to review what went on in the 1980 
supervisorial elections. 
Two demographic changes during the 1970s-the mruked increase in the proportion of the 
county's population that was Hispanic and the disproportionate growth of the Hispanic proportion in 
the First and Third Districts-also conditioned the 1981 redistricting. Two Anglo supervisors, 
Edmund Edelman and Peter F. Schabarum, were potentially at risk from the rising Hispanic 
percentages in their districts, even if the lines remained as they were, and particularly if they were 
changed to track Hispanic growth more closely. 
Republicans in 1981 carried out a secret plan for a private reapportionment effort in which a 
redistricting expert, Joseph Shumate, would be paid, out of the Republican supervisors' campaign 
funds, to design and evaluate the political aspects of redistricting plans. The only plans that the 
Boundary Commission, appointed by the supervisors, seriously considered were plans apparently 
drawn by Shumate, partly with the use of data from the Republican-connected Rose Institute at 
Oaremont McKenna College. 
Democrats also had their secret plans for 1981. Edelman's deputy Jeff Seymour 
surreptitiously got the County's Regional Planning and Data Processing Divisions to match precinct 
and census tract data in order to prepare him an extensive report giving the results of a long series of 
elections at the census tract level for Edelman's district. The 335-page computer printout of these 
returns also demonstrates the defensive nature of the Democratic efforts after they lost their majority 
on the Board. Tbe Republican Board members proposed wholesale changes in the district lines. The 
Democrats planned from the beginning to maintain something much closer to the status quo. 
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The personal histories of the five initial appointees to the Boundary Commission, all close 
political confidants of the supervisors, reflects a great deal about their actions, as well as about their 
later explanations of those actions. After a protest by the Hispanic redistricting group Californios for 
Fair Representation, the supervisors expanded the Commission by adding five members of minority 
groups. All the negotiating, however, went on behind the scenes, and was conducted by the five 
Anglo members. The public hearings were a facade, and a plan proposed by the Californios group 
was never seriously considered, either by Democrats or Republicans. 
Republicans on the Boundary Commission failed to divide the representatives of the two 
Democrats on the Board, and failed to get them to accept plans containing a district that had a 
majority of Hispanics in the population. Because no radical plan could command the support of 
four supervisors, the Board began anew and, in a series of private meetings, negotiated minor 
changes that preserved the fissure in the East Los Angeles community. Again, public hearings were 
purely for show, while the important discussions went on behind closed doors. Hispanic activists 
emerged from the process as frustrated and angry as did Republican activists, if not for the same 
reasons. 
The final section of the paper steps back from Garza to consider the development of the 
intent standard in equal protection and voting rights law. Courts discovered connections between 
intent, effects, and racial discrimination long before the 1970s, and doctrinal developments a century 
ago closely parallel more recent ones. Beginning with the three 1880s Chinese laundrymen's cases,6 
the Supreme Court first claimed to reject evidence of intent as improper, then declared such evidence 
admissible, but inadequate,7 and finally, by the 1915 grandfather clause cases8, rested their 
abrogation of that notorious clause principally on inferences about motivation. More recent cases 
from Brown v. Board of Education• through Washington v. Davis10 and Rogers v. Lodgeu
apparently enshrined an intent standard, but were actually decided on the basis of much the same sort 
of evidence as is required under an effect standard. Although several commentators have attacked 
the intent standard as unworkable or too difficult to meet, no one has previously tried to classify the 
types of evidence that are necessary to demonstrate intent, the rationales for each of them, and the 
causal logic behind various proposed intent standards. After doing so, I apply these criteria briefly to 
various hypotheses that might be offered to explain the shape of Los Angeles county supervisorial 
districts. The evidence in the Garza case is complex, but conclusive. The Los Angeles county 
supervisors could preserve their racially exclusive club only by manipulating district lines to keep 
the mushrooming Hispanic community split. 
I. B. Gerrymandering in General 
American politicians have al ways been quick to discover and eager to use electoral rules and 
practices that advantage themselves and disadvantage their opponents. Disfranchisement, 
gerrymandering, and electoral violence, intimidation, bribery, and ballot tampering may not be the 
best of the American tradition, but they have often played large roles in shaping it. 12 To the old saw 
"Anytime you hear a politician speaking of 'the public interest,' you'd better keep your hand on your 
wallet"' should be added another: "Anytime an electoral procedure is changed, you have only to ask 
who did it to know who benefited." Protestations of virtue in reapportionment cannot be taken 
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seriously, and can only have been made with a wink and a nudge. 
Having planned for a private reapportionment effort secretly paid for by the newly elected 
three-man Republican majority on the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, Ron Smith, 
Supervisor Deane Dana's appointee to the Boundary Commission 13 in 1981, averred that his only 
motive in designing a redistricting plan was "to do a noble and good thing ... "14 Likewise, 
Supervisor Michael Antonovich declared that he selected his former campaign aide Allan 
Hoffenblum to the Commission because he "would be able to be fair," and that his only instruction 
to his other Boundary Commission nominee, Dr. Frederic Quevedo was "to be fair."15 The 
Chairman of the Boundary Commission, Blake Sanborn, maintained that the effect of the 
redistricting on the political fortunes of the supervisor who picked him, Peter F. Schabarum, "never 
entered [his] mind at all."16 On the other side of the partisan aisle, Robert Bush, Supervisor Kenneth 
Hahn's appointee to the Commission, denied absolutely that he and Hahn ever discussed the 
"political implication of the configurations of the different plans," for instance, their effects on 
Hahn's reelection chances.17 And Alma Fitch, former chief deputy to Supervisor Edumund D. 
Edelman and his choice for the Commission, claimed that the only instructions she received from her 
boss were to "Do the best job you can. Whatever kind of district I have when this is over I'll be glad 
to run in. " 18 
More forthright is a statement by the chief consultant to the California Assembly's Special 
Committee on Reapportionment in 1981, Professor Bruce E. Cain: " .. . every plan is going to have 
a bias. Every plan is going to have a slant And therefore every plan is going to be a gerrymander in 
some sense. It is going to have an intention to it. It is going to favor some groups and not others."19 
Framing electoral arrangements is always a zero-sum game. For every winner, there is at 
least one loser. If the incumbent supervisors of Los Angeles County have been the likely winners, 
because they have reapportioned themselves, who, over the past several reapportionments, especially 
that of 1981, have been the losers? Since Garza involves the contention that the intended losers 
have been members of minority ethnic groups, Hispanics in particular, it is appropriate to begin this 
paper by considering the process of anti-minority gerrymandering in general and by putting it in 
some historical perspective. It is logically possible that those who have redrawn lines have until 
recently ignored ethnicity, and that since the 1965 passage of the Voting Rights Act, redistricters 
have tried to promote, not impede the interests of minority groups. Has discriminatory 
gerrymandering been so rarely understood, attempted, or accomplished that one's initial impulse 
should be great skepticism toward any such claim? Or, on the contrary, has anti-minority 
redistricting been so universally recognized, widely undertaken, and repeatedly perpetrated that one 
should expect that when it does happen, it was meant to happen? 
I. C. Gerrymandering in Historical Perspective 
There are no better places for someone interested in the gerrymandering of racial and ethnic 
minorities in America to start than Mississippi and South Carolina in the 1870s and 1880s.20 Deep 
South blacks first voted after the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867. The pro-black Radical 
Republicans who controlled these two states, which had the iargesr proportions of 
African-Americans in the country, evidently understood perfectly the tactics of "cracking " (splitting 
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minority groups between districts) and "stacking" (keeping effective minority voting percentages 
below some threshold level). The racist Democrats, who drew the congressional lines in Mississippi 
after 1875 and in South Carolina after 1881, added to these the technique of "packing" 
(concentrating one's opponents in the smallest number of districts). Even without overt statements 
of the intent behind these particular reapportionments, political commentators of the 1870s and 
1880s concluded from their effects alone that they were meant to be discriminatory. Looking at 
them today, it is easy to see why the circumstantial evidence seemed so conclusive. 
Consider figure 1 and parts A-1 and A-2 of table 1.21 From 1867 to 1875, Republicans 
spread black (and, therefore, safely Republican) majorities among three of the four districts, 
apparently hoping to hold the Fourth District with a black/upland white coalition. No county was 
divided, and, nearly a century before Reynolds v. Sims22, there was little variation in the district
populations. In the first reapportionment after the 1870 census, the Republicans proved even
craftier, keeping three strongly black majority districts and adding an at-large seat (The state as a 
whole was 59% black.) Blacks filled all four black majority seats. (See Table 2, Panel A.) In 1875, 
the Republicans overreached themselves, drawing two marginal districts with slight preponderances 
of African-Americans. The two "whitest" districts also contained the most people. Democratic 
violence and chicanery overcame the natural Republican majorities in these two districts. 
(Figure 1 about here.) 
So many counties were split in the post-1881 reapportionment that it is apparently not 
possible to compute racial percentages for all of the districts for the last map in Figure 1.23 However, 
no statistics are really necessary. This gerrymander passes the "inter-ocular traumatic test"-it hits 
you between the eyes. The gem of this malapportionment, the Seventh District, according to the 
New York Times, "contains all the precincts of black voters that could be strung together with the
faintest connection of contiguous territory."24 Not apparent from the map is that this new "boa 
constrictor" district stretched between the homes of two incumbent Republican Congressmen, a 
black who resided in Beaufort county and a white who lived at the other end of the district in Sumter 
county.25 
(Tables 1 and2 about here.) 
Mississippi's experience in the Reconstruction and "Redeemer" eras is also instructive. In 
1868, the risk-accepting Republicans created two safe and three competitive districts, splitting the 
heavily black counties of Bolivar, Sunflower, Coahoma, and Tunica off from their Delta brethren in 
an attempt to bolster what they hoped would be an appreciable highland white Republican vote. 
(See Figure 2). The two most populous districts were also the most heavily black. Apparently to 
maintain white power within the Republican party, in other words, the Republicans "wasted" many 
of their votes by concentrating too many people in two districts. After the 1870 census, the 
Republicans trimmed their majorities, but kept fairly safe cushions, in five districts, while conceding 
the First to white Democrats. Table 2, Panel B, which shows the actual results of the electoral 
process, reflects these redisticting changes perfectly. 
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(Figure 2 about here.) 
Rather than wait for a new census, the Democrats who had perpetrated the violent 
"Revolution of 1875" in Mississippi immediately reapportioned the congressional seats. Known 
throughout the country at the time as the "shoestring district," the new Sixth ran all the way between 
the northern and southern borders of the state, tracking the Mississippi River and drowning the 
state's black population in its course. Two of the six districts were safely white (and therefore 
Democratic), three would require only a limited amount of ballot box stuffing and night riding for 
the Democrats to carry, and the Sixth was overwhelmingly Republican. Freightened by the 
assassinations of at least 200 white and black Republicans in the state in 1875, most blacks seem to 
have given up politics in Mississippi for the next four years.26 
In 1881, the Democrats retied the shoestring, which was represented by black congressman 
John R. Lynch of Adams county, running it east-west, instead of north-south. In the New York 
Times correspondent's summary, "the whole reapportionment scheme, therefore, turned upon the 
problem of beating Lynch, and an examination of the Sixth District will show that the Bourbons 
[Democrats] did the best job that it was possible to do. The only trustworthy Republican counties in 
the whole district are the two that belonged to Mr. Lynch's old district, Adams and Wilkinson." The
others were sparsely populated and largely white.zi Lynch lost. As Table 1 shows, the Democrats 
created one overwhelmingly black Delta district, the Third, one substantially black district, the 
Seventh, and five districts that stacked the African-Americans so skillfully that they ranged only 
from 49.2% to 53.8% black. In such districts, including Lynch's home district, it was simple to alter
a few tallies, throw out a few thousand votes, or announce solemnly that mules or horses had eaten 
selected ballot boxes.28 Fraud worked easily because gerrymandering had reduced the task to 
manageable proportions. 
In these two states, Democratic gerrymanders had turned an 8-3 probable Republican 
margin to 12-1 Democratic. Since voting was well known at the time to be extremely racially 
polarized-a conclusion borne out by extensive statistical analyses29-a partisan gerrymander 
amounted to a racial gerrymander. Similar reapportionments created the "Black Second" in North 
Carolina, the "Black Fourth" in Alabama, and less notorious concentrations elsewhere.30 
Outside the South in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were too few 
distinguishable, geographically concentrated racial or ethnic groups for them to be the subject of 
flagrant gerrymandering, but the same principles were applied to partisan groups. As a political 
scientist phrased the rule of thumb in 1906: "Make your district majorities as small as is safe; make 
your opponents' district majorities as large and as few as possible; throw away as few of your own 
votes and as many of your opponents' as you can. "31 
In sum, the principles of partisan and anti-minority gerrymandering are so universally 
recognized as to create a strong presumption that, when boundary lines have the effect of 
discriminating, they were intended to. 
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I. D. Gerrymandering Hispanics 
That most honestly brash of California politicians, the late Jesse Unruh, who as Assembly 
Speaker presided over the epic post-Reynolds reapportionment of the 1960s, once acknowledged 
that "Reapportionments are designed by incumbents, for incumbents, as a service to incumbents." 
Continuing this candor, he announced in 1971 hearings of the California State Advisory Committee 
of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights that "Quite obviously the Mexican American community 
has been reapportioned more with regard to how it would maximize the Democratic representation 
that [sic] it has to how it would maximize the Mexican American representation."32 According to 
Los Angeles City Councilman Richard Alatorre, who was chairman of the Reapportionment 
Committee of the State Assembly in 1981, Hispanic areas had been divided in congressional, state 
legislative, and Los Angeles City Council apportionments in California before 1981.33 
It is the disproportionately Democratic affiliation of Hispanics in Los Angeles that makes 
them useful in gerrymanders. 34 According to The Rose Institute, 70.4% of the Latino registered 
voters in Los Angeles County in 1988 were Democrats, 20.4% were Republicans, and 9.2% declined 
to state or affiliated with minor parties. 35 Because of this, according to Prof. Richard Santillan, " . .. 
the Democratic leadership during times of redistricting has deliberately distributed Chicano voters 
into as many districts as possible to maximize and take advantage of guaranteed Chicano support for 
non-Chicano Democratic candidates."36 Conversely, as Prof. Alan Heslop, head of The Rose 
Institute and former Executive Director of the California State Republican Central Committee, put it: 
"Republicans seek to concentrate Latinos excessively by bringing them together in a single district to 
waste Democratic votes . . . "37 Or as Assembly minority leader Ross Johnson put it, "If seats are
created in the Hispanic areas that increase the opportunity for Hispanic representation, ... it follows 
as the night the day that in the suburban areas there will be greater opportunities to elect 
Republicans. "38 
That Hispanics are somewhat less segregated from other ethnic groups than 
African-Americans or white Anglos are in California is widely understood by reapportionment 
experts. 39 The Los Angeles City Community Development Department identified Anglo, black, 
"Spanish ", "mixed", and "Asian" housing clusters from 1950 through 1980. On average, Anglo 
clusters were 87.5% Anglo, black clusters were 81.2% black, but "Spanish" clusters were only 
61.2% Hispanic, and Asian clusters were a mere 36% Asian.40 Because of the degree of segregation, 
it is easiest to draw safe Anglo political districts, but Hispanics are clearly not so mixed within the 
Southern California community as to make it very difficult to cluster them politically, or, 
alternatively, to determine where to divide them. 
The greater proportion of non-citizens and children among Hispanics than among Anglos or 
blacks is also a well-recognized factor in reapportionments. The Rose Institute estimates that 38% 
of California Hispanics are less than 18 years old, while another 38% are not U.S. citizens.41 The 
rate of voter registration among California Anglos, they believe, is about 61 %, while for Hispanics 
who are citizens, the rate is only 45%. 42 Although none of the Los Angeles County reapportionment 
experts in 1981 or earlier seems to have used citizenship or Hispanic voter registration estimates 
explicitly,43 aiJ.d a1L11ough supervisors' offices deny t'lat th.ey give a.1y less attention to ti'le problems 
of non-citizens than they do to those of citizens,44 it is universally understood that the proportion of 
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voters to population is lower among Hispanics than among Anglos.45 
Under what conditions, then, can Hispanics be elected to office in contemporary California? 
In Los Angeles county, there were three congressional districts in which the population was more
than 30% of Spanish origin in voter registration in 1982, according to Justice Department figures: 
the 25th (39.6%), the 30th (35.6%), and the 34th (33.4%). The 1980 total populations of the three 
districts were 63.6%, 54.2%, and 47.6% of Spanish origin, respectively. In none of them, then, was
a majority of registered voters Hispanic. Yet Hispanics Edward Roybal, Mathew Martinez, and 
Esteban Torres won election in those three districts, and have continued to win throughout the 1980s. 
In the State Senate, there were two districts above 40% of Spanish origin in voter registration in 
1982: Art Torres's 24th (47.9% Spanish origin) and Joseph Montoya's 26th (40.1 %). In the State
Assembly, Lucille Roybal-Allard's 56th district had a 62.6% Spanish origin proportion of registered 
voters in 1982, Richard Polanco's 55th was 38.0%, and Charles Calderon's 59th was 42.3%. Only 
one Anglo Assemblyperson, Sally Tanner, represents a district, the 60th, that was as high as 30% 
Spanish origin in voter registration (34.2%).46 Only one of these districts has a majority of Hispanic 
voters, but all of them are a third or more Hispanic. Whatever might be the case in nonpartisan 
elections, in partisan contests in substantially Democratic districts, Hispanic politicians who win 
primaries can generally obtain the votes of enough non-Hispanic whites, African-Americans, and 
Asians to win office.47 
New Latino candidates, like non-incumbents of all ethnic groups, are most likely to be 
successful in contests for open seats or in those with substantially redrawn boundaries. From 1904 
to 1962, there were no Chicanos in the lower house of the California legislature. After the decadal 
reapportionment of 1961, two were elected. In 1968, Peter Chacon, whose district has the smallest
Hispanic percentage of any Hispanic member of the California Assembly, upset a Republican who 
was indicted by a grand jury a few days before the election. After the 1971 reapportionment, the
number of Hispanics in the California legislature rose from 2 to 6.48 The 1981 redistricting added 
two more Hispanics to the legislature, as well as two more to the U.S. House of Representatives. 
California's experience in this regard is typical. The number of Hispanics elected to the 
Arizona legislature jumped from 5 to 11 after the 1971 reapportionment. In Colorado, the election
following the 1964 reapportionment sent six more Hispanics to the state legislature. In New Mexico, 
the number of Hispanics in the state senate jumped from 7 to 12 in the aftermath of post-Reynolds v. 
Sims redistricting. In Texas, court--0rdered as well as regular decadal reapportionment helped raise
the number of Hispanics in the state legislature from 6 in 1962 to 20 in 1978.49 
Four simple conclusions in this section of this paper need to be emphasized: 1. Because 
they are slightly less geographically concentrated than most other ethnic groups, at least in Los 
Angeles county, it is easier to discriminate against Hispanics in reapportionment by cracking and 
stacking than by packing them. 2. Because Hispanics are, on average, younger and less likely to be 
citizens than Anglos or African-Americans, the voting population of any district will usually have a 
smaller Hispanic proportion than the total population. 3. Where partisan designations provide cues 
and partisan loyalties encourage habitual voting patterns, Hispanic candidates can win elections in 
contemporary California in districts that are between 30% and 50% Hispanic in voter registration. 50 
4. Non-incumbents fare best in open or newly realigned districts.
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II. STATE AND COUNTY LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
FOR THE REDISTRICTING OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
The size of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors has been five since 1885, when it 
was reduced from seven. 51 Repeated proposals by official and citizens' committees, as well as by 
various members of the Board to increase the number have failed, the most recent being defeated in 
referenda in 1962 and 1976.52 Under current state law, it takes a vote of the people to change the 
number of supervisors on any county board, but there is no state policy constraining the number. 
There are eleven county supervisors in San Francisco.53 
Board members are elected for four-year terms by the voters of each district. The terms are 
staggered, with three members elected in years that are divisible by four, and two members two years 
later. There is a nonpartisan primary election in June. If no candidate gains a majority, there is a 
runoff election between the top two vote-getters in November. 
Any Board of Supervisors in California can reapportion itself at any time within one year 
after a general election.54 Since the 1965 case of Miller v. Board of Supervisors of Santa Clara 
County,55 and perhaps since the U.S. Supreme Court case of Reynolds v. Sims,56 Boards have been 
required to reapportion themselves on a population basis after every decadal census.57 
According to California law, codified in sections 35000-35006 of the Election Code, a 
Board of Supervisors may appoint a Boundary Commission of any size to assist it in reapportioning 
itself, but the Commission proposals are only advisory, not binding. As of 1981, the guidelines in 
section 35000 stated that in reapportioning itself, the Board "may give consideration to the following 
factors: a) topography; b) geography; c) cohesiveness; d) community of interests of the districts."58 
In 1971, the Los Angeles County Supervisors' Boundary Commission adopted for itself
additional guidelines: "a) preserve the historical representation of certain areas closely identified 
with a particular district; b) insofar as possible not divide cities by supervisorial district boundaries; 
and c) insofar as possible not separate cities or communities sharing common interests and problems 
peculiar to a section of the county."59 
The most significant provisions of the election code for reapportionment require four, rather 
than a simple majority of the Board to concur before any reapportionment is legal, and set a deadline 
(September 24 in 1981) for the Board to act. At least, this has been the usual interpretation of the 
ambiguous "two-thirds" language in the 1913 County Charter.60 Before 1963, the four-vote 
requirement does not seem to have been questioned. 61 In 1965, it was believed that only three votes 
were necessary, even though the final plan received four.62 By 1971, the County Counsel's Office 
was unsure whether three or four votes were required, but again, consensus precluded the testing of 
this matter in the courts.63 Finally, in 1981, when it finally really mattered whether a simple or an 
extraordinary majority was needed to accept a final plan, the County Counsel's office casually issued 
only oral advice on the matter. 64 If no plan were adopted before the deadline, the line-drawing 
would be taken out of the Supervisors' hands and delegated to a three-person committee consisting 
of the District Attorney, the County Assessor, and the Sheriff, which would have the power to act, 
before the end of the calendar year, without the approval of the Board.65 Provisions of the election 
code and county charter require supervisors to live within the boundaries of their disuicts and have 
been interpreted to disallow any boundary change that places a supervisor's home in another district 
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than the one from which he was elected. 66 
Naturally, provisions of the U.S. Constitution and the Voting Rights Act also applied to the 
1981 redistricting, although there was no mention of them by the decisionmakers. 
ill. POLITICS AND REDISTRICTING IN THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, 1958-1976 
m. A. The Lack of Minority Representation and the Incumbency Advantage 
Two of the three members of the first governing body of Los Angeles county under United 
States rule, Augustin Olvera and Luis Roubideau, were Califomios. County Judge Olvera, the head 
of the Court of Sessions that ruled the county from 1850 until the formation of the Board of 
Supervisors in 1852, reportedly spoke no English. Although the county was geographically much 
larger than it is today, the population, according to a state census, was only 7,831, or approximately 
1000 times less than in 1990, and only 377 men voted in the county's first election.67 Until 1874, one 
and often two of the five supervisors had Spanish sumames.68 Since 1875, no person with a Spanish 
surname has served on the Board. No blacks, white women, or Asians have ever been elected to the 
Board of Supervisors in Los Angeles county. Yvonne Burke, a black woman, was appointed to the 
Board in 1979, but lost the 1980 election to Deane Dana. 
In the post-World War II era, supervisorial seats have been very secure. Only 18 different
persons have occupied one of the five county seats of power since 1945. The average tenure of those 
18 persons (including the time, if any, before 1945) has been 14 years. (See Table 3.) Most either 
retire voluntarily or die in office. Since 1970, only three incumbents have been defeated for 
reelection. As Table 4 shows, incumbents are rarely seriously challenged. Their margin over their 
chief opponents has averaged a whopping 36%, and they have usually gathered a sufficiently large 
majority (not just plurality) of the vote to avoid November runoffs. In only 4 of 24 primary contests 
since 1970 has an incumbent failed to obtain a majority. Overall, incumbents have averaged a hefty 
65% of the votes. 
(Tables 3 and 4 about here.) 
Open seat contests, on the other hand, often attract well known, well financed competitors, 
and margins of victory correspondingly shrink. Assemblyman James Hayes, who had the 
endorsement of retiring Supervisor Burton Chace in 1972, battled Los Angeles City Councilman 
Marvin Braude in the primary.69 Two years later, three Los Angeles City Councilmen, Ed Edelman,
John Ferraro, and Ernani Bernardi, struggled for the Third District seat of retiring Supervisor Ernest 
Debs. Despite Debs 's endorsement of Ferraro, Edelman won, but his margin was much less than it 
was in any of his subsequent contests.7° 
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III. B. Electoral Politics and Redistricting Politics
There are two major reasons that incumbent supervisors win so overwhelmingly. First, they 
are able to raise so much money that they frighten away most opponents and heavily outspend those 
who do run against them. 
The best funded non-incumbent campaign since 1980, County Assessor Alexander Pope's 
1984 race against Dana, was outspent by nearly three to one.71 Pope lost the primary by a 57% to 
36% margin. In 1987, three years before they were scheduled to run for reelection, incumbents Peter
F.Schabarum and Edmund Edelman between them had on hand campaign funds totalling nearly $1.5 
million. The Republican Schabarum 's political action committee distributed at least $850,000 to 
other candidates and campaigns from 1981 to 1987, including $213,000 to Dana in 1984. Although 
he failed in attempts to interest candidates in running against his longtime enemy, liberal supervisor 
Kenneth Hahn, Schabarum did arouse Hahn's anger sufficiently to lead Hahn to donate about 
$100,000 to opponents of supervisors Schabarum, Dana, and Antonovich. Incumbent supervisors 
collected 91 % of the campaign contributions given to supervisorial candidates from 1981 to 1986. 
Seriously challenged in the primary and runoff in 1988, Antonovich spent $2.8 million in winning 
reelection. As contributors of under $100 have become less important, accounting for only two 
percent of the total contributions in the 1980s, favor-seeking businesses, developers, and lobbyists 
have bought in. The Summa Corporation, which planned to build a marina north of the Los Angeles 
International Airport, contributed $195,000 to various supervisors from 1980 to 1988.72 For all the 
ideological struggle on the Board, contributors seem to be markedly nonpartisan. For example, 
former Edelman aide Jeff Seymour, a longtime Democratic activist who now lobbies the County for 
developers and other people with special interests in County actions, contributes to every supervisor 
and encourages his clients to do likewise.73 
The second means of maintaining their positions has been redistricting. One gauge of how 
much redistricting matters to a supervisor is the fact that after the minor line-changing in 1981, the 
two supervisors whose boundaries were shifted most, Hahn and Edelman, both sent out letters 
blanketing the areas added to their districts. Hahn, who had received 88% of the vote in 1980, 
enclosed a brochure describing the paramedic program in the city of Los Angeles with his effusive 
letter offering his new downtown Los Angeles constituents assistance with any County service. 74 
An Edelman aide encouraged his boss, who had won reelection in 1978 with 74% of the vote, to 
send a similar letter puffing Edelman's "14 point program," as well as his housing, health, and 
anti-gang efforts. 75 
The supervisors have redrawn their boundaries seven times in the past 37 years. Five of 
those seven instances were not immediately after the decadal census, and, as numerous records from 
the County Regional Planning group show, the 1953, 1955, 1959, 1963, and 1965 reapportionments 
were based on County estimates of intercensal population, not on U.S. Census data alone. As table 5 
shows, population growth has been uneven in the county, especially during the 1950s and 60s, but, 
as it also demonstrates, the redistricting often did not adequately respond to uneven populations in 
the districts and in some crucial cases, was obviously not a response to malapportionment at all. 
Apai.;: f:..um U'1e mandates of state ai1d national law, ti'1e redisti ctings have in fact been responses to 
politics. 
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(Table 5 about here.)
One of the most instructive instances is the 1959 reapportionment. In 1958, John Anson
Ford retired from the Third District seat. Four major candidates jumped into the open seat contest: 
Los Angeles city councilmen Harold A. Henry, Ernest E. Debs, and Edward R. Roybal, and Board of 
Education member Paul Burke. Despite a Los Angeles Times endorsement of the conservative 
Republican Henry, Democrats Debs and Roybal proved the top vote-getters in the June primary and 
waged a hot campaign in the November runoff. The more liberal Roybal, a Mexican-American, 
balanced Debs's endorsements by the Los Angeles Times and much of the business and civic 
Establishment with the backing of Ford and of Saul Alinsky-trained Hispanic organizers. On 
election day, many ofRoybal's Hispanic supporters were challenged-he claimed, unjustly and 
irregularly-at the polls. The election was sufficiently close that four recounts were needed to 
determine the winner.76 Those who were active in his campaign still maintain that Roybal was 
counted out. 77 
The year after his hairbreadth victory, Debs privately negotiated a deal with Fourth District 
supervisor Burton Chace, whose seat was up for election in 1960.78 Chace deeded Debs Beverly 
Hills, West Hollywood, and West Los Angeles, which comprised about a seventh of the people in his 
district, as Table 5 shows. Chace, according to an insider newsletter that circulated widely in 
County circles and was distributed to Boundary Commission members in 1962 by the County 
Adminstrative Office, wished to avoid a contest with rich and well--<:onnected Los Angeles City 
Councilwoman Rosalind Wyman. Wyman, a Democrat, would probably not-and did not-oppose 
Democratic Debs, the newsletter explained, though she had been expected to mount a contest against 
Republican Chace. 79 
It is clear enough why Chace wanted to act at all (to avoid a challenge from Wyman), why 
he wanted to move then (because he was up for reelection in 1960), and why he could not make a 
deal with anyone else (only Hahn's and Debs's districts bordered on West Los Angeles, and Hahn 
preferred to run in a working class, ethnically mixed constituency, not Beverly Hills). But why was 
Debs receptive to the deal? Why help a partisan, and, presumably, ideological foe, Chace, against a 
more compatible possible colleague, Wyman, especially since forcing her into Debs's district might 
have led her to run against Debs? Why the timing? Since there was no effective equal population 
requirement in California before 1965, there was no legal pressure to act, and, since the 1960 census 
was but a year off, there were practical reasons for waiting. Why move the district west, instead of 
east? Debs did not attempt to take in any of Frank Bonelli's First District, the largest of the five in 
population, even though the largely working class area to the east of Debs 's district might seem 
natural territory for a Democrat. The obvious problem was that gaining territory from Bonelli would 
have moved Debs farther into the Latino core area, the stronghold of Ed Roybal, the candidate who 
had come so close to beating Debs a few months earlier. Roybal had lost neither his city council seat 
nor his ambition. Before he took in Beverly Hills, West Hollywood, and West Los Angeles, 22.7% 
of the population in Debs's Third District had Spanish surnames. By contrast, the western area that 
he annexed from Chace was but 2.6% Spanish-surnamed, bringing the district's total in 1960 below 
20%.'° Circumstances suggest, in other words, that Debs moved west to ;;whiten;; his district. 
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The enactment of a new law in 1961 that mandated periodic reapportionments and required 
that a "Boundary Commission " be appointed to make recommendations for new lines81 did not 
change the basic mode of operation: The supervisors still negotiated changes among themselves. 
The commissioners were lightning rods to deflect anention and criticism away from the supervisors, 
as the events of 1962--63 demonstrate clearly. 
At a March 1, 1962 meeting, each supervisor appointed a boundary commissioner. 82 Under 
Chairman Emmen M. Sullivan, an experienced Long Beach politician appointed by Fourth District 
Supervisor Burton W. Chace, the Boundary Commission delayed action until after a referendum in 
November on expansion of the board to 7 members. 83 Before the Board voted to put the expansion 
measure on the ballot, an insider newslener reported that if the number of seats remained at five, 
there were plans to move the Third District north into the San Fernando Valley, transfer Compton 
from Chace's Fourth to Hahn's Second District, and shift East Los Angeles from Debs to Hahn.84 
This is yet another indication of Debs' s apparent desire to shed Hispanic East Los Angeles. 85 
After the defeat of the expansion proposal, the Boundary Commission reconvened. Again, 
the Newsletter stated that Debs wanted to move his district into the San Fernando Valley and that 
"Debs will have to give up East Los Angeles and surrounding territory to Hahn."86 Working not 
only with population data, but also with infonnation on voter registration by party, the Boundary 
Commission members acted as agents for their supervisors. 87 As George Marr, a 36--year veteran in 
the county Regional Planning Department who carried out staff work for the supervisorial 
reapportionments during this period, phrased it, each Boundary Commissioner "had their wish list 
and 'don't you dare give me that area' or 'don't you dare take this area away from me' and they 
would sit down and argue. Pardon me.-discuss the information. And then they would go back and 
refer to their appointers [the supervisors] to see if they should change their attitude."88 And as 
Boundary Commission coordinator John Leach commented in a memo to Boundary Commission 
Chairman Sullivan, after the Commission had completed its report, but before that report was made 
public: "The [Boundary] Committee approved everything that the supervisors had agreed to ... 
None of the [Boundary] Committee members will be at the Board meeting on Tuesday. I suggested 
they stay away, so they would not have any questions asked of them ... .I get the definite feeling 
that the Board members feel adjustments will be necessary right after the 1964 elections. "8 9 
While secrecy facilitated horse-trading, it outraged the Los Angeles Times and the League 
of Women Voters.90 The report was "submitted " to the Board April 11, 1963, but only made public 
May 13, when the supervisors, after a full five minutes of discussion, with no attempt to allow 
comments from (other) interested parties, voted four to one to adopt it, with Hahn in dissent.91 The 
Commission had considered switching 154,300 people in Alhambra, San Gabriel, Monterey Parle, 
and South San Gabriel from the First to the Third District, but for unstated reasons left all these 
greater East Los Angeles areas with First District Supervisor Frank Bonelli. 92 The principal 
alterations switched 52,500 people in the San Fernando Valley and 41,300 in Eagle Rock from 
Dom's Fifth to Debs's Third District, 52,000 in Long Beach from Bonelli's First to Chace's Fourth, 
and 117,300 people in Torrance, Culver City, and the Mar Vista area from the Fourth to Hahn's 
Second. 93 The additions further diluted the Hispanic percentage in the Third District's population, 
which had been 19.8% in 1960, by adding territory that was oniy 2. i % Hispanic.94 Even after the
May 13 vote, Bonelli publicly moved to shift Monterey Parle and Alhambra from his bloated First 
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District to Deb's underpopulated Third, as well as much of the east San Gabriel Valley to Dom's 
Fifth, but the Board took no further action before the October 6 legal deadline.95 Again, Debs had 
shunned the offer of more territory in the Hispanic core, moving, instead, north over the mountains 
and into the predominantly Anglo San Fernando Valley areas of Sherman Oaks and Studio City and 
northeast into ethnically similar Eagle Rock. Overall, the changes did not equalize the population 
between areas very much. In fact, Chace, whose district had contained 18.2% of the population 
before the 1963 redistricting, held but 17.2% after it.96 
Because the variation in population between Los Angeles County supervisorial districts was 
greater than allowed by the California Supreme Court decision of Miller v. Santa Clara County.,,,
the supervisors had to redistrict again in 1965.98 A majority of the 1965 Boundary Commission had 
served on that of 1962-63. The Commission considered a proposal by Russell Quisenberry, the 
appointee of Supervisor Warren Dom, to dislodge 90,000 people in Alhambra and San Gabriel, areas 
close to the Hispanic core, from Bonelli's First District and give them to Debs's Third.99 Dom 
himself proposed that the change take place after the 1966 elections, apparently to decrease the 
threat to Debs, who was up for election then.100 Instead, the final report pushed Alhambra and San 
Gabriel into Dom's Fifth District and moved 87,000 San Fernando Valley residents from Dom to 
Debs.101 Dom termed this needlessly complicated two stage shift "ridiculous.102 Why did Debs insist 
on it? According to George Marr, the "general feeling" that Debs's staff conveyed as to why their 
boss desired to move further north, instead of east, was that the (Anglo) voters in the San Fernando 
Valley are "our kind of people."103 The total area shifted to the Third District in 1965 had been 8.3% 
Hispanic in population in 1960.104 
Perhaps seeking to avoid protests against secrecy, which the League of Women Voters had 
repeated in 1965, the Boundary Commission that was set up in 1971, two of whose members were 
veterans of earlier reapportionments, cosmetically opened their hearings to the public.105 Appointed 
April 20, the Commission met three times from June 21 to July 13, adopting a plan that was 
subsequently ratified by the supervisors.106 Whether because they recognized the charade for what it 
was or not, members of the public did not, in fact, bother the county officers by participating. 107 " • •
. Never before," Supervisor Hahn remarked in 198 1 ,  "has anyone come in to object or support" a 
redistricting plan.108 In the words of a newspaper reporter, in 1971, " . . .  redistricting sailed through 
with no hitches."109 
What really happened was that Richard Schoeni of the Executive Office of the Board met 
with the chief deputies of each supervisor several times, in order to determine their bosses ' desires, 
and then drafted three comprehensive plans.110 Schoeni presented these to the Boundary 
Commission formally on July 1 ,  and twelve days later, presumably after more offstage negotiation, 
the Commission agreed on a final plan.111 No one on the Commission drew a plan or even part of 
one.112 As Supervisor Hahn remarked in 1981, speaking of previous reapportionments, "It was all 
done by the Supervisors." 113 
Although neither the Boundary Commission nor the supervisors' offices appear to have been 
presented with explicit racial or ethnic data regarding proposed changes in each district, the results 
of the process continued the trends of the redistricting of the 1960s. Population was further 
equalized by shifting territory from the peripheral First and Fifth Districts to the more central 
Second, Third, and Fourth, but the switches were accomplished in ways that made key incumbents 
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more secure. Chace 's Fourth or "beach cities" district curled around and moved north and inland to 
take in such conservative areas, close to Orange County, as Lakewood and Cerritos from Bonelli' s 
vast First District, as well as the northern part of middle class Torrance from Hahn's south central 
Second. The largest change, involving more than 150,000 people, pushed Debs's Third District 
further into the San Fernando Valley, adding the overwhelmingly Anglo Van Nuys and Panorama 
City sections of the city of Los Angeles.114 
Calculations based on the printed census statistics by tract, which were used in a 
computerized form by the 1971 redistricters, show that the populations of the districts could have 
been equalized more simply, without divisions in any city except Los Angeles, in a manner that 
added to, rather than subtracted from the Latino percentage in the Third District. Instead of twisting 
the Fourth District north at its eastern boundary, it could have been moved directly north at its 
northern boundary, picking up the demographically similar canyon areas from Brown's Canyon west 
to the Ventura County line. Since the First District had more than its requisite one-fifth of the 
population, and the Third had less, Bonelli could have deeded Debs two towns on their border, El 
Monte and Pico Rivera, and could have given up the eastern section of Rosemead, instead of taking 
in the western section, as actually happened. Such a logical, if hypothetical shift from the First to 
the Third District would have given Debs an area that resembled East Los Angeles more and more 
every day, and that was in 1970 40.8% "Spanish language".115 Just these changes and the shift of the 
Palms and Rancho Park areas of Los Angeles from the Third to the Second District (which really 
took place) would have brought all districts within a percent of the 20.0% target. In place of such 
straightforward changes, however, Debs in fact acquired an area that was not 4 1  %, but only 13% 
Latino. East Los Angeles formed, in effect, a semipermiable wall, allowing Hispa.-Ucs, but not the 
boundary of the Third District, to move east. 
In sum, even before 198 1 ,  redistricting was employed to strengthen incumbents, and some 
direct and much indirect evidence indicates that the supervisors kept the Hispanic core area split in 
order to preserve their offices against potential challengers who might particularly appeal to 
Hispanics. In particular, repeated treks of Supervisor Ernest Debs 's Third District in western and 
northern directions, begun almost as soon as Debs barely vanquished the first major Hispanic 
politician in modem California history, Edward Roybal, diluted the Hispanic percentage of the 
population in the Third District markedly. Had the Third District moved east into Alhambra, San 
Gabriel, and similar communities, as was proposed in 1965 and at other times, instead of west into 
Beverly Hills and north into Eagle Rock and the San Fernando Valley, the political and ethnic 
complexion of the district would have been considerably different, and Debs might well faced one or 
more challengers that were not the choice of "our kind of people." 
ill. C. The 1972 Reapportionment of the Los Angeles City Council 
Although the apportionment of other governmental bodies was not directly at issue in Garza, 
that of the Los Angeles City Council in the early 1970s is relevant for three reasons: First, the 
central issue in it was Hispanic representation. Second, it involved then city councilman and later 
cou.."1ty supervisor Ed Edehua."1, as well as mai1y of th.e HisparJc activists who v.·ould subsequently 
participate in the 1981 county reapportionment. Third, its very visible results, well known to 
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everyone who followed Southern California politics during the period, 116 helped to shape both 
assumptions and tactics in 198 1 .  
Before 1971, Los Angeles City Council districts had been apportioned according to the 
number of registered voters. In that year, however, the California Supreme Court ruled in Calderon 
v. City of Los Angeles 117 that apportionment must be based on population, and that it could take
"group interests" into account. As the Council's Charter and Administrative Code Committee, 
headed by Edelman, began to weigh different plans, "Chicanos for Fair Representation" (hereinafter 
CFR), an umbrella group active in the contemporaneous statewide reapportionment, began to interest 
itself in the Council redistricting.118 Actually a coalition of Hispanics and liberal Anglos, CFR asked 
the Council to redistrict without regard to incumbency, to order all the elections for 1973 (instead of 
allowing those elected in 1971 to serve out their four-year terms, as the City Charter provided), and 
to adopt a plan drawn by Clifford Lazar that made District Fourteen 74% Hispanic in population and 
District Four, 43.5%.119 The Los Angeles Times believed that CFR's plan would "probably tum three 
incumbents out of their jobs." 120
The ambitious Edelman, who reportedly aspired to run for mayor if Councilman Tom 
Bradley lost in 1973 to incumbent Sam Yorty, as he had in 1969, was caught in something of a 
dilemma: No plan that inconvenienced too many incumbents could hope to secure the necessary ten 
votes from the Council. On the other hand, Hispanic activists were pressing him to concentrate 
enough Hispanics in a few districts to make it possible to elect Hispanic candidates.121 And to 
become mayor, Edelman would need to attract votes from the increasingly large Hispanic 
population. In this case, however, Edelman's dilemma also provided an opportunity, and he took it 
Another potential mayoral hopeful, Yorty ally Arthur Snyder, held the district with the second 
highest proportion of Hispanics, the Fourteenth. By combining Lincoln Heights, Boyle Heights, and 
El Sereno, which were East Los Angeles Hispanic communities that had been split into four districts 
by previous City Council lines, Edelman could make a bid for Hispanic support while causing 
trouble and perhaps defeat for an enemy. 122
Edelman's statement when he made his plan public echoes ironically in 1990. Next to 
equalizing the population of each district, Edelman announced, the most important goal that he had 
in the 1972 reapportionment was serving "the interests of ethnic minorities." He had increased the 
Hispanic proportion in Snyder's district from 38% to 68%, and added two "Hispanic growth 
districts," one 30% Hispanic in the Echo Park area, and one 23% in the northeast San Fernando 
Valley.123 He had also kept the three districts tben represented by African-Americans Gilbert 
Lindsay, Billy Mills, and Tom Bradley stable. His plan, he declared, "provides an opportunity for 
Mexican-American representation on the Council . . .  It is my belief that the Los Angeles City 
Council faces both a legal and a moral duty to provide fair representation for the Mexican-American 
community. I might point out that above and beyond the legal requirements of the Calderon Case, 
there is a more pressing moral obligation for the City Council to affirmatively act to provide an 
opportunity for just representation for the large and vital Mexican-American community of our 
city."124 
Neither CFR nor Snyder liked Edelman's plan, both of these strange bedfellows attacking 
the scheme publicly on the ground that it did not go far enough toward massing the Hispanic 
population. MALDEF claimed that the Hispanic population proportion in tbe Fourteenth District 
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was actually only 57% and pointed out that Edelman's map still split such Hispanic areas as Echo 
Park, while Snyder asserted that 45% of the Hispanics in the District were under eighteen years old, 
while another 40% were not citizens.125 Although he did not propose a redistricting setup himself, 
Snyder castigated Edelman's divisions for making it a "practical impossibility" to elect a Hispanic 
candidate in any councilmanic district.126 Apparently in a move to placate incumbents, MALDEF 
came up with another plan, this containing three districts that its authors said were 65%, 45%, and 
30% Hispanic, respectively. After listening to 43 Hispanic witnesses endorse this MALDEF 
compromise and disapprove Edelman's efforts, the Council voted 13- 1 ,  and, later, 1 0--2, to accept 
Edelman's lines.m 
Mayor Sam Yorty vetoed the plan on the ground that it was unfair to Hispanics, although 
Edelman charged that Yorty's veto was merely a bid for Hispanic votes in the next year's mayoral 
race.128 In any case, the Council quickly overrode the Mayor's negative, Snyder and Yorty ally John 
S. Gibson dissenting, along with Marvin Braude, who charged that Edelman's plan did not go far 
enough, presumably meaning far enough toward creating winnable Hispanic districts.129 Braude, a 
liberal Westside Democrat, was then engaged in a hot runoff campaign for county supervisor with 
former Assemblyman and Republican conservative James Hayes. The fact that the Beverly Hills Bar 
Association, an Anglo organization, was a conspicuous member of CFR, was probably not lost on 
Braude.130 
MALDEF and several other groups sued in state court, charging unconstitutional dilution. 
On the basis of the relatively undeveloped case law at the time and the fact that the reapportionment 
substantially increased the Hispanic proportion in the Fourteenth and other districts, the state appeals 
court turned down the mandamus petition. 131 (The splitting of districts Thirteen and Fourteen to 
create a new district with a two-thirds Hispanic majority in the population-an increase in the most 
Hispanic district from 40% to 68o/<>-Contrasts sharply with the repeated decreases of the proportion 
of the Third County Supervisorial District in each succeeding reapportionment.132) Although 
severely challenged by Hispanic candidates in repeated recalls and regular elections, Snyder 
survived politically until a series of scandals led him to retire in 1985.133 
Political activists drew two contradictory lessons from Snyder's experience. On the one 
hand, it underlined the fact that a Hispanic population majority was no guarantee of success for 
Hispanic candidates against a "masterful" and hardworking Anglo politician who could raise larger 
campaign funds than any other Los Angeles City Councilman from oil and developer interests.134 
On the other hand, it is not so easy to be an Anglo politician in a minority district Snyder was the 
first Los Angeles City Councilman to be faced with a recall election since 1946. After the 1972 
reapportionment, Snyder learned Spanish and hustled grants for bricks and mortar projects for his 
district. His chief opponents were Hispanics who charged that he did not represent their community 
adequately. And his reelection victories were often by very tight margins. In 1984, for instance, he 
won only in a recount.135 As a prelude to the 1981 Board of Supervisors' reapportionment, the case 
of the Fourteenth District has a third implication. The council, led by Edelman, knew how to draw 
seats that would provide Hispanics with better chances to elect candidates of their choice, they knew 
that doing so conflicted with the protection of Anglo incumbents, and when a sufficient majority 
could agree that one colleague was dispensible, redistricting politics could work in favor of 
previously excluded ethnic groups.136 
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III. D. Efforts to Expand the Board of Supervisors 
In 1852, when the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors was first established, each of 
its five members represented 1566 people. B y  1986, according to a U.S. Census estimate, Los 
Angeles county had a population of 8,295,900 people-far and away the largest county in the 
nation-but the number of supervisors had not changed. Each of the five represented about 1 .659 
million people. Its population growth between 1980 and 1986 alone-818,700---was more than 100 
times its total population when the number of supervisors was first fixed at five. In population, each 
supervisorial district was larger than the populations of fifteen states, or of three average 
congressional districts. If a candidate campaigned door to door talking to each constituent for ten 
minutes, it would take him or her over fifty years. With officials from 85 cities competing for media 
attention, supervisors are probably the least well known truly powerful civilian officials in the 
country. In land area, Los Angeles county is near! y four times as large as the state of Rhode Island 
and more than twice as large as the state of Delaware.137 
The population per elected official is much larger in the Los Angeles County government 
than in any other county government in the nation, and the county has by far the largest population 
per district of any county that selects its officials from single-member districts. Cook county, 
lliinois, the nation's second largest county, for example, elects 15 commissioners from single­
member districts. Each represented 353, l 93 persons in 1986, or about a fifth as many as in Los 
Angeles county. The 35 councilpersons from the five boroughs that make up New York City 
represented slightly over 200,000 persons each in 1989. San Diego County's five supervisors 
represented 440,260 persons each, while Orange County's represented 433,360, and Santa Clara's, 
280,320. 'fire comity closest to Los Angeles h1 district size-is!iarfi-s-County, Texas (Houston), whose 
five county commissioners represented an average of 559,660 persons.138 
Not only does such vast size put minority candidates at a disadvantage, because they usually 
have less ability to raise the vast amounts of money that are necessary to run in such districts, but it 
also stimulates moves by citizens' groups that are concerned about adequate representation to 
propose adding to the Board's numbers. Yet expansion has not been just a "good government" issue, 
calls for closer representation on one side matched by fears that more county employees would mean 
more taxes, on the other. For at least a half century in Los Angeles, arguments over increasing the 
number of supervisors have involved the representation of minority groups. 
In its 1935 report to the Board of Supervisors, the Committee on Governmental 
Simplification recommended an expansion of the Board to 15 members, which was large enough, the 
committee stated, "to be representative of different groups and sections . . .  "139 
As the minority population in the county began to grow. supervisors asked for and received 
precise estimates of minority proportions. As early as 1953, for example, an internal county report 
focused on ethnic percentages in each supervisorial district, determining that Hahn's Second District 
contained 64.6% of the county's African-American population.140 In 1962, staff from the Regional 
Planning Commission tabulated the number and percentage of blacks in the Second and a portion of 
the Fourth Districts, apparently in response to a request from Hahn's office.141 
A Charter Study Committee Report of 1958 recommended expa..11.ding th.e Board to eleven 
members in order to provide more opportunity for people to have direct contact with their 
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supervisors.142 Although Warren Dorn and Ernest Debs voted to put a proposal for a seven-person 
Board on the ballot, they could not obtain a third vote from another supervisor.143 Another Charter 
Study Committee Report in 1962, after much controversy over moves for a 15 - 1 1 - or 9-member 
Board, finally supported a 7-member body. This time obtaining votes from the necessary three 
supervisors, the charter amendment providing for expansion failed in a referendum.144 Debs favored 
the expansion, a Los Angeles Times reporter speculated, because he was "hoping to withdraw from 
the East Los Angeles area into the remaining downtown, Hollywood, Beverly Hills, and West Los 
Angeles portions of his district."145 Among the reasons that supervisors gave for opposing expansion 
in 1962, the most revealing came in a statement at a Board meeting by Burton Chace, who fought 
against the change: "I can see it coming, and I can see many, many groups that are in certain areas 
that are going to request that they have representation on the Board of Supervisors, new Districts 
here and there which will be carved out of other Districts/or certain minority groups, et cetera."146 
Chace was prophetic. Although the 1958 and 1962 Charter Study Commissions had had but 
one member with an identifiable Spanish surname, by 1969, Hispanic leaders were speaking for 
themselves on the expansion issue. First, they pressured the Los Angeles City Council to increase its 
membership from 15 to 17 in order, in a reporter's summary, "to make possible the election of a 
Mexican-American."147 Led by Esteban Torres, then president of the Congress of 
Mexican-American Unity and now a Congressman, Michael Tirado, a special assistant to 
Congressman Edward R. Roybal, and Miguel Garcia, then of the California Chicano Law Students 
Association and in 1981 state president of Californios for Fair Representation, Hispanic wimesses 
strongly backed Councilman Tom Bradley's plea to give Hispanics a "fighting chance" to elect those 
"who can best articulate" their needs.148 Losing by a 7--0 council vote on July 27, after Councilman 
Ernani Bernardi voiced his opposition to what he called "legalized mandatory gerrymandering," the 
Council reversed itself three days later, 9--0.149 Voters subsequently defeated the proposal, leading to 
a further 15-year struggle that finally eventuated in the election of the Council's first Hispanic since 
Roybal, Richard Alatorre, in 1985. 
Between the defeat and the victory in the Los Angeles City Council, Torres appeared before 
the County Board of Supervisors in a parallel effort to get them to back a similar expansion 
measure.150 Tonres had been one of eleven Hispanic witnesses who appeared before the Los Angeles 
County Citizens Economy and Efficiency Committee during its hearings in 1969-70, where he 
charged that the all-Anglo Board did not understand "the basic needs and aspirations of the 
Mexican-American community." District lines, Tonres and his fellows asserted, had been 
gerrymandered to dilute the power of the Latino voters.151 This testimony notwithstanding, the 
Committee voted 14-5 not to recommend an expansion to seven seats, and the Board voted 3-2 not 
to put a 7-member proposal on the ballot.152 The minority of five on the Economy and Efficiency 
Committee favored expansion, and even opponents recognized that the chief aim of increasing the 
size of the Board was "to give representation to the minorities."153 
Again in 1974, the Economy and Efficiency Committee debated but could not agree on 
proposals for a seven-member Board and a County chief executive, but this time the deadlock 
apparently led the County Bar Association to appoint a Public Commission on Los Angeles County 
Government. Headed by Seth Hufstedler, a leading downtown lawyer, and Harold Williams, dean of 
the UCLA School of Management, the 12-member blue ribbon commission, unlike the Economy 
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and Efficiency Committee, included female, black, and Latino members. Its 1976 report, "To Serve 
Seven Million," pointedly remarked that "The narrow band of citizens from which all Supervisors 
have been drawn is a proper cause of grave concern. Every successful candidate in the history of the 
County [since 1875] has been a white male, as has every Sheriff, every Assessor and every District 
Attorney."154 From 1958 to 1972, the report emphasized, there was no turnover at all in the 
membership of the Board of Supervisors, and three of the four who were replaced between 1972 and 
1974 had either died or resigned. "Each district is so large and diverse that the cost of a serious 
challenge to the incumbent can be prohibitive." "The scale of these districts has too often led to 
under representation, particularly in the case of racial and ethnic minorities." To get this "static" 
government moving and to give citizens a feeling that they were represented, as well as to give 
minorities and women better chances to break the Anglo male monopoly of offices, the Commission 
proposed an increase to nine members. 155 
The ethnic representation issue, along with opponents' charges that expansion would lead to 
an increase in taxes, was central to the subsequent referendum. The first reason that the Los Angeles 
Times gave for endorsing Proposition B, the nine-member move, was that it raised "the probability 
that [the Board] would become more representative of ethnic districts-and it could also result in the 
election of the first woman supervisor in history. "156 The Charter Amendment Task Force noted that 
Proposition B would "increase the ability of the two principal minorities-the black and the Latin 
Americans-to elect representatives of their own race."157 As the November vote approached, the 
Los Angeles Times, advertisements, and ballot arguments for Proposition B downplayed the ethnic 
representation issue, presumably because proponents recognized the unpopularity of such 
representation with the Anglos who comprised an overwhelming majority of the electorate.158 
Although many leading Democrats and such groups as the AFL--CIO, the League of Women Voters, 
and the Chamber of Commerce endorsed Proposition B, the only major Republican to do so was 
Sheriff Peter Pitchess. Supervisors James A. Hayes, Peter F. Schabarum, and Baxter Ward publicly 
denounced proposition B, which subsequently lost by a 65-35 margin.159 
ill. E. The 1980 Elections: Race, Money, and the Conservative Upsets 
As the 1980 elections approached, Democrats held a 4-1 majority on the Los Angeles 
County Board of Supervisors. New Deal liberal Kenneth Hahn, first elected in 1952, had been 
joined by former newscaster and maverick Democrat Baxter Ward, who had upset Warren M. Dom 
in the Fifth District in 1972, and by westside Los Angeles City Councilman Edmund Edelman, who 
had succeeded Ernest Debs in 1974. When Republican James Hayes unexpectedly resigned in 1979, 
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. appointed Yvonne B. Burke to be the first black and the first 
woman member in Board history. Elected to the state Assembly in 1967 and to Congress in 1972, 
both from majority nonblack districts, Burke had gained national attention as Vice-Chairperson of 
the 1972 Democratic National Convention and statewide exposure as the Democratic nominee in an 
open race for state Attorney-General against George Deukmejian in 1978.160 Up to the point that the 
Deukmejian campaign began running television commercials with ethnic overtones attacking 
Burke's views on busing ai1d U.1Je deati.  penalty, Bufi(e's polls, she latei remembered, showed her 
nine percentage points ahead. She lost by three percent of the vote.161 
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Even though the Fourth District was two-thirds Anglo and less than ten percent black, 6 1 .9% 
of those who registered with one of the two major parties were Democrats, and Jerry Brown had 
carried the district in the 1978 Governor's race by a 59-4 1 margin.162 Intelligent, photogenic, 
diligent, and very accustomed to interacting with overwhelmingly white groups, Burke began a 
fturry of activity immediately after her appointment-meeting with local officials who had often felt 
neglected by the distant Hayes, focusing on noncontroversial community projects, such as cleaning 
up the beaches and fighting petty crime, and conciliating developers who feared that she would be 
ideologically opposed to any growth. Born and raised in South Central Los Angeles, but by 1978 a 
resident of stylish Brentwood, Burke self-consciously presented herself as an "ethnic crossover" 
politician,--a role that easily attracted plentiful positive media coverage.163 By January, 1 980, all of 
Burke's well-known Republican potential opponents-State Senator Bob Beverly, whose district 
covered a third of the Fourth District, fonner State Controller Houston Flournoy, Assemblyman Paul 
Priolo, Assemblywoman Marylyn Ryan, State Senator Ollie Speraw, ex-County Assessor Philip 
Watson, fonner Congressman Alphonzo Bell, and Long Beach Mayor Tom Clark-had decided to 
pass up the race.164 Burke's name was known to 90% of a sample in the district, those sampled were 
much more likely to view her favorably than unfavorably, and she led Bell and Flournoy by 1 6  
percentage points in a private poll run by Republican political consultant Allan Hoffenblum and 
probably paid for by Schabarum.165 Another consideration that eliminated her strongest undeclared 
opponent, Beverly, was how to deal with the matter of her race. "There are those who want to beat 
Yvonne who are racists or close to it," Beverly told the Los Angeles Times. "That's one thing that 
bothers me. What do you do with their support? I don't know how you handle that."166 
Deane Dana, a plainspoken, undemonstrative middle-level telephone company executive, 
who had never before run for public office167 and his campaign manager Ron Smith, a Republican 
political consultant who boasted of his tough campaign tactics, 168 were not as reticent as Beverly. 
One of ten comparative unknowns facing Burke-it was just the type of contest pollster Hoffenblum 
had worried in January that Burke would carry by a majority in the primary169-Dana had to adopt 
aggressive tactics to differentiate himself from the pack of conservative Republicim white male 
candidates and to hope to force Burke into a two-person November runoff. 
The Board's single Republican, Schabarum, backed a former lobbyist for apartment house 
owners, Mike O'Donnell, whose attempt to tie Burke to white liberals Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda 
apparently fell ftat. Nor did an O 'Donnell tabloid distributed just before the primary that contained 
critical statements about Burke by local officials help his campaign, for several of the officials 
quickly disavowed the statements attributed to them. O'Donnell finished with 7.9% of the vote. By 
contrast, Dana capitalized on an endorsement by Deukmejian, whose home was in Long Beach, to 
edge into the runoff with 2 1 %  of the vote to Burke's 42%.170 
Behind by twelve points in August and ten in September, facing an incumbent who had 
represented areas of the district for thirteen years and who had raised more than twice as much 
money as all her opponents combined in the primary, Dana and Smith resorted to the most openly 
racist campaign in the recent history of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.171 Initially, 
Smith later admitted, he had not planned to emphasize busing, which he chastely characterized as 
. .. • • • - •• •• 1'1? • -• - • • • • • • � • • • • • - - •  • - •  - • nor · a rac1ai issue at w:· · · - Apparenuy, tsurKe·s 1eaa cnangea :sm1m·s mma. tven mougn me tsoara 
had no inftuence whatsoever over pupil placement policies in the public schools, Smith/Dana's 
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billboards proclaimed that "Yvonne Burke Lied on Busing," their television and radio 
advertisements echoed the theme, and a slick Time Magazine-like brochure reiterated charges of 
Burke's alleged endorsement of "forced busing" three times in seven pages.173 Burke edged away 
from earlier votes to allow busing for integration purposes in some circumstances and generally 
attempted to downplay the issue of race.174 To counter the "soft on crime" image created by her race 
and her anti-death penalty stance, which Deukmejian had exploited effectively in the 1978 election 
for Attorney General, Burke trumpeted her endorsement by Republican Los Angeles sheriff Peter 
Pitchess, then embroiled in a bitter personal feud with Schabarum.175 Burke's last leaked poll 
showed her ahead by four points, with eighteen percent undecided, while Dana's called the contest a 
dead heat. 176
Undoubtedly realizing that partisan and ideological control of the Board hung in the balance, 
conservative Republican leader Schabarum provided Dana with a last-minute infusion of $100,000 
that sent a two-page mailer, designed by Smith, into culturally conservative white areas of the 
district.177 For a serious challenger to display a photograph of his opponent prominently in his own 
campaign literature, especially if he is not glamourous and the incumbent is a former model, would 
seem a foolish campaign tactic under most circumstances. But below a generously shaded picture of 
Burke, the flier emphasized not only the contrast between Dana's opposition to "forced busing of 
school children" and Burke's purported support of it, but also invoked the classic American racist 
image, accusing Burke of opposing "mandatory prison for rape" .178 Despite denunciations of such 
tactics as "racist" by prominent white male politicians, the Smith/Dana tactics succeeded, as the 
Burke lead faded in the last weekend, and Dana won by 53% to 47%.179 
The contest between incumbent Baxter Ward and challenger Mike Antonovich attracted less 
media attention than that between Burke and Dana. A fiscal conservative, Ward had sometimes 
voted with Schabarum and Hayes to keep expenditures down, but when health and welfare benefits 
for the poor were at issue, he was much more generous than the Board's Republicans were. Blunt 
and outspoken, Ward refused to take money from developers and was willing to look Schabarum in 
the eye, detail the campaign contributions that Schabarum had received from someone with a matter 
currently up for a vote, and ask Schabarum to recuse himself. In the primary, the widely known 
former television newsman had refused to take any contributions over $50 or to hire a professional 
campaign manager.180 Antonovich, a personable, very right-wing Assemblyman who had run 
unsuccessfully for the Republican nomination for Lieutenant Governor in 1978, raised several 
hundred thousand dollars, much of it from north county developers, with a small, symbolic 
contribution directly from Schabarum.181 After a ferocious campaign in which, Ward felt, 
Antonovich purposely distorted Ward's record, Antonovich won by a 55-45 margin.182 Last minute 
advertisements and targeted mail overcame a reported five percent Ward lead.183 
In an invisible campaign in the Second District in 1980, Kenneth Hahn buried the second­
place finisher by 88%-9%. 
But the new Schabarum-led majority could not have felt very secure. Schabarum, after all, 
had avoided a runoff in 1978 by a mere 6% against the minor opposition of Covina mayor Elaine 
Donaldson, an underfinanced conservative Republican, and two nominal candidates. 184 A private 
poll in 1982 showed tl1at only a Urlrd of Schabarum ·s constituents had heard of him and had a
favorable opinion of him.185 Antonovich had ousted Ward by less than landslide proportions, while 
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Dana and Smith might find it even more difficult to overcome a white male opponent. No doubt, 
Antonovich and Dana could expect increasing funds to flow into their coffers after 1981 ,  and 
Schabarum had money to spare, but their districts were hardly "ideal" for them, affording "no way to 
strengthen the Board Majority" through redistricting, as Smith later averred.186 As Table 2, above, 
shows, the 1978 and 1980 majorities of Schabarum, Antonovich, and Dana were among the lowest in 
the Board elections since 1970. 
III. F. Demographic Change in Los Angeles County, 1970-80
Two demographic patterns helped to shape the redistricting process in 198 1 .  Most important 
was the fact that population growth in Los Angeles county during the 1970s was remarkably evenly 
spread across supervisorial districts. Table 5 shows that the largest district, the Third, was only 1 . 1  % 
over the 20% equality level in 1980, while no district contained less than 19% of the people. To 
express the same figures in another way, the difference between the percentages in the largest and 
smallest districts was about 10% of the population of a single supervisorial district. As County 
Regional Planner George Marr noted in a 1978 memo and a later deposition, "if all you were doing 
was equalizing the population," there was no need to make "massive changes in the boundaries."187 
The ethnic mix within the county and within each district, however, was far from stable. 
Spanish-surnamed individuals became the largest minority ethnic group in Los Angeles county in 
1960. During the decade of the 1950s, the number of people in the county with Spanish surnames 
doubled, and by 1960, the census counted 576,7 16 of them, which amounted to 9.6% of the 
population.188 In 1970, 15% of Los Angeles county's people considered themselves Mexican-
Americans, and another three percent, non- Mexican Latino.189 From 1970 to 1980, there was a 68% 
increase in the county's Hispanic population, a 21 % increase in its African-American population, 
and a 20.9% decline in the county's non-Hispanic white population.190 B y  1980, 27.6% of the 
county's population was Latino, and Health Department and County Regional Planning Group 
estimated that from 30.4% to 3 1 .7% of the population was Hispanic in 1985.191 By 1995, 
demographers projected, Hispanics would surpass Anglos as the largest ethnic group in the 
county.192 
Just as politically relevant as the overall increase was the uneven distribution of each ethnic 
group. Table 6 demonstrates that Hispanics were clustered in Supervisorial Districts One and Three 
(Schabarum's and Edelman's, respectively), while blacks by 1980 constituted a substantial plurality 
of Kenneth Hahn's Second District. By 1985, the Health Department estimate was that non­
Hispanic whites composed less than fifty percent of the population not only in the Second and Third 
Districts, but in the First District, as well. In fact, as Table 7 points out, the largest increase in the 
Hispanic population during the 1970s-a trend that demographers expected to continue through the 
1980s-came in the First District. Even if supervisorial district lines were shifted only marginally in 
198 1 ,  the emerging non-Anglo majorities, especially in Districts One and Three, must have given 
such cautious politicians as Schabarum and Edelman some pause. 
(Tables 6 and 7 about here.)
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IV. REDISTRICTING THE LOS ANGLES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS IN 1981
IV. A. Overview 
The final outcome of the 1981 reapportionment was determined by the necessity of obtaining 
at least four votes from the five supervisors, 193 the unwillingness of politicians to tum their electoral 
futures over to people over whom they have no control, 194 the resolve of the two Democrats, Kenneth 
Hahn and Edmund Edelman, to stick together no matter what,195 and their stubbomess in the face of 
the onslaught of their partisan/ideological foes and pressures from their usual allies in the Hispanic 
community.196 In retrospect, an incumbent gerrymander that shifted district lines as little as was 
necessary to satisfy population equality between districts seems to have been inevitable. 
At the beginning of 1981, however, different results seemed possible to two groups. To Pete 
Schabarum and his proteges who formed the new Board majority, and especially to two brash, 
aggressive Republican political consultants, Ron Smith and Allan Hoffenblum, 197 it seemed likely 
that the Republicans could solidify their tenuous hold on the suburban Board seats198 while creating 
problems for their partisan enemies199 and building goodwill with Hispanics.200 To Latino activists, 
the rapid but uneven growth of the Hispanic population entitled it to ethnic representation or at least 
more influence,201 and they were able and willing to combine both insider and outsider tactics to 
further Hispanic political power. Anglo Republicans, counting on a de facto alliance of convenience 
with Hispanics to help them overcome Democratic majorities in the state legislature and to coerce 
Hahn and Edelman into acquiescing in changes that doomed them to permanent powerlessness, 
facilitated the organization of the Hispanic activists and gave them free but limited access to the 
computerized redistricting operation at The Rose Institute.202 In the end, however, the curious 
combination never really came together, incremental changes in boundary lines preserved the 
supervisorial fault line in East Los Angeles and did nothing further to shore up shaky Republican 
control, and both the Hispanic and Republican activists went away discouraged and angry at each 
other, as well as at the Democrats. 203
IV. B. The Republicans' Secret Plan and The Rose Institute 
A February, 1981 "lettergram" sent to Schabarum and Antonovich under Dana's imprimatur, 
but probably written by Ron Smith, 204 proposed the establishment of a "non-public reapportionment 
committee" composed of representatives of the three Republicans. Since "the power in 
reapportionment is information," the memo proposed either using the resources of The Rose 
Institute, a non-profit group at Claremont McKenna College headed by Alan Heslop, former 
executive director of the California State Republican Central Committee and still a very active 
campaign consultant to Republican candidates,205 or purchasing Rose data and buying data 
processing services elsewhere. Rose had proposed to make available to the public Boundary 
Commission population, ethnic, and political data for $23,950, but the memo writer believed that 
even more political data would be necessary. Using Rose would save money, but it would mean that 
the extensive political data would have to be shared with representatives of Hahn and Edelman, who, 
the writer smirked, "would try to stop our attempts for a fair reapportionment". If the public 
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Boundary Commission did not make use of Rose, the Democrats would have to rely strictly on non­
political data, which was appropriate because "after all, their [the Boundary Commission's]
decisions really should not be made on a political basis." This and the additional secrecy it afforded 
tilted him toward an operation that had no connection with Rose, even though it might cost $47,000. 
In either case, he proposed hiring as an expert Joseph Shumate, Smith's partner in the political 
consulting firm, who, he noted, "was instrumental in the Republican [state] reapportionment of 1970, 
1971, and 1972."206
Disregarding the fear that employment of Rose would raise suspicions of Republican 
partisanship,207 the Republican supervisors bought Shumate's advice for $18,000,208 and charged 
data collection and processing costs to the County. Rose, which had collected extensive census and 
political data and designed a frilly reapportionment software package called REDIS under an 
$800,000-$1 ,000,000 grant from the California Business Roundtable, 209 eventually set a price of 
$30,000 for the County's use of it. 210 The data they proposed to deliver included statistics on "voter 
turnout and ethnic participation in the political process" and a special allocation of $1,500 for 
unspecified "ethnic Hispanic data"-an indication of how transfixed by ethnicity everyone involved 
in the 1981 process was from the beginning. Charging $10,000 as "user fee" for the REDIS system, 
which had already been paid for by the Roundtable grant, and $3,000 for training in the use of 
REDIS-instruction, that, according to Rose's chief technician, Robert Walters, took only 1-2 
hours211-the contract, let to Rose over the objections of County staft'l12 and with no competitive 
bidding, 213 was no bargain for the financially strapped local government. 214 In fact, it is doubtful that 
anyone with an official position in the County reapportionment effort used Rose at all. According to 
their testimony, no Boundary Commissioner, Supervisor, supervisorial deputy, or County employee 
------aidre ugh-anintenrin-Schabarwn's office�Mnre-tfaines, illc 
apparently use Rose facilities to plot a map that lumped minorities into the Hahn and Edelman 
districts, but drew no precise boundaries between the Democratic seats.215• Shumate, a private 
employee of the Republicans who had no independent contract with Rose, did use data from Rose, 
but, as he remembers it, he only drew one plan, and that mostly by hand calculations from paper 
copies of computer printout.216 All of Rose's bells and whistles, then, allowed one intern to sketch 
out a rough partisan plan that clustered minorities helter-skelter into the Democratic districts and that 
never seems to have been considered at all seriously by anyone. 
IV. C. The Democrats' Secret Plan and the County Bureaucracy 
It is instructive to conjecture how the Democrats would have handled the 1981 County 
reapportionment if Ward and Burke, instead of Antonovich and Dana, had been successful in 1980. 
Hahn and Edelman, recently relected with 88% and 74% of the vote, respectively,217 could have 
easily afforded changes in their districts. Had Ward been reelected after having been outspent by 
better than ten to one by a vigorous, seasoned campaigner, 218 he would have seemed quite 
formidable to other potential challengers. Burke's district being adjacent to Hahn's, she, probably 
the weakest of the Democrats, could have swapped him some working class whites near Orange 
County for some of his South Central blacks.219 AssumLng that Hisparilc pressure on tlie Board 
would have been as well organized and vociferous as it was in the actual circumstances in 1981, the 
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Democrats would probably have responded as Edelman and his fellow Democrats on the Los 
Angeles City Council did in 1972: they would have cut up Schabarum's district, as they had abrasive 
conservative Republican Art Snyder's in 1972, and given him a substantial Hispanic population 
majority. After all, Hahn disliked Schabarum intensely, both for his politics and for the fact that 
Schabarum had thwarted Hahn's ambition to succeed in the normal rotation to the chairmanship of 
the Board of Supervisors. 220 Burke would no doubt have sought revenge for Schabarum 's major role 
in recruiting and financing her opponents. And Ward detested Schabarum, whom he thought a 
creature of special interests.221 Furthermore, by uniting the Hispanic core in one district, the 
Democrats could have appeared responsive to one of their key constituencies, and they might have 
kept Republican activists so busy trying to save Schabarum that they would have left the Democrats 
on the Board alone at election time for awhile. 
Since they faced a 3-2 Republican majority, instead, the Democrats adopted a strictly 
defensive posture and, from the beginning, sought a redistricting as close to the status quo as 
possible.222 As Hahn's longtime deputy, Mas Fukai, remarked later, Hahn's preference in 1981 was 
for "just keeping everything he had and keeping it the same . . . he liked the district as it was. "223 
Hahn's Boundary Commissioner Robert Bush told a reporter after the first meeting of the 
Commission that "I don't think that we will be changing all those boundaries very much."224 
The Democrats were just as "political" and secretive in their efforts to maintain the status 
quo as the Republicans were in theirs to change it radically. Each supervisor in 1981 designated one 
aide as a reapportionment liason.225 Schabarum and Antonovich named their chief deputies, Mike 
Lewis and Kathleen Crow, respectively, and Dana picked his former campaign manager, Ron Smith, 
who had very temporarily been placed on the County payroll. 226 Hahn selected Fukai, while 
Edelman chose Jeff Seymour.227 A member of Edelman's City Council staff from 1972 to 1974, and 
his supervisorial staff from 1974 on, Seymour was intensely partisan, having been president of 
Young Democratic clubs in high school and at two colleges, and a member of the county and state 
Democratic central committees. Edelman's former chief deputy, Alma Fitch, who wo!Xed with 
Seymour for nearly a decade, ranked him as one of the most "political" persons in Edelman's office, 
giving him "an eight or nine" for that trait on a scale of one to ten.228 As Edelman's chief liason to 
the Jewish community, Seymour boasted of close personal connections to the Westside "machine" of 
Howard and Michael Berman and Henry Waxman.229 
On May 1 1 ,  two and a half months after the "private reapportionment" memo circulated 
among the Republicans, Seymour sent Edelman a parallel lettergram setting out. at least in part, their 
aims in reapportionment. "I will be preparing a political analysis of the district to show your 
strongest areas," Seymour told the supervisor. 230 In particular, Seymour asked Edgar Hayes, director 
of the County's Data Processing Department, and Leonard Panish, County Registrar-Recorder, to 
arrange for County staffers to merge population and electoral data for the Third Supervisorial 
District in order to determine how the people in each census tract voted in the presidential, 
congressional, and gubernatorial contests from 1976 to 1980, the Bu!Xe-Deukemejian Attomey­
General 's race, Proposition 13 and the 1980 Gann state tax limitation initiative, the 1973 Bradley­
Yorty mayoral election, and a few others, apparently later including Edelman's own 1978 
supervisorial race, in which he had two Hispanic opponents.231 In addition, Seymour wanted the 
voter registration by party in each tract.232 After a meeting on June 9, attended by County staff 
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members from the offices of Hayes and Panish as well as the engineering department, computer 
programmers Donald Gilbert233 and Peter Fonda-Bonardi234 matched electoral and census units and 
spewed out paper copies giving Seymour what he asked for.235 Fonda-Bonardi was directed by his 
superiors not to discuss the work he was doing with voting returns. "There was an atmosphere of 
'keep it quiet' . . .  My impression was that only one supervisor [Edelman, through Seymour] had 
asked us for this data, and he didn't want the other supervisors to have these services. "236 
Since the costs of data collection, programming, and computing time were absorbed into 
County expenses, Seymour's hush-hush political redistricting effort cost Edelman even less-­
nothing-than the Republicans' effort cost them. Seymour's operation was also entirely negative 
and defensive in nature. To draw lines that differed much from the status quo, one would need 
statistics on all the districts, but Seymour asked only for data on the Third. Even to make large 
changes in the Third, a 335-page printed copy by census tract, not aggregated into cities or 
recognized communities, was very unwieldy.237 Because Rose's software allowed someone to redraw 
lines and quickly reaggregate population, ethnic, and political totals, it was tailor-made for 
aggressive, radical Blitzkreigs. By contrast, Seymour's handiwork was a Maginot line. 
IV. D. The Boundary Commission and the County Staff
Supervisor Deane Dana's March 17, 1981 motion for the Board to appoint a Boundary 
Commission set out as one of the Commission's goals to "ensure that ethnic minorities are equitably 
represented."238 A colloquy in that day's Board meeting, however, sliced through the affirmative 
action rhetoric to get to the incumbent-protecting reality. After Supervisor Edelman mused that 
--------
"Ce rt aml y this [the appomtment of the Comm1ss10n] wilITal(e some of the heat ofrthe Board of 
Supervisors in doing the reapportionment", Supervisor Hahn shot back: "No, it won't. How do you 
say that, Mr. Edelman? The heat will all be here. We'll just appoint our people and we'll tell them 
what to do. And they'll say, 'Cut this person out and put this city in. ' . . .  That's the way it 
workso"239 
The Commission's chairman, Blake Sanborn, an insurance broker, former city councilman 
in and mayor of suburban Whittier, Republican activist and Supervisor Schabarum 's representative, 
does not appear to have played much of a role on the Commission and in 1989 recalled almost 
nothing about the 1981 redistricting. 240 Hahn's choice, Robert Bush, a former newsman who had 
been a senior deputy in Hahn's office from 1969 to October, 1979, played a canny, almost teasing 
role in the process.241 Frank to admit that he was "essentially representing his [Hahn's] interests on 
the Boundary Commission,"242 Bush repeatedly dangled before the Republicans the hope that they 
might get his vote if they made a few more concessions, but he always drew back, much to their 
constemation.243 Bush's ally on the Commission, Alma Fitch, had been active in the liberal 
California Democratic Council during its heyday in the 1950s and 60s. Joining Edelman's City 
Council staff in 1968, she played an active role in the 1972 City Council reapportionment and 
became Edelman's chief deputy when he joined the Board in 1975, resigning in March, 1981 to form 
her own political consulting firm.244 Like Bush, she reportedly led the Republicans to think that she 
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The most "vocal" members of the Commission, according to Fitch and others, were Ron 
Smith and Allan Hoffenblum.245 Smith began working for the Republican Party in high school, and 
by the time that he graduated from college, he was a veteran of both a gubernatorial and a 
presidential campaign. As an employee of the state Republican apparatus in 1971-72, he assisted in 
the state Republican redistricting effort.247 Forming a San Francisco political consulting firm in 
1973 with two other Republican activists, Joseph Shumate and Emily Pike, he managed several 
Northern California campaigns before engineering Dana's controversial last-minute triumph in 1980, 
an achievement that made Smith a hot commodity on the lecture circuit. 248 
Smith claims to have acted in civics textbook fashion in 1981.  When approaching 
redistricting, one should not have in mind " . .  .if X gets elected, then they'll have more health 
services," he later asserted. "What you should be thinking about is the process of how they elect the 
people, not the result of that election, of the actions of the kinds of people who are elected. That 
shouldn't come into consideration."249 Despite the tight margins of the Republican supervisorial 
victories in 1980, " . . .  we weren't trying to make the three Republicans better districts. That was 
not a goal because it wasn't necessary."250 Unlike other Commissioners, Smith "did not perceive 
[himself) to be on that committee as an agent of Deane Dana . . .  In that role, my goal was to have it 
be as nonpolitical as possible."251 Not only did he simply want to draw "a fair redistricting plan," he 
even attributed the same motive to his Democratic adversaries on the Commission: "I had a feeling 
that the politicos on the Boundary Commission all felt this: this was our one chance to propose 
something that was, quote, good government." He never "ever" felt, he recalled, that Bush and Fitch 
torpedoed his plan because they saw it as strengthening the Republican majority on the Board.252 
Republicans, so far as Smith, the state chairman for the 1983 Sebastiani reapportionment plan knew, 
had never conducted a redistricting "which disadvantaged minorities. "253 He, Hoffenblum, and 
Shumate "went into this with hopes of coming up with a district that maximized Hispanic 
empowerment in the county . . .  We weren't going to get any brownie points for having this Hispanic 
district. We were doing it because it was the right thing to do."254 "[A] fair redistricting plan," he 
asserted, "will help Republicans . . .  we really wanted to have a process where there were fair lines 
drawn."255 
After graduating from the University of Southern California in 1962 with a major in radio 
and television broadcasting and serving in the Air Force, Allan Hoffenblum got his first job with the 
Republican Party, and has been in politics ever since. From 1968 to 1972, he was an area director 
of the Party in Los Angeles county, and in the latter year, he became the county director of the 
Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP). A member of the Republican State Central 
Committee for a decade, he generally attends the Party's state convention.256 
The first campaign in which Hoffenblum was the de facto campaign manager is particularly 
relevant to his activities on the Boundary Commission. A series of retirements during 1970 and 
1971 left the East Los Angeles 48th Assembly District open in November, 1971 at the same time 
that the state legislature was trying to negotiate a redistricting arrangement. A tentative agreement 
on reapportionment hinged on a victory in the 48th by Richard Alatorre, who hoped to become the 
Assembly's third Mexican-American representative.257 Seeking to sabotage the pact, Republican 
activists from Sacramento fiew down to try to heip Bili Brophy, an Angio millionaire who was the 
only Republican in the contest, try to garner over 50% of all the votes in what was expected to be a 
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low turnout primary. When Brophy was forced into a runoff with Alatorre and two candidates from 
the minor Peace and Freedom and La Raza Unida parties, the activists returned north, assuming an 
Alatorre victory in the overwhelmingly Democratic district.258 
Only Hoffenblum persevered. "I took the initiative and was able to raise the funds necessary 
to design some mailers that went into selective precincts," he remembered seventeen years later.259 
One last minute mailer from a nonexistent "Democratic League of Voters" with a mailing address in 
a vacant lot, signed by a pseudonymous "Patrick S. Sherman" and sent to Anglo areas of the district, 
denounced Alatorre as not a true Democrat.260 Another, which featured a darkened picture of 
Alatorre, attempted to tie him to violent Hispanic groups.261 Key to Brophy's eventual 4.5% 
plurality was the 7.9% of the votes that Raul Ruiz of La Raza Unida garnered. "Brophy didn't win 
this," Ruiz crowed. "We did."262 According to the then chairman of the Assembly Elections and 
Reapportionment Committee, Henry Waxman, "The reason we lost was a cynical alliance of neo­
segregationists in the Chicano community with the Republican party." Alatorre was blunter, 
charging that " . . .  the Republican Party financed" La Raza Unida's campaign, the high point of the 
minor party's electoral success in the state.263 
Hoffenblum proudly claimed credit for the victory. It was "the only campaign that I was 
basically responsible for the outcome [in] . . .  I called the shots", he remembered.264 This last phrase 
echoes with doubtless unconscious irony, in light of the most spectacular incident in the Brophy­
Alatorre contest. After a late dinner the night before the election, Brophy and his administrative 
assistant Bill King had just returned to Brophy's Highland Park home when some undetermined 
person fired eight to ten rounds from a .22 caliber rifle through Brophy's front window. No one was 
hurt. Dramatic pictures and extensive television and radio coverage on election day "gave Brophy 
publicity and momentum we had never hoped to achieve", according to an anonymous Republican 
strategist quoted in the Times.265 Much to the amusement of his Sacramento colleagues, Republican 
Paul Priolo announced on the Assembly floor the day after the election that "he was acting as a 
broker for [Republican] caucus Chairman [John] Stull, who had worked in Brophy's campaign. 'Mr. 
Stull has for sale a slightly used .22 rifle,' Priolo said."266 Alatorre found the incidents less 
humorous. The contest, he charged, " . . .  was used as the training grounds for what ended up being 
the dirty tricks during the Nixon re-election campaign."267 
The man who actually drew the plans for the Republicans was Joseph Shumate, Smith's 
partner in the San Francisco political consulting firm. A user, rather than a designer of computer 
software systems, Shumate had been a campaign strategist for the Republican State Central 
Committee from 1969 to 1972. Along with Smith and others, he drew redistricting plans for 
Congress and the state legislature, taking into account, he said later, age, race, income, education, 
registration, and past voter history in order to maximize Republican representation. At Smith's
suggestion, Shumate was hired by the Republican supervisors to draw plans and to advise them of 
the effects of various plans on "their re-election efforts. "268 More forthright than his partner, he 
acknowledged that what Dana wanted out of reapportionment was "a district that he could win," and 
that he did not flesh out a proposal that would have added Hispanics to Schabarum 's district 
primarily because " . . .  it would have done political harm to Supervisor Schabarum . . .  eventually he 
would have faced a viable Hispanic . . . "269 
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In 1983, Smith, Hoffenblum, and Shumate were to collaborate again on the radical 
Sebastiani Initiative, Smith as state chainnan, Hoffenblum as media coordinator, and Shumate as 
principal line drawer. zm This plan, drawn at The Rose Institute, was opposed by many leaders of 
both political parties and virtually all African-American and Hispanic activists. The Sebastiani (or 
Shumate) Plan cut the number of Assembly districts that were 35% or more Hispanic in population 
from seven to four. It switched the residences of Assemblyman Alatorre and then newly elected 
State Senator Art Torres, as well as that of Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, into new districts with 
much lower percentages of minorities than in their current districts, Torres's district, for example, 
becoming 2 1  % Hispanic, instead of 71 %. In San Diego and San Bernardino counties, it sliced up 
existing minority concentrations in the districts of incumbent Latinos Peter Chacon and Reuben 
Ayala. At the congressional level, the scheme destroyed Edward Roybal's district and threw him 
into a new, 16% Hispanic district against six-tenn incumbent Anglo Republican Carlos Moorhead, 
merged the districts of freshmen Marty Martinez and Esteban Torres and created a new, population 
majority Latino district in southern Los Angeles county that included the heavily conservative city 
of Downey. Two congressional seats then held by blacks in Los Angeles county were merged with 
two Westside seats that contained Anglo Democratic incumbents, at the least forcing painful black­
Jewish conflicts, and at the most causing blacks to lose seats. Throughout the state, blacks were 
packed into fewer and fewer seats. Both MALDEF and black leaders joined a successful suit in the 
state Supreme Court to keep the Sebastiani-Smith-Shumate-Hoffenblum Initiative off the ballot Zll 
These were the most aggressive members of the 1981 Boundary Commission, then: Ron 
Smith, fresh from ending the political career of the only member of a racial minority group to sit on 
the Board of Supervisors in a century, and Allan Hoffenblum, who still vividly remembered the first 
campaign that he had been "responsible" for, one that employed questionable means to choke off, 
temporarily at least, an opportunity to elect a second Hispanic Assemblyman from Los Angeles 
county.272 Their private technician was a practical line drawer who in the 1970s, and again in 1983 
designed or helped to design districts throughout the state that used every device to minimize the 
power of ethnic minorities. Asked why he favored creating a "Latino district" on the Board in 198 1 ,  
Hoffenblum responded: "I've always believed in civil rights . . .  and I truly believe that people 
should have the right to elect their own and not be gerrymandered out of that right."273 
At the Boundary Commission's first public meeting, Hispanic activists attacked the body 
because it contained no members of minority groups. "Our interests are not served without a 
Hispanic on this committee," announced Miguel Garcia, state chairperson of Califomios for Fair 
Representation.zi• At the next day's Board meeting, Edelman moved to double the size of the 
Commission in order to "allow . . .  for greater opportunities for us to appoint people from the 
minority communities - the black, the Chicano, the Asian, and other communities - in Los Angeles 
County."zi5 The motion passed without recorded debate. Although the Califomios group submitted 
lists of names from which they hoped the supervisors would pick the additional Commission 
members,zi6 the supervisors ignored them, choosing either insiders loyal to them or outsiders who 
were treated as utterly irrelevant to the redistricting process. 
The best known of the five in County Government circles was Robert Perkins, an African.­
American who had successively been chief deputy to supervisors Hayes, Burke, and Dana. Perkins 
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could be relied on. " [T]he only way I survived three supervisors," he later noted, was to "keep my 
personal views out of the office . . . I sat on the [Boundary Commission] as a minority and certainly I 
represented my office's position, not my personal position." From his experience, he concluded that 
"if you expect to have boundaries drawn where all of the groups are going to be really considered, 
then you need an independent board rather than a board that's appointed by the Board of 
Supervisors . .. m Perkins' s was the only one of the five names of minority Boundary Commission 
members that Ron Smith, nominally Perkins's subordinate in Dana's office, could recognize in 
1989.278 
Hahn appointed a retired deputy who had served him for 25 years, Davis Lear, a black, while 
Edelman selected his former deputy Jesus Melendez. During the Boundary Commission process, 
Melendez reportedly avoided talking to representatives of Californios.279 Both of these veterans 
apparently played roles that paralleled Perkins's on the Commission, although neither in 1989 
remembered any details about the 198 1 redistricting at all. 280 
Antonovich tapped Frederic Quevedo, a medical doctor of Filipino origin who had first met 
the Supervisor when he treated Antonovich's mother for an illness in 1978.281 As Quevedo 
remembers it, he never met with or received any communications from Antonovich or anyone from 
his office before or during his service on the Commission, was never consulted on the preparation of 
any proposal or shown any plan prior to its formal submission to the full body, skipped the final 
meeting in which the only vote on any plan was taken to attend an annual convention of Filipino 
doctors, and was never told what the Boundary Commission ultimately decided to do. 282 Like 
Quevedo, Lauro Neri, a politically inexperienced Hispanic printer who knew the supervisor who 
appointed him, Pete Schabarum, because they belonged to the same horseback riding club, did not 
recall e1Uier tJemg instructed or consulted by anyone connected with his supervisor.283 Allan 
Hoffenblum, Antonovich's first appointee to the Commission, remembered Quevedo only as "an 
elderly gentleman, but I don't recall specifically who he was . . .  Chinese or Filipino or someone 
such as that . . .  The commission was ten, but it was the five doing most of the negotiating . . .  "284 
Although Neri claimed in 1989 that he was "in and out of his [Schabarum's] office a great deal," 
Schabarum at the same time denied that he recognized Neri 's name.285 
Two County staff members from the Office of the Board of Supervisors, Richard Schoeni 
and Deborah Turner, facilitated the redistricting process and played larger roles in the ultimate 
outcome than any of the Boundary Commission members. As assistant executive officer of the 
Board, Schoeni served as secretary to the Boundary Commissions of both 1971 and 198 1 .  In 197 1 ,  
he had consulted the chief deputies of all the supervisors, learned which areas each supervisor 
wanted to gain or lose, and, on the basis of those consultations, he had actually drafted the plan 
formally proposed by the Boundary Commission.286 In 198 1 ,  at least up to the time that the 
Boundary Commission issued its report, he did not perform a similar middle man role. "There was 
not as much informal interaction between myself and the chief deputies in 1981 . . .  there was just a 
lot less interaction between myself and any of the offices. "287 As for the Commissioners, they 
rejected his office's offer of assistance, relying, instead, on The Rose Institute. 288 Nor did he, as he 
remembers it, draw up a plan to serve as the basis for a settlement in the weeks between the report of 
Schoeni, not Smith or Hoffenblum, who was present helping to provide staff assistance to the 
supervisors' final negotiations. 290 
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Schoeni did earlier oversee the development of five or more plans, at least four of which, 
known as Plans A, B,  C, and D, were presented to, but ignored by the Boundary Commission.291 
These were actually drawn by Deborah Turner, an assistant in the Executive Office, who had neither 
previous redistricting experience nor a record of political activity. Working on her own with only an 
adding machine, maps, and aggregate population data for well established communities within the 
city of Los Angeles and for smaller cities throughout the county, Turner equalized the populations of 
the supervisorial districts, making only slight changes in the boundaries.292 She then had the 
Regional Planning and Data Processing Departments compute ethnic percentages for each of her 
plans.293 Denying that she took into account either the political or ethnic consequences of the plans 
that she drew-and she apparently lacked information on either-Turner seems to have performed as 
an efficient, nonpartisan clerk. Her actions prove that minor redistricting activity can be a mere 
clerical task.294 
IV. E. Californios for Fair Representation 
In 1971 , Hispanics were not well organized to take part in redistricting, and activists 
emerged from the process frustrated and angry. At hearings of the California State Advisory 
Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, two Hispanic professors, David Lopez-Lee and 
Henry Pacheco, presented maps of Los Angeles county showing that East Los Angeles was sliced 
into several Assembly districts, but they had to rely on the Assembly for statistics, they did not have 
the resources to draw districts themselves, and they had no data for areas outside East Los 
Angeles. 295 Even more important, there was no powerful Latino ms1de the process, smce there were 
only two Hispanic Assemblymen, neither of whom was on the Assembly Reapportionment 
Committee, and no Hispanic State Senator.296 Traipse the legislative halls in Sacramento as they 
might, activists could get no firm committments for new Hispanic seats, they said. Students yelling 
"Chicano Power" picketed and milled around, while elder statesmen such as Abe Tapia and Bert 
Corona, of the Mexican American Political Association, and Richard Calderon, who had been 
narrowly defeated for Congress in 1970, threatened a massive defection to La Raza Unida party. 
"The two-party system has failed the Mexican," Tapia announced. "We don't need it. We don't 
want it. "297 
Although the four additional Hispanics who were elected to the Assembly and State Senate 
during the decade probably lifted the spirits of Hispanic reformers, and although Hispanic 
politicians, especially Assembly Reapportionment Committee Chairman Richard Alatorre, were 
certainly in a much better position to influence the redistricting process in the legislature in the 
1980s than in the 1970s, those who took part in the earlier remapping did not want 1981 to be a rerun 
of 1971. And they were not alone. Despite Governor Ronald Reagan's veto of the Democratic 
reapportionment plan in the early 1970s, the Republican Party did not prosper under the lines drawn 
by court-appointed special masters. In 1979, Democrats enjoyed majorities of 50-30 in the 
Assembly, 26-14 in the Senate, and 27-16  in Congress. Even the 1980 Reagan landslide could not 
entirely wipe out Democratic dominance, u.1ough it did reduce it to 47-33 in u.;e Assembly, 23-17 in 
the Senate, and 22-21 in the national House of Representatives.298 Since Democrats would control 
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the data and the computers in 198 1 state legislature, Republicans had to launch a private effort if 
they wished to compete equally in private negotiations and the battle for public opinion. Because, as 
they often acknowledged, 299 Republicans stood to gain if more members of Democratic-oriented 
minority groups were packed into fewer seats, the Republicans might strengthen potential allies in 
the statewide reapportionment if Hispanics were better organized for redistricting, and especially if 
they had access to easily manipulable machine-readable files. 
On November 16, 1979, and again on January 31,  198 1 ,  The Rose Institute sponsored 
conferences on "Hispanics and California Redistricting. "300 Although part of Claremont McKenna 
College, Rose was not a typical academic entity, and these were not the usual scholarly conferences. 
Lacking an endowment, dependent on a constant stream of grants and contracts, 301 Rose was finnly 
linked to the Republican Party. Director Alan Heslop was not the only one of the three principal 
officers of Rose with close ties to the Republican Party. Heslop's "alter ego," Thomas Hofeller, had 
worked with Heslop, Smith, Shumate, and others on the Republican reapportionment effort in the 
1970s and was soon to become director of the Redistricting Department of the Republican National 
Committee in Washington, and chief fundraiser Dixon Arnett was a fonner Republican 
Assemblyman. 302 The money that made the Rose RED IS software package possible and that funded 
the "Hispanic Reapportionment Project" at Rose came from the Republican-oriented California 
Business Roundtable, and its computer was donated by fonner Nixon cabinet member David 
Packard. 303 
The Rose conferences attracted not the usual set of Ph.D.'s, but groups of 50 and 150 Latino 
politicians and activists, respectively, from around the state. A February 7 follow-up conference at 
California State University at Los Angeles discussed goals and chose the name "Californios for Fair 
Representation. "304 Although the acronyms and three of the four words in the names of the 1971 and 
1981 organizations were the same, the contrast in the first words is instructive. Despite the fact that 
non-Hispanic members played important roles in the group in 1971, it called itself "Chicano," a 
truncated fonn of Mexicano with overtones of radicalism and ethnic nationalism. 305 By contrast, 
"Californios," a reference to the pre-1850 Mexican-American inhabitants and their descendants, 306 
exuded tradition and integration into the larger society. In 198 1 ,  however, the umbrella organization 
(hereinafter referred to as "CFR") was simply a coalition of representatives of a number of Latino 
groups.307 
Shortly after the 1 979 conference, Rose had hired Dr. Richard Santillan of the California 
Polytechnic University at Pomona as director of the Roundtable-funded "Latino Redistricting 
Project" to help map strategy, draw districts, and serve as a spokesperson for Hispanics on 
reapportionment issues, as well as to facilitate the free use of its computer by CFR members-during 
off hours late at night. 308 Holder of a Ph.D. in Political Science from Claremont Graduate School, 
Santillan was typical of the young professionals who led the 198 1 CFR, leaders who combined 
ethnic activism with a demonstrated ability to work within the larger, socially pluralistic system. Of 
those who were most active in redistricting the County Board of Supervisors, for instance, Steve 
Uranga was a job training analyst with the County and an active member of the Chicano Employees' 
Association, while Leticia Quezada was a community relations manager for Carnation Company and 
a pa..-Jcipai"'lt in numerous Latino orgarrlzations. Both had college degrees.309 W11ile willing to use 
Rose's resources, CFR members were very conscious of wanting to maintain their political 
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independence. Santillan, for instance, was so concerned that Rose's well-known Republican identity 
would compromise his position that he agreed to take on the job, he said a decade later, only on the 
condition that no other Rose employee would have any "involvement at all with the [Latino 
redistricting] project. "310 More interested in results than in posturing, 311 as the substitution of 
"Califomios" for "Chicanos" symbolized, the CFR people were willing to compromise and 
negotiate. Activists, but not political insiders,312 they felt no need to protect any specific officeholder 
or party, and they retained the idealism, naviete,313 and capacity for anger314 that elected office 
usually dulls. Lacking real political power, the CFR leaders clearly realized that they had to 
organize in the Hispanic community, and, above all, that, whatever their tactical disagreements in 
private, they had to speak with one voice in public.315 
Undoubtedly recognizing CFR's sensitivity, the Republicans in the Rose leadership avoided 
heavy-handed pressure on the group.316 But whereas, at the state level, the drives for more 
Republican seats and more Latino seats were complementary ,317 because Democrats controlled the 
legislature, at the county level in Los Angeles, the interests of the controlling Republicans were 
potentially in conflict with those of CFR. In Sacramento, criticism of the procedures and plans of 
the State Senate and Assembly leadership and of the reapportionment committees was ipso facto 
criticism of Democrats. In Los Angeles, it was, first of all, criticism of Republicans. Unless 
Hoffenblum's and Smith's public and private pressure on CFR to concentrate all their attention at 
the districts of the incumbent Democrats succeeded.318 the Republicans would regret that CFR 
members had ever been given access to Rose's Hewlett-Packard computer. 
IV. F. The CFR, Smith, and Hoffenblum Plans 
The five-person Boundary Commission first met on July 8, 198 1 ,  and the minority­
augmented Commission, a week later. At the initial meeting, secretary Richard Schoeni emphasized 
the four-vote requirement and the fact that if the Board of Supervisors did not act by November 1 ,  
the decision would be turned over to the District Attorney, Assessor, and Sheriff.319 As anyone who 
followed politics at the time knew, two of these three officials, John Van De Kamp and Alexander 
Pope, were liberal Democrats, while, as insiders recognized, the third, Republican Peter Pitchess, 
was carrying on a nasty feud with Supervisor Schabarum. 320 These two provisions gave the 
Democrats a veto power that they fully realized, and perhaps even provided them the upper hand. 
As Hahn appointee Robert Bush remarked to a reporter at the meeting, "We are not going to have a 
situation where three members decide the boundaries and shove them down the throats of the other 
two."321 
The Commission's first meeting also demonstrated how anxious the Commissioners were to 
make meaningless gestures of concern for the ethnic consequences of redistricting. Bush moved to 
recommend to the Board its expansion to seven members, a proposal that he had helped Hahn push 
during the 1970s in order to make it easier to elect ethnic minority members to the body.322 Opposed 
by the Republicans on the Board, as it had been during the 1970s, and continued to be through the 
1980s, Bush's suggestion was not seriously considered.323 Even more emptily rlletorical was Ron 
SmiL.1.'s call at t.'lat meeting for "a redistricting piru-1 tl1at provided fair representation for the 
minorities in Los Angeles County," for it furnished no realistically practicable means whatever of 
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accomplishing that objective. 324 The Commission also asked Deputy County Counsel Edward G. 
Pozorski to "investigate case law regarding ethnicity as a basis for redistricting to ensure the legality 
of the final plan," but if he did so, he never filed a written report on the matter. 325 At its next 
meeting, the Commission adopted as its ninth and last guideline a goal of establishing a "fair 
distribution of ethnic groups," but left "fair" conveniently undefined.326 
The public Commission meetings were a sham. As Antonovich's minority member Dr. 
Frederic Quevedo bleated, a month into the process, "I've been coming to these meetings for four 
weeks and there has only been one incident where someone has said anything about redistricting. 
I'm a little disturbed that everyone is just laying back. We should be determining what is acceptable 
to the supervisors we represent by being on the comminee."327 Actually, although neither Quevedo 
nor any of the other minority Commissioners seems to have been apprised of the fact, negotiations 
were taking place in private between Smith, Bush, and Fitch. 328 The negotiators disregarded the 
staff-devised plans,329 as well as that presented by CFR at a public Boundary Commission meeting 
on July 29. CFR 's plan, its presentation, and its reception is nonetheless interesting for what they 
revealed about the tactics and motives of the participants in the 1981 process. 
As early as February 2, 1981,  even before the group had taken on the name "Califomios," 
MALDEF attorney John Huerta set out a timetable and a set of goals for the organization: "The 
primary goal is to maximize Hispanic voter influence," Huerta announced. "[A] secondary goal is to 
increase the number of Hispanic elected officials. "33° Keenly aware of the 3-2 Republican majority 
on the Board and the four-vote rule for adoption of boundaries, CFR decided that to propose a plan 
with an overwhelmingly Hispanic district would be futile. 331 As Prof. Richard Santillan put it, CFR 
realized that the supervisors "are not going to do anything that is going to jeopardize their 
mcumbency."332 Consequently, even though some CFR members believed that the group should 
draw two seats with Hispanic population majorities of approximately 65% and 52%, they finally 
agreed that because the supervisors would find such percentages "very, very threatening", they would 
compromise. Accordingly, their plan set the Hispanic population percentages at 50% in District 3 
and 42% in District l ,  with the vague hope that "we could maybe get someone elected by the end of 
the decade. "333 But while CFR "thought that by not taking a radical approach but just being very 
reasonable and practical and trying to incrementally improve over the existing fragmentation that 
there was, that we could sell that plan to this Board of Supervisors," in fact, they could not.334 
"You're talking about messing around with five kings and the way they draw their lines to keep 
themselves in power," John Huerta reflected later. 335 
CFR's public and private positions were closer to each other than those of the other 
participants in the process.336 Testifying before the Boundary Commission, Huerta declared that 
Hispanics had little political power in Los Angeles County government because of "prior 
gerrymandering, our demographic profile and economic circumstances. When one's vote is diluted, 
as it has been in years past, there is less of an incentive to run for office, to vote and to conduct voter 
education and registration drives. Once this initially happens, it creates a vicious circle that is 
difficult to break out of . . . .  We are asking you to do this [i.e., adopt the CFR plan] without 
displacing incumbent supervisors. We are not seeking ethnic or racial representation. We are 
seeking political influence. We want ul.e ability to elect supervisors and to have politicai influence 
with them. "337 No other Hispanic group or any Hispanics who were not part of CFR were mentioned 
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in the Boundary Commission minutes or in newspaper reports of its meetings. No independent 
evidence whatsoever confirms the claims of Hoffenblum and Kathleen Crow, Antonovich's chief 
deputy, that the Hispanic community was "severely split" in public over whether to concentrate 
Hispanics in Edelman's district orto increase the percentage in Schabarum's, as well.338 
CFR decided early on to disrupt Hahn's Second District as little as possible and to cooperate 
with any black leaders who took part in the process.339 Unlike Hispanics, blacks, except for elected 
officials, seem to have paid almost no attention to reapportionment in 1981.340 Until Robert Perkins, 
Dana's chief deputy and minority Boundary Commissioner, got his old friend William Marshall in 
touch with CFR, there seems to have been no outside participation by blacks in the county 
redistricting. 341 Marshall and a couple of black friends spent a day at Rose with CFR, caucused 
together in a corner of the room, and came up with a plan to move Compton and northern Long 
Beach into the Second District in order to increase the likelihood of electing a black supervisor there 
i f  Hahn should retire sometime in the future.342 CFR acceeded, moving these areas from Dana's 
Fourth District to the Second, and Marshall testified in favor of the CFR plan before the Boundary 
Commission.343 On the other hand, Compton officials, as well as some people in Marshall's own 
group, opposed the move, believing that if they remained in Dana's district, they might be able to 
influence his vote on some measures of health and welfare, and that they might get a bigger share of 
construction and other funds that had traditionally been disbursed equally to each district, according 
to the "divide by five" principle. 344 If they joined Hahn's district, which was already filled with poor 
minority communities like theirs, competition for discretionary funds would become even more 
intense, and the likelihood of cutbacks in government services, they feared, would grow. Or, as 
Hahn put it, more picturesquely, "Compton is the only thing that keeps Deane Dana from trampling 
over the poor. "345 
What Smith and Hoffenblum objected to about the CFR plan was not its effect on Edelman's 
Third District, for the Hispanic population percentage in the Third District in what became known as 
the Smith and Hoffenblum plans was the same, 50%, as it was in the CFR plan. Their real objection, 
as both directly or indirectly stated, was that CFR 's map raised the Hispanic population percentage 
in Schabarum 's district from 36% to 42%. CFR's design, said Hoffenblum, represented an attempt 
"to make the First District hard for Schabarum to hold on to. "346 Smith elaborated: "What they 
[CFRJ were interested in doing, very clearly, was overturning the results of the 1980 election [i.e., 
the shift from a 4-1 Democratic to a 3-2 Republican Board], and that was their only interest . . . .  I 
mean their whole testimony was, 'you should draw the lines so that a majority of the districts are 
represented by Democrats. "'347 Tue only logic in their plan, Smith concluded, "was it would change 
the political configuration of the county, not change the . . .  ethnic representation. "348 He had 
"horrible confrontations" with CFR over the matter, he remembered. 349 
The goals of Hoffenblum and Smith were, Hoffenblum admitted, very different from those 
of the Hispanic group: "We wished to create a Latino district without changing the philosophical 
makeup of the Board . . . .  We wanted it to remain predominantly conservative . . . .  We thought 
there was a need for an ethnic change. We did not think there was a need for a philosophical 
change."350 The Republicans could not have disliked the changes in the Fourth and Fifth Districts, 
since the gains and losses that they sketched out for them, shown in Tables 8 and 9, only added 
Republican strength. Antonovich would give up increasingly Hispanic San Gabriel, Alhambra, and 
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San Fernando, while gaining affluent foothill communities from tony Arcadia to horsey Bradbury. 
Dana tacked on conservative La Mirada, while sacrificing only working-class communities. There is 
no clearer proof of Schabarum's perceived weakness in the face of a threat from an increasingly 
Hispanic electorate than the Smith and Hoffenblum objections to the CFR plan. 
(Tables 8 and 9 about here.) 
Edelman and his aides could not afford to gloat over the Republicans' discomfort, for the 
CFR plan raised Edelman's Hispanic population percentage from 42% to 50%. Although Edelman 
and Jeff Seymour thought that the Supervisor could be reelected in 1982 easily in a district that had a 
slight Hispanic population majority, Edelman agreed with the suggestion that, eventually, he might 
have difficulty carrying such a district 351 More troublesome to Edelman was that the CFR plan 
stripped him of many of the Westside areas that he had represented since his election to the Los 
Angeles City Council in 1965.352 "That area is the heart of the Jewish community," Seymour 
emphasized. Edelman had been working on programs there for fifteen years, and did not wish to 
deplete all that political capital. 353 Although Seymour and Edelman deny that they opposed the CFR 
and similar plans partly because they removed Edelman's fundraising base from his district, the 
Times reported that that was another consideration in the Edelman camp. 354 In any case, Edelman 
never had to take a public stance on the CFR plan, for, as Seymour noted, Hoffenblum and other 
Republicans were so infuriated by it that it never came to a vote. 355 Instead, Seymour and Edelman 
could meet with CFR representatives, smile sweetly, make no offer to negotiate, and go about their 
more serious business. Edelman shared Seymour's concern that the CFR plan robbed him of much 
of his home base, but neither ever conveyed their feelings to CFR, as they would have had to if they 
had even made a feint at considering the plan seriously.356 
Although a contemporary news report indicated that the redistricters looked at "two dozen" 
plans altogether,357 fairly precise descriptions of but eight of them have survived, only three of 
which--the CFR, Smith, and Hoffenblum plans-made substantial changes in the 1971 lines.358 
Smith and Hoffenblum left the details about the tentative reshufflings that took place as a result of 
negotiations to Shumate and the Rose staff. To facilitate the work at Rose, everyone seems to have 
relied primarily on Henry Olsen, a Claremont undergraduate who knew how to operate the REDIS 
system, and who, according to Director Heslop, had developed an encyclopedic understanding of 
politics in Los Angeles county. 359 Despite the fact that Hoffenblum remembered that Shumate 
concocted both the Smith and Hoffenblum plans, Shumate and Smith recalled that Shumate framed 
only one plan, the so-called Smith plan. 360 And while Shumate declared that almost no real worlc 
was done at Rose, Smith had memories of numerous phone calls with Rose staffers in 1981.361 Since, 
as Tables 8 and 9 demonstrate, the Hoffenblum plan was considerably more complex than the Smith 
plan, involving fifteen more unincorporated areas-clusters of census tracts that could be moved 
back and forth easily only on a computer-it is logical to assume that the otphan was conceived at 
Rose, perhaps in violation of a clause in its contract with the County that banned Rose employees 
from actually charting a reapportionment map for the County.362 
As Table 10 demor!Strates, tl1e n1axirr1um Hispanic percentage in any district under either the 
Smith or Hoffenblum plans was 50.2%. The Republicans claimed to want to design a scheme that 
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"maximized Hispanic representation."363 Why did they not produce a district with a higher Latino 
percentage? Surely it was possible to do so, as plans drawn for the Garza case make clear. 
Moreover, other things being equal, the fewer predominantly Democratic Hispanics there were in the 
three Republican districts, the more secure the Republicans would be, and the effects on the political 
fortunes of Schabarum, Antonovich, and Dana were certainly important to Smith, Hoffenblum, and 
Shumate. 
(Table 10 about here) 
Another possibility is that the designers were concerned with arranging district lines that 
looked "pretty" on a map. But this was patently untrue. The Hoffenblum plan extended a finger of 
Edelman's district up to the Hispanic cities of San Fernando and Pacoima, and launched Dana over 
the Santa Monica Mountains, so that his district looked like a giant backwards "J". Smith broke up 
Dana's "beach cities" district by shifting Venice and Santa Monica to Hahn's, and repeatedly offered 
to transfer the Pepperdine University campus in Malibu from Antonovich to Hahn, a Pepperdine 
alumnus, which would have spread Hahn from the Long Beach border nearly to Ventura county.364 
In fact, Los Angeles county supervisorial districts had never looked very tidy on a map. Most 
notorious was the "parrot's beak" in the First District, drawn to keep First District supervisor Frank 
Bonelli 's home in his district, 365 but this was by no means the only example. Under Debs and 
Edelman, the western portion of the Third District flung a tentacle over the mountains, deeper and 
deeper into the San Fernando Valley in 1965 and 1971, obviously to encircle more Anglo voters.366 
Aesthetic considerations were obviously unimportant. 
What was important was politics. Since the populations of each district were legally 
reqmred to be equal, stuffing more Hispanics into the Edelman seat meant transferring some of his 
liberal Anglos to Dana or Antonovich. Beverly Hills, Hollywood, Westwood, West Hollywood, and 
similar areas were hardly potentially fertile grounds for a doctrinaire conservative like Antonovich or 
a colorless novice like Dana, and neither was so politically secure that he could afford to add such 
territory. Not only was Beverly Hills more than two to one Democratic, its citizens were also the 
sorts of Democrats who did not defect from the party because of racial appeals. In 1982, Beverly 
Hills went for Tom Bradley for Governor over George Deukmejian by 62-37. Likewise, Bradley got 
60% of the vote in Hollywood, 64% in Westwood, and 77% in West Hollywood. By contrast, two­
thirds of the voters in Palos Verdes, Dana's home base, and Glendale, Antonovich's, rejected 
Bradley. 
A closer look at the Smith and Hoffenblum plans, especially at Smith's, which both men 
avowed was the really "serious" plan,367 makes clear that it was the desire to strengthen the shaky 
Republican hold on the Board, not their professed concern for the "empowerment" of Hispanics or a 
"belief in civil rights" that explained the configurations. Although Smith later contended that "there 
were going to be two Democratic districts and three Republican districts no matter what, "368 in fact 
64% of the two-party registration in the county in 1981 was Democratic, and there were plenty of 
possible configurations that could have changed the political, as well as the ethnic composition of 
the Board. 
From a partJsan political sta...11dpoint, one of L11e key features of both the Smith and 
Hoffenblum plans was the shift of overwhelmingly black Compton from Dana's to Hahn's district. 
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The clumsiness of their rationalizations of the politics behind this move demonstrates the Republican 
Boundary Commissioners' sensitivity to the issue. Dana lost overwhelmingly black Compton to 
Burke in 1980 by a tally of 16, 1 18 to 7 1 1 .  Protesting much too much to be credible, both Smith and 
Hoffenblum swore that Dana expressed reluctance not only to lose the 4.2% of the Compton citizens 
that supported him, but the other 95.8%, as well. According to Hoffenblum, Dana told him , "I got a 
lot of support in Compton and I would really be disappointed if I would have to lose the city of 
Compton. "369 Smith chorused that Dana announced to him "that he would do very well in Compton 
and he would be sorry if he had to lose Compton "370 Smith even went so far as to claim that 
conservative Republican supervisor James Hayes had run better in Compton than elsewhere in his 
district in 1972 and 1976, which Hayes denied, and that Dana had carried Compton in 1984, when 
Smith was again his campaign manager, when in fact the official returns give Dana only 34.6% of 
the vote.371 Contemporary newspaper accounts painted a different picture, the Times reporting that 
Dana stalked out of Hahn's office saying, "if I don't get rid of Compton, I won't vote for 
anything. "372 The San Gabriel Daily Tribune learned "that Compton was the sticking point when the 
five men each tried to devise districts in which they could comfortably win re-election. Supervisor 
Deane Dana, a conservative Republican, wanted Compton out of his district and into the district of 
liberal Democrat Kenneth Hahn . . .  "373 
Of twenty-two cities wholly contained within the Fourth District, Dana carried 1 8, even 
though some of them were by relatively small margins. Besides Compton, the only other city that he 
lost in which more than 10,000 people voted was Santa Monica. Smith and Shumate moved Santa 
Monica, as well as the Venice area of the City of Los Angeles, which was even more of a liberal 
Democratic stronghold, into Hahn's District. Santa Monica was 56% Democratic in 1982, and 
Bradley polled 60% of the votes there in the 1982 gubernatorial race. The analogous percentages for 
Venice were 64% and 7 1  %. By contrast, Downey, which the Smith plan added to his mentor's 
district, was 55% Democratic, but voted only 34% for Bradley, and South Gate was 65% Democratic 
and 46% for Bradley. As Dana later acknowledged, Santa Monica and Venice were, along with 
Compton, his "weakest areas."374 "I imagine this [the Smith plan] was his idea of the most safe 
possible district we could possibly have. "375 
Of 1 3  independent cities in the Fifth District, Antonovich lost only San Fernando to Baxter 
Ward in 1980. Antonovich's Boundary Commissioner, Hoffenblum, moved it into Edelman's 
district. 
The Smith-Shumate Plan reportedly served as the basis for negotiations in which Smith tried 
to attract either Bush or Fitch. 376 Both Bush and Hoffenblum agreed that Bush asked to have Santa 
Monica and Malibu transferred into Hahn's district, and both agreed, as well, that there was little 
likelihood that any concession would have separated Bush from Fitch. 377 As Bush expressed it, after 
the Republican victories in 1980, Hahn "had only one ally . . .  Edelman . . .  To protect the interests 
of Supervisor Hahn's district, it was my suggestion that we-that I would not support any proposal . 
. . that would not also be supported by Supervisor Edelman's representatives."378 That pact made 
Fitch the linchpin of the negotiations. Smith hoped that "Edelman would have pressure [on] him 
[by] Hispanics, that he would have to accept a Hispanic district."379 The strongest attempt to apply 
pressure on EdeLua.1 iJ1 public was a staterr1ent that Hoffenblum made during or after the meeting at 
which CFR representatives addressed the Boundary Commission: "We would be remiss,'' 
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Hoffenblum told the Daily News, truthfully, but tactically, "if we did not have at least one district 
that was at least 50 percent Hispanic. Otherwise, it looks like we 're sitting here trying to save five 
white supervisors."380 According to Hoffenblum, the "intense" discussions with Fitch centered on 
"how Latino . . .  would he [Edelman] accept and still vote forthe plan."381 Unlike the Hoffenblum 
and CPR plans, Smith-Shumate did not remove much of Edelman's Westside base from his district. 
Yet Edelman did not accept it, the negotiations broke down, and just to have some tangible sign of 
their work,382 the Commission, by a 5-4 vote (Quevedo, who had endorsed the CPR plan, was 
conveniently absent)383 recommended not the Smith plan, but the mysteriously conceived 
Hoffenblum plan. 384 
Why was something close to the Smith plan not acceptable to Edelman? At the time, Bush 
denounced the Republican plans for trying "to get rid of every minority they can" and "to draw a line 
around the inner city of Los Angeles and to give those problems to districts represented by only two 
supervisors."385 Edelman said later that these proposals "lumped Hispanics into one district and 
changed the boundaries in other districts to I believe weaken Democratic registered voters. I think it 
seemed to me like it was a Republican plan to weaken Democratic registration in certain districts. "386 
His staff, he remembered, computed the partisan percentages for each district under both the 
Republican plans. 387 During 198 1,  before Garza was filed, Edelman had emphasized the ethnic, 
rather than the partisan aspects of packing. Unlike the Hoffenblum plan, he told the other 
supervisors, the boundaries that they ultimately adopted avoided "a clumping of minorities into the 
central city supervisorial districts . . .  "388 The Final Report of the Boundary Commission, crafted by 
Richard Schoeni, admitted the packing, and attempted to make a virtue out of it. The Hoffenblum 
plan "increases the opportunity of Hispanics and Blacks by recognizing that a special community of 
------interest exists-fur-Hispanics and Blacks. Boundaties were developed to mcrease the electoral 
effectiveness of these two groups in the Second and Third Supervisorial districts. "389 
Tables 10  and 1 1  certainly show that the Smith and Hoffenblum plan increased the 
percentages of minorities in the districts of the two Democrats. Under the boundaries in place before 
the 198 1 redistricting, 72.8% of the county's blacks were in districts Two and Three (68.5 + 4.3 in 
Panel B of Table 10). The Smith plan raised that to 8 1 . 1  %, largely by removing Compton from 
Dana's Fourth District, while the more complex Hoffenblum proposal increased it to 78.5%. Smith 
concentrated 5 1 .2% of the county's Hispanics in the Hahn and Edelman districts, and Hoffenblum 
squeezed 55% of them in. To view the figures another way, as Table 10 demonstrates, Smith lifted 
the proportion of Edelman's district that was either black or Hispanic from 45.2% to 54.8%, while 
Hoffenblum stopped at 53.6%. What the Democratic districts gained, the Republican seats lost. 
Under both Smith and Hoffenblum, Dana's black percentage was cut almost in half, while under 
Hoffenblum, Schabarum's Hispanic percentage dropped by 13.5% (36.2% - 3 1 .3% / 36.2%). 
(Table 1 1  about here.) 
Tables 10  and 1 1, as well as Edelman's criticisms of the Republican offers, suggest that the 
question ought to be what Edelman had to gain and lose from the Smith plan, not why he didn't 
accede to it. Edelman knew that he could win the district he had by a la..11dslide. Vlhy subtract Eagle 
Rock, Los Feliz, and Anglo parts of San Fernando Valley, and add about 100,000 new people, 
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78,000 of whom were Hispanic, in Pico Rivera and Huntington Park? Why allow Schabarum and 
Dana to pad their majorities by shifting black and Hispanic Democrats into Hahn's and Edelman's 
districts, thereby guaranteeing that many of the health and welfare policies that Edelman and Hahn 
had fought for, with the avid support from their constituents, would be reversed? Self-interest, 
partisan interest, policy interest, and, the Democrats surely assumed, their constituents' interest all 
pointed in the same direction-toward rejection of any aggressive Republican proposal such as the 
Smith or Hoffenblum plans. The wonder is that the hubristic Republican consultants ever imagined 
that they could induce the Democrats to swallow such a deal. 
IV. G. September Anticlimax 
After the Boundary Commission deadlocked, Allan Hoffenblum lost interest. "It was my 
feeling they would jiggle the lines and that would be the end of it," he said in hindsight.300 Ron 
Smith was "disgusted and discouraged" by the Commission's failure, and he "didn't even think 
about it anymore," learning of the final settlement only through the newspaper.391 The Executive 
Office of the Board, which had been largely excluded from negotiations that went on under the 
umbrella of the Boundary Commission, became "pretty quiet" on the subject of redistricting for a 
time, which must have been quiet, indeed.392 No one remembers drawing up plans between the 
August 12 Boundary Commission vote for the Hoffenblum plan and the September 24 vote of the 
Board,393 but Jeff Seymour recalls seeing some plans that were conceived by either Schoeni or 
Turner at this time.394 Two otherwise unidentified "peripheral plans"-plans that made minor 
changes around the peripheries of the districts-may date from this period. 395 
Although some news reporters396 and CFR apparently believed that the Hoffenblum plan was 
a live option, in fact, as Richard Schoeni put it, "the Board set aside the Boundary Commission 
report and proceeded from a clean slate, if you will, with Supervisor Edelman mediating . . .  "397 The 
clean slate, of course, was not a blank map, but the lines that had been drawn in 1971. Patient 
negotiations between the supervisors themselves, a process reminiscent of that of the 1950s and 60s, 
produced occasional outbursts, such as Dana's pique over not being able to jettison Compton, and 
Schoeni 's anger over Antonovich' s seeming inability to realize that since his district had more than 
20% of the population, he could not annex any more territory.398 But the negotiations went on, off 
the record and without leaving a paper or much of a memory trail. 
Two days before their deadline for acting, the supervisors staged a public hearing. Although 
the CFR leaders asked for, and perhaps got a meeting with Edelman earlier in September, they seem 
to have been left in the dark about the nature of the negotiations that were going on at the time. 
Realizing that their own plan was not under consideration, but apparently believing that the 
Hoffenblum plan, which they opposed because it reduced the Hispanic percentage in the First 
District, the one in which the Hispanic proportion was growing fastest, was still alive, CFR decided 
to protest. They therefore sent out a firey handbill in an attempt to boost Hispanic attendance at the 
Board of Supervisors' only public meeting on redistricting. "LET YOUR VOICES BE HEARD!" the 
flyer announced in full capitals. "SHOW YOUR SUPPORT FOR FAIR REPRESENTATION FOR 
TBF LATINO COM.!v1LTNITY! SH0\1/ YOL1R ELEL"lbD 0}1'1CiALS THAT YOU ARE 
OPPOSED TO MINORITY GERRYMANDERING OF OUR COMMUNITIES." The Hoffenblum 
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plan, the broadside trumpeted, was "a blatant attempt by the conservative members of the Board of 
Supervisors to maintain their dominance of the liberal supervisors for the next ten years and at the 
expense of the HISPANIC community."399 At the Board hearing, an angry crowd repeatedly 
disrupted proceedings by shouting, and CFR leaders Leticia Quezada, Steve Uranga, Virginia Reade, 
and Robert Espofino denounced the Hoffenblum plan, Espofino calling it "more than an obvious 
attempt to maintain the present political status quo . . .  unethical, immoral, unjust, and in violation of 
our civil rights. "4<Xl 
As the process that had begun in January sputtered to a close on September 24, the last day 
before reapportionment would be turned over to other officials, supervisors drifted in and out of the 
formal Board meeting that was still in session in the Board meeting room. Two by two, to avoid the 
sunshine law requirements of the state 's Brown Act, they adjourned to an anteroom to pore over 
maps and discuss deals. For an hour and a half or perhaps longer, assisted by Deborah Turner and 
Richard Schoeni of the Executive Office and perhaps by a few of their personal staff members, they 
thrashed out details, completely ignoring the CFR plan and the other six plans that had been formally 
considered by the Boundary Commission. Never, so far as anyone remembers about that last day's 
events, did the Board members consider a plan that raised the Hispanic percentage in any district to a 
majority or more. Away from the public eye, they did not posture about protecting the rights of 
minorities, but simply went on with the business of cutting deals to protect their futures. Having 
earlier invested the County's money in The Rose's Institute's split-second remapping software and 
fancy graphics, having raised many people's hopes and wasted many people's time on the Boundary 
Commission and in public meetings, they ended with Turner calculating and recalculating each 
minor boundary change on a low-tech adding machine and Schoeni tracing the barely altered lines 
by hand on a mylar overlay. 
The plan that the Board adopted on September 24 reduced the proportion of Hispanics in 
Edelman's district slightly, from 42.4% to 4 1 .8%.402 In the largest swap, Edelman lost 86,597 
people, 74,738 of them to Hahn, of whom 56% were Hispanic and 8.3% were black.403 Besides this 
minor reduction in ethnic concentration-ironic in the light of all the attention devoted to increasing 
such concentration throughout the redistricting process-there were no other important changes 
during the redistricting. The Board's phrasemonger, Pete Schabarum, referred to it as "the ho-hum 
plan."404 
Having raised the Hoffenblum boogeyman, Board members could seem comparatively 
conciliatory to Hispanics by then adopting what CFR called "the status quo plan". CFR could 
declare a victory of sorts-at least they had avoided a substantial reduction in the Hispanic 
percentage in the First District-and lick their wounds privately.405 On his way out of the room after 
the Board meeting on September 24, Mike Lewis, Schabarum 's chief deputy, was still trying to 
salvage some partisan advantage from the affair. "Edelman screwed you," he told Steve Uranga of 
CFR. "No," Uranga replied, "the Board screwed us." Recalling the exchange, Uranga elaborated. 
"Everything about it from the beginning-from the very beginning in my opinion was a farce, a 
show, and all these county people were participating and all of them had their little roles to play 
from the boundary committee to the staff of the boundary committee to the board to their aides to 
tl1eir appointees to tl1e bow.1dary committee. The whole Utlng was a charade or a big farce, a big 
show. They did a very good job of putting on a show, I thought, except . . .  for those of us that were 
the victims of it. "406 
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V. DISCRIMINATORY INTENT AND THE LAW, 1885-1989 
V. A. " Subjective" and " Objective" Intent 
or 
"Direct" and "Indirect" Evidence? 
Discussions of the uses of the concepts "intent," "motive," or "purpose" in recent Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendment cases often distinguish between three notions: subjective intent, or what 
moves individuals to act; foreseeability, or the consequences that objective observers think could 
reasonably have been expected to follow from a particular action; and institutional intention, or the 
sum of a series of decisions by different officials.407 These distinctions seem to me neither logical 
nor, as I argue in this section of this paper, in accord with the usage of judges. All three varieties of 
intent are fundamentally concerned with explaining why people acted. "Institutional intent" either 
creates the convenient fiction that collections of individuals act as one person or treats people who 
served sequentially as though they held office together and as though the decisions that they made 
occurred simultaneously. "Subjective" and "objective" intent both focus on what was in people's 
minds and hearts, but discussions of subjective intent tend to emphasize what people said about why 
they acted, while discussions of objective intent stress external, circumstantial evidence. Because it 
is the nature of the evidence, rather than the object of the explanation that truly distinguishes 
------dailfffireerent-ttses-ef-the-eoneept of intent, I will distinguish in dre followtngutsc:uss10n "be�tw�ee�n�'�'d"'1re=ct�'�-----­
and "indirect" or "circumstantial" evidence, rather than between "subjective" and "objective" 
intent.408 
V. B. The Notion of Discriminatory Intent a Century Ago 
The U.S. Supreme Court made its first pronouncements on intent in racial discrimination 
cases long before the 1 970s. In its 1884 and 1885 terms, three cases challenging San Francisco's
regulation of laundries raised the issue directly,409 and the Court's resolution of them has interesting 
implications for more recent history. Hard-working Chinese dominated the laundry business in San 
Francisco during the 1 870s and 80s. Popular nativist agitation led the city government to pass a 
series of regulations, impartial on their face, that mandated health and fire inspections, banned night 
work, and required special licences for laundries operated in wooden structures, supposedly because 
they represented fire hazards.410 The purpose of these and other related ordinances, the Board of 
Supervisors announced, was to "drive [the Chinese] to other states ... "411 Two lawsuits, Barbier v. 
Connolly and Soon Hing v. Crowley, challenged the anti-night work provision, the first, as an 
unreasonable infringement on the rights of anyone, no matter what his race, to labor and to acquire 
property, the second, as a subterfuge for racial discrimination. Sustaining the ordinance against the 
first challenge as a standard exercise of the police power, Justice Stephen J. Field disti11guisl1ed in 
the second case between the purposes and the prejudices of legislators and rejected evidence about 
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their prejudices as improper for judges to consider: 
"The motives of the legislators, considered as to the purposes they had in view, will always 
be presumed to be to accomplish that which follows as the natural and reasonable effect of 
their enactments. Their motives, considered as the moral inducements for their votes, will 
vary with the different members of the legislative body. The diverse character of such 
motives, and the impossibility of penetrating into the hearts of men and ascertaining the 
truth, precludes all such inquiries as impracticable and futile. And in the present case, even 
if the motives of the supervisors were as alleged, the ordinance would not be thereby 
changed from a legitimate police regulation, unless in its enforcement it is made to operate 
only against the class mentioned; and of this there is no pretense. "412
The logic of Field's position was that the judiciary would consider the intent of the legislators as 
possibly probative, but, instead of seeking direct evidence of intent, would deduce what motivated 
them from objective facts. Moreover, intent by itself was insufficient to determine a decision. 
Plaintiffs had to prove that the effect of the regulation was discriminatory in order to overturn a 
regulation. This "reasonable foreseeability" standard, so long established, is, of course, particularly 
pertinent to gerrymanders. Indeed, the very name "gerrymander" is based on this usage. It was the 
salamander-like shape of a congressional district drawn when Elbridge Gerry was governor of 
Massachusetts in 1 8 1 2  that gave birth to the word.413 And those who looked at the districts drawn in 
South Carolina and Mississippi during the 1870s and 80s, at the time of the first racial gerrymanders 
in the history of the United States, were willing to conclude simply by observing the ethnic 
percentages of each that they were adopted with a racially d1scnmmatory mtent.41 
Fourteen months after Soon Hing, the Court, in the third unanimous opinion of this trilogy, 
issued its opinion in the more famous case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 415 What apparently moved the 
Court to decide this, but not the two previous cases, for the plaintiffs, was that the ordinance on its 
face gave the Board of Supervisors the power to discriminate between whites and Chinese in 
granting licenses to laundries in wooden buildings, and that it was demonstrated that the power had 
been used in precisely this fashion. Quoting from the Circuit Court opinion, which referred to "the 
notorious public and municipal history of the times" and declared that the anti-Chinese purpose of 
the ordinance "must be apparent to every citizen of San Francisco,"416 Justice Stanley Matthews 
emphasized not only the fact that every Chinese applicant, but only one Caucasian, who applied for 
the necessary license, was turned down, but also that the ordinance evidenced by its very terms a 
discriminatory "necessary tendency." An elementary cross-classification table demonstrates 
dramatically the overwhelming effect that so impressed the Court, making plain that the discretion 
open to the Supervisors was employed in a biased manner. (See Table 12.) However necessary proof 
of effect was to sustain a violation, evidence not available on the face of the ordinance was 
obviously also important. Otherwise, how did the Court distinguish between the impartial 
"tendency" of the health and fire inspections and the "opportunities ... of unequal and unjust 
discrimination in their administration" of the Supervisors' possible conduct?417 
(Table 12 about here.) 
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One soaring sentence in Matthews's opinion invited further litigation: "Though the law itself 
be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public 
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal 
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal 
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution."418 This invitation was taken up by an 
obscure black lawyer from Greenville, Mississippi, Cornelius J. Jones, who was simultaneously 
trying to overturn the state's notorious 1890 "disfranchising" constitution by asking Congress to 
unseat representatives elected under its voting provisions.419 Jones 's African-American client, Henry 
Williams, was convicted of murder before an all-white jury drawn from the voter rolls.420 Pointing 
to the discretion granted to registrars to discriminate against blacks through the "understanding" and 
other clauses, and quoting from newspaper reports of the debates at the constitutional convention, 
whose delegates repeatedly avowed their racist purposes, Jones asked the Court to void Williams's 
conviction and overturn the Mississippi constitution at the same time. 421 Although the relevant state 
constitutional provision was at least as suspicious on its face as the San Francisco laundry ordinance 
thrown out in Yick Wo, and although the Mississippi Supreme Court had, in a companion case,422 
admitted the racist intent of the convention, Jones had failed to demonstrate that blacks were actually 
disfranchised by the constitution.423 The Mississippi constitution and associated laws "do not on 
their face discriminate between the races,"  intoned Justice Joseph McKenna disingenuously, "and it 
has not been shown that their actual administration was evil; only that evil was possible under 
them."424 
Although historians have sometimes treated Williams as a more positive endorsement of the 
"Mississippi Plan" than it was, strictly construed,425 contemporary disfranchisers gave it a more 
c1rcumscnbed readmg, and feared its apparent implication that proof of a racially discriminatory 
effect would invalidate southern electoral laws and administrative practices.426 The legal threats 
were particularly acute in Louisiana and Alabama, which adopted versions of the "grandfather 
clause" to allow illiterate and propertyless whites to assume that they, but not blacks, would be able 
to register to vote once the new constitutions went into effect 4r1 Delegates to the Alabama 
Constitutional Convention of 1901 were so openly racist, and the registrars' subsequent 
discrimination was so flagrant,428 that black educator Booker T. Washington had no trouble secretly 
raising and disbursing the money to finance a legal challenge.429 Appending several speeches from 
the Constitutional Convention debates to his briefs as direct evidence of intent, black lawyer Wilford 
H. Smith demonstrated the requisite effect in two ways: First, the lead plaintiff, literate federal 
courthouse janitor Jackson W. Giles, and twelve other black Alabamians swore that they were 
qualified to vote under the law, but had been denied registration solely because of their race. 
Second, Smith presented extensive newspaper clippings on the comparative numbers of blacks and 
whites who registered under the new constitution in numerous localities around the state.430 Similar 
suits were filed in Louisiana and Virginia. 431 
Faced with compelling direct proof of intent, prima facie evidence in the tenns of the 
constitution, and both individual and collective documentation of the racially discriminatory effects 
of the law, U.S. District court Judge Thomas G. Jones, a former Alabama governor who had been a 
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While seeming to admit both intent and effect, "liberal" Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendall 
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Holmes, writing for a six-man majority, declared the courts unable to counter the power of a state 
that was so adamant in passing and administering its laws in a discriminatory fashion. Furthermore, 
if the Court granted Giles's wish to throw out the whole scheme of suffrage regulations as 
unconstitutional, Holmes continued, in a sophomorically clever argument, under what provisions 
could he then be registered?433 
Just as Holmes blatantly ignored both substantive and jurisdictional precedents, which the 
dissenters in Giles v. Harris vigorously pointed out,434 the Supreme Court a decade later utterly 
ignored Giles. A suit originally brought by Oklahoma Republicans who feared the loss of their black 
supporters, and reluctantly supported by the national administration as part of William Howard 
Taft's successful effort to gain renomination as the Republican presidential candidate in 1912, and, 
more avidly, by the just-organized NAACP, Guinn and Beal v. U.S. overturned a 1910 amendment 
to the state constitution that allowed illiterates to register to vote if they were descended from men 
enfranchised before the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.435 No direct evidence of intent or of 
more general effects than the denial of a few blacks' right to vote was presented, and Louisiana-bred 
Chief Justice Edward Douglass White 's opinion in this and a companion case from Maryland did not 
cite Yick Wo, Williams, or Giles.436 Doubtless recalling his "conservative" political faction's
opposition to the grandfather clause in the 1898 Louisiana constitutional convention, 437 White ruled 
similar clauses from Oklahoma and Maryland unconstitutional because the provisions revealed their 
intent on their faces.438 Apparently the states made no effort to provide any non-racial justifications 
for the clauses. 
Moving from objective intent and effect in Yick Wo, to effect alone in Williams, to political 
questions in Giles, to objective intent and effect with an emphasis on the former in Guinn, the turn of 
tlle century Supreme Court followed a confusing and contradictory path on occupational and voting 
rights. In their decisions in cases involving segregation and discrimination in public 
accommodations and education, moreover, the Court's opinions on motives and impact became even 
more tangled. 
The Justices sometimes assumed that good faith and a nondiscriminatory intent lay behind 
challenged laws. Perhaps most notoriously, in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Henry Billings Brown 
declared that "We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the 
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority." Of course, Brown undercut his own argument by ending the paragraph in which t..'10se 
words occurred with the assertion that "If one race be inferior to the other socially, the constitution 
of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.'"39 In his most famous dissent, the first 
Justice John Marshall Harlan scornfully answered Brown: "Every one knows that the statute in 
question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars 
occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white 
persons . . . The thing to accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal accommodation for whites 
and blacks, to compel the latter to keep to themselves while traveling in railroad passenger coaches. 
No one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary."440 It is instructive to note that 
neither in the trial nor in the briefs for Plessy, the gen de cou/eur who challenged the Louisiana 
railroad segregation statute, \vas tr,ere ar,y discussion of ·what t.a'le legislators said about wl1y tl1ey 
passed the law.441 
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Three years later, when the Supreme Court considered the question of whether, in effect, it 
would enforce the "equal" part of Plessy's "separate but equal," Harlan reversed course. The case, 
Cumming v. Richmond County, Georgia,442 has several interesting parallels with the Garza litigation 
and the decision in the case represents an extreme against which to judge proposed criteria of intent. 
Augusta, Georgia had supported two high schools for whites and one for blacks for several years 
before 1897. Faced with an overflowing black elementary school population, the Board of 
Education in that year decided to close the black high school, which was, at the time, the only 
publicly-supported high school for African-Americans in the state, and to convert the building into 
elementary classrooms and hire elementary teachers. Like the all-Anglo Los Angeles County Board 
of Supervisors, the all-white Richmond County Board of Education responded to the resultant storm 
of minority protest by holding a public hearing at which the blacks respectfully presented their 
grievances, and, like their California counterparts, the white Georgians politely rejected minority 
criticisms. By the standards of nineteenth century equity law, refusing to provide a mechanism for 
the dissenters to voice their opposition might have damaged Richmond County's subsequent legal 
case. By the standards of twentieth century public relations, not adding minority members to the 
Boundary Commission would have been embarassing. 
Augusta whites also asserted their good faith. It would have been "unwise and 
unconscionable to keep up a high school for sixty pupils and tum away three hundred little [N]egroes 
who were asking to be taught their alphabet and to read and write," the Board's lawyers announced. 
At the same time that they played upon the judges' heartstrings. the lawyers tried to obscure the fact 
that the school board could have shifted the money for black elementary schools from the much 
larger funds for white schools, or that they could have used the 23% increase in state funds for 
------<>OOGatioo-for the year-t�blaek-hlgh-schoob-bkewise, Republican mernbe1'Sof the 
Boundary Commission claimed to have had only the welfare of Latinos at heart in the 1981 
redistricting, while Democrats avowed that at least they saved Hispanics from an even more racially 
retrogressive redistricting. And the Board of Supervisors as a whole could have taken a number of 
actions to mitigate the effects of past discrimination, instead of perpetuating it. 
In a decision that no one has ever been able to explain satisfactorily, and that has long been 
recognized as a terrible blot on his reputation, Justice Harlan ruled, for a unanimous Supreme Court, 
in favor of Richmond County. To sustain a contention of discrimination under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, Harlan announced, blacks had to demonstrate t.hat the Board 
of Education had "proceeded in bad faith", that they had been motivated by "hostility to the colored 
population because of their race", that using public funds to provide high schools for whites, but not 
for blacks was "a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the 
land."443 Cumming was no mere matter of degree, of white schools with better teachers, better 
buildings, or more convenient locations than the black schools. Like Garza, Cumming was a matter 
of absolute inequality--0f no black high school, no minority supervisors. What more evidence than 
this absolute distinction, this radically disproportionate effect, could Harlan have asked for? Did he 
really expect Board members to admit under oath that their sole or principal or even minor purpose 
had been discriminatory? Surely asking for such evidence would have been unreasonable. 
If this radical "racial hostility test" of intent must be met for plaintiffs to prevail, then the 
Reconstruction Amendments would be reduced to a cruel hoax. For while Justice Brown had merely 
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assumed nondiscriminatory motives and impact, Harlan in Cumming had brushed aside a patently 
discriminatory impact, fully evidenced in the record of the case, and placed such an onerous burden 
of proof on the blacks in the motive inquiry as to make it nearly impossible to bear. If a mere verbal 
assertion of good faith sufficed to defeat an allegation of discrimination, why would this passage 
from the opening address to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1 898 by its president, Ernest 
Kruttschnitt, not serve? 
My fellow-delegates, let us not be misunderstood! Let us say to the large class of the people 
of Louisiana who will be disfranchised under any of the proposed limitations of the suffrage, 
that what we seek to do is undertaken in a spirit, not of hostility to any particular men or set 
of men, but in the belief that the State should see to the protection of the weaker classes; 
should guard them against the machinations of those who would use them only to further 
their own base ends; should see to it that they are not allowed to harm themselves. We owe 
it to the ignorant, we owe it to the weak, to protect them just as we would protect a little 
child and prevent it from injuring itself with sharp-edged tools placed in its hands.444 
V. C. The Twisting Course of Intent and Effect from 1954 to 1986 
If Plessy disingenuously assumed a beneficent intent and a nondiscriminatory effect, and 
Cumming ignored impact and demanded proof of an unequivocably malevolent motive, Brown v. 
School Board ofTopeka445 in 1954 held, as it were, that if one could demonstrate that school 
segregation had deleterious consequences for African-American children, then the reasons for 
adopting that policy were either irrelevant or presumed to be invidious. In fact, as Harlan had 
------pt7inted-mrt h1 Iris Pfessy dissenr.everyone knew Ulat white southerners' motives m segregating 
blacks were discriminatory,446 and, as the brief for Plessy had argued, segregation might have been 
overturned purely because it made an arbitrary distinction, dividing passengers or schoolchildren 
along racial lines, rather than along lines of willingness to pay or mental ability.447 Brown might 
therefore have rested on intent or substantive due process, rather than effect grounds. Nonetheless, 
after 1 954, acts that segregated people by race were tacitly understood to have a malign intent. 
This realignment448 of the law with common sense reached voting rights in the keystone case 
of Gomillion v. Lightfoot in 1960.449 Despite massive continued discrimination against black 
registrants in the black university town of Tuskeegee, African-American voting registration had 
steadily risen and threatened to surpass white registration. To prevent any blacks from being elected, 
a local act of the Alabama legislature in 1957 snipped the previously square boundaries of the city of 
Tuskeegee into "an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure," which had the "effect" of removing from the 
city's boundaries "all save four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single wlrite 
voter or resident."45° Faced with a Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment challenge, the city offered 
no non-racial justification for its action, merely claiming an absolute right to regulate its own 
political affairs.451 Reaclring beyond the justiciability issue that he began by terming "the sole 
question" before the Court, Justice Felix Frankfurter deduced that an "unlawful end" had motivated 
Tuskeegee officials. He based his deduction on the "unconstitutional result," wlrich he thought was 
evidenced partly by demograp!1ic statistics a..'1d part"Jy by a before-ai*ld-ar'ter map ti1iat made u;e
gerrymander obvious.452 In a brief opinion, Justice Charles Wlritaker concurred on the grounds that 
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the state's "purpose" was to segregate black from white voters, and that under Brown, such a 
segregative purpose violated the Fourteenth Amendment.453 Whether read as an effect case or an 
intent case,454 Gomillion employed only objective evidence. 
Courts took two roads out ofTuskeegee. The pure effect road led through Baker v. Carr455 
and Reynolds v. Sims456 to all of the apportionment cases and at least to the neighborhood of the 
"political gerrymandering" case of Davis v. Bandemer.451 In these cases, plaintiffs were not 
required to show any desires on the part of, say, rural legislators to discriminate against the urban or 
suburban population of their states in apportionment. The fact of numerical inequality of 
representation was, by itself, necessary and sufficient to demonstrate a violation of equal 
protection.458 The second road was full of sharp curves and repeated switchbacks, and judges 
careened from effect to intent in efforts to avoid what they perceived as various slippery slopes on 
both sides, before finally slowing as the path flattened and straightened. 
In United States v. O' Brien459 and Palmer v. Thompson,460 majorities of the Supreme Court 
looked over the precipice of intent and swerved towards an absolute effect standard. 0 'Brien 
challenged his conviction for burning his selective service card on the grounds that Congress had 
been motivated by a desire to suppress dissent when it amended the selective service law in 1965 to 
prohibit the mutilation of draft cards.461 Although the sparse comments on the amendment on the 
floor of Congress and in the House and Senate reports buttressed O'Brien's contention, Chief Justice 
Earl Warren rejected the antiwar student's First Amendment defense. Requiring men to possess 
draft cards, Warren concluded for an 8-1 majority, was the most narrowly drawn means of 
administering the selective service system, which was incident to the warmaking power. Possession 
precluded mutilation. And since Congress clearly had the power to enact the amendment, its motive 
-------wasirrelevant.462 TI1e effect oftlreia:w may have been to remove one dramauc way of protestmg, 
and it presumably had no impact at all on supporters of the Viemam War, but Warren neglected 
disproportionate impact entirely. 
The Palmer case arose from the closing of all publicly-owned swimming pools by the city of 
Jackson, Mississippi, in the face of federal court-ordered integration.463 Contending that courts 
would have difficulty determining motivation, especially the "sole" or "dominant" motivation of a 
group of legislators, that an injunction would be futile, because a legislature could merely repass the 
regulation without an incriminating motive, and that judicial inquiry into legislative motives would 
overstep proper separation of powers bounds, Justice Hugo Black, speaking for a bare 5-4 majority, 
unequivocally rejected the notion that an equal protection violation could rest solely on intent.464 
Dissenting judges and commentators raked Justice Black's Palmer opinion, although they 
largely ignored parallel arguments in O'Brien. In a statement that was nearly four times as long as 
Black's majority opinion, and which in form ressembled an opinion of the court, more than a dissent, 
Justice Byron White declared that previous cases contained an "invidious purpose or motive" 
standard. His detailed examination of "the circumstances surrounding this action and the absence of 
other credible reasons for the closings" convinced White that Jackson's motive was to stop 
integration in public services, a motive that he apparently considered unconstitutional per se.465 
Professor Paul Brest answered Black's difficulty, futility, and impropriety points more 
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the sole or dominant reason for action, because an illicit motive, even if comparatively unimportant, 
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might tip the balance toward action - for instance, by moving a pivotal member or group in a 
legislative body.467 Nor is direct evidence of intent necessary, for, here as elsewhere in the law, 
circumstantial evidence, such as the sequence of events that led to the decision, the terms of the 
regulation themselves, or the placement of election district lines, often gives a clear enough 
indication of motivation, as it did in Gomillion.468 As for futility, it would be a credulous court, 
indeed, that would wipe from its memory a prior ruling of illicit motivation when considering a 
reenacted law.469 Finally, every invalidation by a court of a law or administrative practice intrudes 
on legislative or administrative powers, often in the pursuit of individual constitutional rights. Why 
is it more of an imposition to question the motive for a decision than to upset the decision itse!fl470 
A week before Palmer, five justices, among them four members of the Palmer anti­
motivation majority,471 had joined an opinion by White in Whitcomb v. Chavis.472 Upholding 
multimember legislative districts in Indiana against charges that they were racially discriminatory, 
White began his criticism of the District Court opinion, which had reached the opposite result, by 
asserting that the Reconstruction Amendments protected against "purposeful devices to further racial 
discrimination."473 Noting that the plaintiffs had made no effort to prove a racially discriminatory 
purpose in this case, contending that blacks registered and voted freely, and concluding that black 
candidates lost in party-line voting when the Democratic ticket on which they were nominated in 
Indianapolis was defeated, Justice White found no evidence of discriminatory purposes and plentiful 
signs of other reasons for the less than proportional representation of African-Americans in the 
Hoosier State 's legislature.474 How those who joined both the Palmer and Whitcomb majorities 
reconciled their stances is unclear. 
Two years later, Justice White wrote the opinion, this time for a unanimous court, that 
ovenumed a mUltunember legislative districting scheme in Dallas and San Antonio, Texas under 
challenge as racially discriminatory by black and Mexican-American plaintiffs.475 What 
distinguished White v. Regester from Whitcomb v. Chavis was not direct evidence of intent, or even 
a clear statement of the necessity to prove intent, but the presence of "enhancing factors" - a history 
of official and unofficial racial discrimination, language barriers to Spanish speakers, majority vote 
and numbered place requirements, and a lack of access to a slating group.476 The "totality of the 
circumstances," Justice White announced, proved that members of minority groups "had less 
opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect 
legislators of their choice" in multimember districts in Texas.477 White was later reduced to a 
formula by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Zimmer v. McKeithen.478•
Five years and three new justices after Palmer, the Supreme Court adopted an intent 
standard - but relied primarily on effect evidence to assess motivation.479 Under the Equal Protection 
Clause, said Justice White for a 7-2 majority in Washington v. Davis, "a law claimed to be racially 
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. "480 It would not be 
unconstitutional "solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact "481 Otherwise - this was the 
slippery slope on the effect side - all sorts of tax, welfare, regulatory, and other policies that bore 
more heavily on members of one race than of another would be drawn into question.482 Nonetheless, 
"an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, 
including L11e fact, if it is true, that Ui.e law bears more heaviiy on one race than another. "483 Lest it 
be thought that the blurring of the concepts of motive and impact was careless or inadvertent, Justice 
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John Paul Stevens 's concurrence underscored the point that intent could be proven by indirect 
evidence: "Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what 
actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For 
normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds ....  My point in 
making this observation is to suggest that the line between discriminatory purpose and 
discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not as critical, as the reader of the Court's 
opinion might assume." 484 
A year after Washington v. Davis, Justice Lewis Powell outlined some of the ways to prove 
purpose, drawing heavily on Brest's critique of Palmer.485 A racially disproportionate impact "may
provide an important starting point" for the inquiry into motive.486 Once plaintiffs showed that race 
was "a motivating factor" - it was unnecessary to demonstrate that it was "dominant" or "primary" -
the burden of proof switched to the defendants to prove that "the same decision would have resulted 
even had the impermissible purpose not been considered. "487 In addition to impact, intent could be 
deduced from "the historical background of the decision," the sequence of events that led up to it, 
especially whether there were departures from normal procedures, the legislative or administrative 
history, and statements from officials.488 
A sex discrimination challenge to the Massachusetts veterans' preference for state 
employment elicited the last major doctrinal discussion of intent from the Supreme Court during the 
1970s.489 The concept of discriminatory purpose, announced Justice Potter Stewart's opinion of the 
court, means "that the decisionmaker .. .  selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in 
part 'because of, ' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."490 Exactly 
how this criterion applied to a legislature, which is not a unitary decisionmaker, Stewart did not 
-------<e..,x-rpmlo"i"'e-. -iL-Tike-I'uwellanctStevens before furn, Justice Stewart rejected the necessity of proving 
intent by direct statements: "Proof of discriminatory intent must necessarily usually rely on objective 
factors. "491 And as in Yick Wo, the Court seemed most moved by facts that can be encapsulated 
easily in a 2 X 2 table, such as Table 13.  Both the majority and Justices Stevens and White in a 
concurring opinion seemed to rest their opinions in this "intent case" largely on the bottom left cell 
of the table. The fact that nearly half the males were non-veterans and that they got hired by the 
state government approximately proportionately was a clear indication to seven members of the 
Supreme Court that the veterans' preference was not a mere subterfuge for sex discrimination.492 
(The District and Appeals Courts had focused on the contrast between the two columns. No matter 
that a minority of men were disadvantaged- 98% of women were!)493 
(Table 1 3  about here.) 
The intent standard stumbled into the arena of voting rights in 1980 in a confused set of 
opinions in City of Mobile v. Bolden. 494 Three justices (Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist) signed onto 
Justice Stewart's  plurality opinion, which ruled that intent was the proper standard, even if a 
fundamental right such as voting were at stake, that only individual, not group voting rights were 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the evidence that had convinced District Court 
Judge Virgil Pittm_a._11 and t.he Fift.l:l Circuit Court of Appeals was irJ.Sufficient to pr-ove intent.495 Four 
other justices (White, Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan) believed that the evidence in Bolden had 
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proved a discriminatory intent, although Blackmun agreed with Mobile that Judge Pittman's single­
member district remedy was too extreme.496 Justice Stevens sided with Mobile on the grounds that 
the evidence had not proved a discriminatory impact, which he, Marshall, and Brennan believed to 
be the proper standard. 497 
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion was subjected to perhaps the most vociferous protest of 
any Supreme Court civil rights opinion since Brown. According to Prof. Avi Soifer, Stewart 
required an "overwhelming demonstration of the most blatant form of discriminatory motive ... .  proof 
far stronger than the standard of causation generally used in the common law .... proof akin to that 
required in a criminal context...a smoking gun. "498 Civil rights lawyer Frank Parker believed that 
Stewart had rejected the "foreseeability standard" and had "implied that circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory purpose would not suffice to prove discriminatory intent. "499 Similar glosses on 
Stewart's opinion fueled the struggle over the renewal of the Voting Rights Act in 198 1- 82.500 Was 
Bolden so extreme? Did it establish, unequivocably, not only an "intent" standard, but one that 
required direct, not objective or circumstantial evidence?501 In short, what was Bolden' s intent? 
One consideration that undercuts this extreme reading is that Stewart began by interpreting 
Guinn and Gomillion as "purpose" cases, despite the fact that, as shown above, no direct evidence of 
intent was presented in either case.502 A second is that he recognized the potential relevance of 
discriminatory impact, merely stating that impact "alone cannot be decisive . . .  of discriminatory 
purpose." 503 A third is that the plaintiffs had not contended that the at-large system of the Mobile 
city government had been established with a discriminatory purpose, and they had not pointed to 
particular officials and particular events that had maintained it for a discriminatory purpose. Stewart 
specifically reserved the question of discriminatory maintenance, and did not rule out the possibility 
--------rhl!Lobjective evttlence might be sufficient to prove 1V 
The difficulty with Stewart's opinion was not that it embraced a direct intent criterion, but 
that it established no standard at all.505 Ignoring Justice White 's "totality of the circumstances"506 or 
"totality of the relevant facts"507 phrases, Stewart considered four factors, which he rejected as 
"sufficient proof' of discriminatory purpose one by one, without discussing whether they might be 
adequate if weighed together, or specifying what sort of additional evidence might tip the scales in 
the plaintiffs' direction. The fact that no black had ever been elected to the Mobile City 
Commission, if considered "alone," was only evidence of normal political defeat. Proof of racial 
discrimination in mi.micipal employment and public services was, by itself, only a "tenuous and 
circumstantial" indication of the invalidity of the electoral system. The history of past official racial 
discrimination in Mobile, unless specifically related to the establishment or maintenance of the 
Commission, was only "of limited help" in the purpose inquiry. The numbered place and majority 
vote requirements disadvantaged any minority, but did not prove an intent to discriminate against 
blacks specifically.508
The cynical interpretation of Stewart's opinion, especially in light of the trenchant criticisms 
in the dissents of Justices White and Marshall, was that a result-oriented anti-civil rights faction on 
the Supreme Court would set standards that were as difficult as possible for minority litigants to 
meet and would then captiously reject whatever evidence was offered.5°' The more optimistic gloss 
was Lliat all tl:le plurality required was greatei specificity ai1d car-e in argument. According to this 
view, the relations of general trends to particular decisions that established or maintained the 
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electoral systems in question had to be demonstrated explicitly, and either direct or circumstantial 
evidence of the racially discriminatory intent of such acts was acceptable. Titis sort of careful 
hypothesis testing of causal explanations was just what political historians, particularly historians of 
southern politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, had been doing for years. When Bolden 
and the companion school board case in Mobile were argued before the district court on remand in 
198 1 ,  the plaintiffs brought in historians as expert witnesses and concentrated on motivation.510 Once 
again, they prevailed, and this time, Judge Pittman's new decisions, full of lessons on Reconstruction 
and "Progressive Era" history, were not overturned on appeal.511
Besides the Bolden remand's empirical proof that it was possible to establish the intent of 
the original framers of an aged electoral scheme in a court, 1982 brought two other relevant events. 
First, in a case in which the evidence seemed almost indistinguishable from that in the original 
Bolden case , but where lower court judges had phrased their decisions in intent, rather than effect 
terms, a 6-3 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the at-large system for electing county 
commissioners in Burke County, Georgia, had been maintained for racially discriminatory 
reasons.512 Joined in the majority by Bolden dissenters Brennan and Marshall, as well as by Chief 
Justice Burger, who had been part of the plurality in Bolden, Justice Blackmun, who had concurred 
with the outcome in Bolden because of the remedy ordered, and Justice O'Connor, who had replaced 
Stewart, Justice White triumphantly led the retreat from Mobile back to Dallas and San Antonio. 
Pointedly not citing Feeney, White catalogued a series of factors that, he asserted, proved a racial 
intent in this rural black-majority county: racially polarized voting and no black candidate ever 
elected: past official discrimination in education and voting regulations, which inhibited blacks' 
current registration and political participation; exclusion from Democratic ��po=s�ts�un=n=·l�l=9�7�6�; 
__
_
__
_
_ 
_ 
property qualifications for some offices; hiring discrimination in the county government; the 
unresponsiveness of the County government to the particularized concerns of African-Americans; 
blacks '  depressed socioeconomic status; the refusal of representatives to the state legislature, who by 
tradition controlled local legislation, to introduce bills requiring single-member districts; the large 
geographical size of Burke County; and the majority vote and numbered post requirements for 
election. 513 
The second event was the debate over and amendment of section two of the Voting Rights 
Act, which made clear, contrary to the plurality opinion in Bolden, that Congress meant to allow 
plaintiffs in voting rights cases to prevail if they demonstrated either intent or effect 514 According to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the bill, a plaintiff who chooses to prove intent under the 
amended section two may rely on "direct or indirect circumstantial evidence, including the normal 
inferences to be drawn from the foreseeability of defendant's actions ... "515 Paraphrasing White v. 
Regester and Zimmer v. McKeithen, the report also outlined nine factors which might be relevant to 
proving a case of discriminatory effect, only two of which - a candidate slating process from which 
minorities were excluded, and racial appeals in campaigns - were not considered by Justice White in 
Lodge as indicators of intent.516 The conjunction within two days of the publication of the Lodge 
opinion and the passage of the amended Voting Rights Act made clear that it matters less whether 
the standard in voting rights cases is referred to as "intent" or "effect" than what sorts of evidence 
are counted as probative and how they are weighed. 517
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The patchwork of intent and effect discussions in other Supreme Court decisions of the 
1980s formed a crazy quilt whose doctrinal pattern was strikingly irregular.518 In 198 1 ,  for instance, 
the same four justices who had formed the plurality in Bolden joined in another plurality opinion in 
Michael M., a case in which California's statutory rape law was challenged on two grounds: first, 
that its effect was to discriminate against males, and second, that its adoption in the nineteenth 
century was tainted by now-outmoded sexual stereotypes of young women.519 But whereas in 
Bolden, Rehnquist, Stewart, Burger. and Powell had demanded proof of intent, in Michael M., they 
returned to the intent-irrelevant view of O'Brien and Palmer v. Thompson! An "impermissible 
motive," Rehnquist intoned, would not void an "otherwise constitutional statute."520 Yet four years 
later, this time for a unanimous court, Rehnquist rejected a provision of the 1901 Alabama 
Constitution that disfranchised people convicted of various petty or more serious crimes largely on 
the ground that it would not have been adopted "but for" a racially discriminatory motive.521 This 
time, motive was not only relevant, but the presence of a "permissible motive," the state 
constitutional convention's desire to disfranchise poor whites, did not "trump" its racially 
discriminatory motive. 522 
In the mid-decade's most important voting rights case, Thornburg v. Gingles, Justice 
Brennan ignored intent altogether in tossing out certain districts adopted in the 1981 North Carolina 
legislative reapportionment.523 The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act rendered effect 
evidence sufficient, and three of the nine "Senate Report factors" seemed to Brennan more important 
than the others: minority electoral success, compactness, and cohesion.524 Apparently satisfied to 
have three points to tick off, lower court judges often considered intent evidence, but the Supreme 
Court did not, at least in the voting_rights area, provide further guidance on the proper inte_nt_crite_ria�--- -
V. D. Nine Intent Factors and Their Rationales in Voting Rights Cases 
The nine White-Zimmer factors, numbered and codified in the 1982 Senate Report, and 
narrowed to three main points in Justice Brennan's Gingles opinion, set out clearly what courts 
should focus on when determining whether the effect of an electoral regulation is illegal. But what 
factors should typically be taken into account in an intent inquiry, and what the rationale for each is 
has not been explained systematically. Judicial opinions, logic, and my own and others' experiences 
in normal scholarship and in testimony in voting rights cases suggest that nJne elements ought to be 
taken into account. 
Underlying every historical explanation is an implicit or explicit model of human behavior, 
a theory, often inchoate, of how people typically act in certain kinds of situations. Sometimes based 
on empirical generalizations, sometimes, on rough analogies, sometimes, on common sense, these 
frameworks should not mechanically detennine conclusions-if they do, why bother about the 
evidence? But they do establish baselines of initial plausibility for different possible interpretations, 
and the thinner the available evidence in any instance, the more determinative of conclusions the 
theory is likely to be. Three examples drawn from the voting rights area illustrate, respectively, the 
systematic, commonsensical, and analogical foundations of models. At-large elections have 
repeatedly been found to disadvantage political or racial minorities. 525 Politicians who desire 
election or reelection care quite a lot about electoral laws and changes in them. 526 In the first 
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instance in American history in which a large number of members of an ethnic minority were able to 
vote, during the post-Civil War era in the Deep South, politicos immediately demonstrated both the 
willingness and the ability to gerrymander district lines in order to crack, stack, and pack African­
American voters. 527 
Judges, as well as historians, have frequently made such models important parts of their 
reasoning. In Feeney, for instance, Justice Stewart stressed that both federal and state governments 
had long given military veterans special hiring privileges, which implied that there was nothing 
special about Massachusetts' actions, no unusual animus against women that needed to be 
explained. 528 In his plurality opinion in Bolden, Stewart claimed-ignoring the mass of contrary 
scholarly findings, even in one of the works he cited!-that an at-large system of elections "was 
universally heralded not many years ago as a praiseworthy and progressive reform of corrupt 
municipal government."529 In Davis v. Bandemer, Justice White drew on the common understanding 
that "whenever a legislature redistricts, those responsible for the legislation will know the likely 
political composition of the new districts and will have a prediction as to whether a particular district 
is a safe one for a Democratic or Republican candidate or is a competitive district that either 
candidate might win."530 The "suspect classification" doctrine reflects judges' empirical 
generalization that laws that treat people of different races differently are likely to have been 
motivated by racial prejudice.531 
Whatever their validity in particular instances, such generalizations are significant because 
they provide keys to what one can expect that political actors know and foresee, and because they 
affect the degree of skepticism with which analysts approach each possible explanation. If one 
expects politicians never to be interested in reelection or to be ignorant of how to draw district lines 
or other electoral arrangements to their enemies' or allies' disadvantage, one might accept at face 
value statements of civic virtue in reapportionment or be genuinely surprised when electoral systems 
had the effect of disadvantaging minorities. Because of their background importance in shaping 
reasoning, psychological or sociological models ought to be adopted self-consciously, and they 
ought to be based on the best available empirical evidence. There is no easier way to construct a 
biased "law office history" than to begin with one's conclusions, basing them on little more than 
unexamined individual experiences and values. 
The second factor is the historical context, especially the sequence of events, which is 
important for what it reveals about the general attitudes and interests of decisionmakers. In the 
remand portion of the Mobile cases, for instance, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the at-large 
election systems for the Mobile city government and school board originated not in 191 1 or 1919, as 
everyone had assumed at the time of the first Bolden case, but in the 1 870s, a time of violent racial 
turmoil, when the vast majority of blacks were still able to vote, and when they had been appointed 
and elected to offices in Mobile. The fact that white Democratic primaries for the city government 
were held on a ward basis from 1872 to 1906, while general elections, at which blacks could vote, 
were at-large, offered further evidence that those who shaped electoral laws at the time were fully 
aware of the racially discriminatory consequences of their actions.532 Obviously, Mobile 
decisionmakers knew that the voters preferred ward elections, and they designed elections to let 
whites settle their battles first in segregated primaries, and then solidly confront blacks in an 
electoral structure guaranteed to disadvantage minorities. 
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Hunter v. Underwood challenged a suffrage provision, section 182, of the 1901 Alabama 
constitution, which had been formed by a convention whose chief purpose, openly and widely 
advertised, was to disfranchise as many blacks as possible. 533 A contention that any of the suffrage 
provisions was free of the white supremacist zeal that animated that convention was too incredible 
even for the defendants, who merely argued that the convention delegates wished to disfranchise 
poor whites, too.534 U.S. v. Dallas County involved an at-large election scheme for a county 
government that had been passed in 1901 between the time that the disfranchising convention was 
authorized and that it met.535 White politicians from Dallas county, the county seat of which is 
Selma, were among the leaders in the 1901 constitutional convention, and the same motives, the 
plaintiffs successfully stressed, lay behind the county at-large election provision. 
In Taylor v. Haywood County, Tennessee, it was held to be significant that the county 
switched to an at-large mode of electing its road commission at its initial opportunity after the 
election of the first black ever to sit on that board.536 In Garza, the 1959 redistricting, coming just 
after the closest election for supervisor in the postwar era537 and the only one in which a Hispanic 
candidate launched a major campaign and taking place just before new census data would be 
available, raises considerable suspicion. Furthermore, the continued northward, but rarely eastward 
extension of the Third Supervisorial District in the face of Hispanic protests and political activism in 
1971 and 198 1 makes clear that the ethnic and political consequences of the redistrictings were 
foreseen by all participants.538 Any local or state election laws enacted shortly after the invalidation 
of laws such as the white primary ,539 during the turmoil after the Brown decision,540 a serious contest 
by a significant minority candidate,541 the passage of the Voting Rights Act,542 or coterminous with a 
minority voter registration campaign or a racially charged election543 should come into court bearing 
a heavy motivational burden. 
The third factor should be the text or provisions of the law or regulation, or, in the case of 
alleged racial gerrymandering, the pattern of the lines, compared to ethnic geography. The law at 
issue in U.S. v. Dallas County, for instance, tacked the at-large scheme on in an illogical and 
syntactically clumsy way at the end of a section that had clearly established a ward system.544 This 
fact raised the suspicion that the method of election was a last-minute thought, an insurance scheme 
to preserve white supremacy in case the constitutional convention did not go as planned, or the 
courts invalidated the resulting constitution. 545 The addition of some, but not other misdemeanors to 
the list of felonies for which men were disfranchised by section 182 of the 1901 Alabama 
constitution was taken to be an indication of racially discriminatory intent by the Supreme Court in 
Hunter v. Underwood, especially since one of the misdemeanors appended was miscegenation,546 a 
racist "crime" for which white men were never convicted in the South. Numbered post, majority 
vote, anti-"single shot,"547 and staggered terms provisions of at-large election systems are indicators 
of motivation because all are well understood to disadvantage minorities. Similarly, secret ballot 
acts that denied illiterates any assistance, at the time of widespread illiteracy, especially among 
African-Americans, broadcast their purpose.54S The "uncouth 28-sided figure" was enough to 
convince the Supreme Court in Gomillion, and the East Los Angeles Wall between the First and 
Third Supervisorial Districts supports the same inference of ethnically discriminatory desires. 549 
The fourth variety of evidence is basic demographic facts. A rising and/or concentrated 
minority population, unusually populous or geographically spread out districts, which magnify the 
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disadvantages of representatives of relatively impecunious groups, and populations whose depressed 
educational and economic levels reflect the vestiges of past racial and ethnic discrimination are all 
facts that politicians can be expected to observe, and that, therefore, should be assumed to affect 
their design of electoral structures. Literate adult male blacks, for example, constituted 78% of one 
of the four single-member residency districts detailed in the 1901 Alabama law at issue in U.S. v. 
Dallas County, as well as slight majorities of two other districts. 550 Had courts ordered the literacy 
test in the 1901 Alabama constitution to be fairly administered, therefore, African-Americans would 
almost certainly have been able to elect at least one commissioner in Dallas county under a ward 
system. No one, of course, doubted that politics in Selma in 1901 was racially polarized, or that 
whites considered black political power threatening. Plaintiffs argued that these facts and the 
hypothesized outcome under single-member districts strengthened the case that the at-large system 
was adopted with a racially discriminatory intent.551 The demographic information and discussion 
that comprise such a large proportion of the redistricting files in Los Angeles county, especially in 
1981,  show unmistakably that all participants were aware of the unequaled size of the districts and 
the ethnic facts of the county's life, and that they took these into account in drawing lines between 
supervisorial districts. 552 
Two basic political facts, the number of minority candidates elected and the approximate 
extent of racial polarization among voters, also must be assumed to condition the expectations of 
officials who frame or maintain electoral arrangements. Blacks and their white allies dominated 
offices in the Alabama Black Belt during Reconstruction. Although little direct evidence survives 
about the reasons for moves to substitute appointive for elective local governments in Dallas and 
other counties. historians have ne_�uiilllhted.thaLracially discriminatocy_purpose&undeday-su1ui-------­
laws.553 That all of the officers appointed were white-a d:·amatically disproportionate racial 
effect-is, of course, what primarily convinced historians of the racist intent of the provisions. In a
1 978 Sumter County, South Carolina referendum on whether to switch from at-large to single-
member districts for the county commission, a newspaper advertisement arranged by the incumbent 
white commissioners touted the easier election of minority-favored candidates as one of the 
"advantages" of single-member districts, and (for anyone who missed the racial cue once) as one of 
the "disadvantages" of the at-large system. The one black among the seven Sumter County 
commissioners was not informed of the meeting that authorized the advertisement. 554 In 
Chattanooga, Tennessee during the 1970s and 80s, only one black candidate for the city commission 
attracted a substantial white crossover vote-a fact evident even without statistical analyses of 
voting, since he was the only black in that one-third black city to win. It is logical to assume that 
projections from such past experience conditioned opinions about the consequences of changing to a 
single-member district system during a referendum on the subject in 1988, voting in which was, as 
usual, racially polarized. 555 Similarly, in Los Angeles, everyone who dealt with county government 
knew that no supervisor was Hispanic in the postwar era, and there was a widespread understanding 
that, given a viable and otherwise attractive choice, Hispanics usually preferred Hispanic candidates, 
but Anglos did not. 556 
A sixth factor is the background of key decisionmakers, because it may reflect on their 
motives in particular instances. The principal framer of section 182 of the 1901 Alabama 
constitution, John Fielding Bums, was a planter and longtime magistrate in then-80%-black Dallas 
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county, who presided over a court where most defendants were black.557 Burns's experiences reduce 
the plausibility of the argument of the defendants that the section was aimed principally at poor 
whites.558 James Nunnellee, who introduced the Dallas County Commission bill into the State Senate 
in 1901, was the editor of the Selma Times. In 1895, he had written: 
The Times is one of those papers that docs not believe it is any hann to rob or 
appropriate the vote of an illiterate Negro. We do not believe they ought ever to 
have had the privilege of voting. This right was given or forced upon them, and the 
white people by the bayonette [sic], and the first law of nature, self preservation, 
gives us the right to do anything to keep our race and civilization from being wiped 
off the face of the earth. 559 
Although their sentiments were no doubt a good deal tamer than Nunnellee's, the key roles 
of Ron Smith and Allan Hoffenblum in campaigns against prominent minority politicians undercut 
arguments that they were sincerely concerned only to create districts where blacks or Hispanics 
would have a fair chance to elect candidates of their choice. 560 
Like their backgrounds, other actions of decisionmakers may be indirect indicators of their 
general attitudes toward minority groups. There are two broad classes of such indicators - process 
indexes and output indexes. The fonner includes everything from imposing voting restrictions such 
as poll taxes or literacy tests to holding hearings and appointing minority representatives to 
decisionmaking bodies. A legislature that restricted the suffrage in a manner that disproportionately 
affected members of minority groups, or that won office from such an electorate, may well have been 
motivated by the same bias when it designed an electoral structure. Thus, Justice Rehnquist's 
quotation in Hunter v. Underwood of parts of the white supremacist opening speech of John B. 
Knox, the president ortlieI901 Alabama Conslltut10nal Convention, and his references to other 
discriminatory actions of that convention were pertinent to the motives of the convention in adopting 
section 182.561 
Similarly, the purportedly beneficent objects of an official body that does not provide 
minority group members with a forum to express their views, or that only creates an appearance of 
listening, are suspect. No Los Angeles county supervisorial redistricting plan adopted since 1953 has 
been unveiled before the meeting at which it was voted upon. No one outside the inner circles of 
power has been apprised of the proposed boundaries in time to comment meaningfully. 
Furthennore, the appointment of minority Boundary Commission members in 1981 and the opening 
of Commission meetings to presentations by CFR were, as shown above,562 mere shams. The 
minority Boundary Commissioners were either servants of the supervisors or political ingenues, and 
none was included in the Commission's private negotiations. The CFR plan was never considered 
seriously by either Republicans or Democrats on the Board, or by their representatives on the 
Commission. It was not that Hispanic groups ' opinions were honestly weighed and rejected - an 
exercise of discretion characteristic of legislative bodies, and one that would have removed at least 
some of the bad feeling from and part of the legal underpinning of a redistricting challenge. Instead, 
the Board acted to defuse hostility and potential protest by creating the counterfeit of a fair and open 
process, by seeming responsive without actually being responsive. 
The term "iesponsiveness" is more typically applied to output meas-ures, such as gauges of 
equality of services. If ghettoes or barrios have unpaved streets, no sewers, parks and schools badly 
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in disrepair, inadequate police, fire, and medical services, few appointments to boards and 
commissions, etc., while Anglo areas enjoy excellent public benefits, then one suspects that electoral 
structures designed or maintained by the same government may be deliberately discriminatory. 563 
But responsiveness is often difficult to determine precisely, for two reasons: first, records are often 
not available by race or ethnicity or for areas that correspond closely to ethnically distinct districts; 
and, second, measures of different services may give different results. However accurate or 
unequivocal the measures, responsiveness is not the same as representation, but only an indirect 
indicator of it. Mussolini made the trains run on time, but dispensed with elections. To make an 
intent case hinge on responsiveness, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did in Lodge v. Buxton,564 
is to substitute one's judgment of what government ought to be doing for the voters' right to select 
candidates of their own choice. 
Statements by important participants, which are referred to as "smoking gun" evidence if
they are sufficiently incriminating, are difficult to come by and must be interpreted with due caution 
and skepticism, but may, in some cases, be significant. It is certainly too strong to say that they 
constitute "no test of intent at all. "565 The only direct evidence of the intent of the framer of section 
182, or of other delegates to the 1901 Alabama Constitutional Convention, is a newspaper interview 
with John F. Burns, in which he stated his belief that the wife-beating provision of the section alone 
would disfranchise 60% of the adult male blacks in the state.566 The chief sponsor of a 1962 
Mississippi law requiring all cities with a mayor-council form of government to adopt at-large 
elections urged its passage in order "to maintain our southern way of life."567 
But statements from participants may be misleading because people may distort the 
expression of their intentions in four ways. First, they may simply forget, or say they for�L' w=h"-y 
___
_ ___ 
_ 
they acted. The most common single response by protagonists, sometimes prompted by their 
counsel, in the depositions in the Garza case was "!  don't recall."568 Second, people may have, or say 
they have, several motives for acting, and they may retrospectively weigh one sort of intention 
differently than they actually did when they acted. When discussing why he opposed the 
Hoffenblum plan in 198 1 ,  Supervisor Edelman stressed ethnic factors; when remembering his 
actions in 1989, he emphasized partisan reasons.569 Third, people may try to appear to be lambs, 
when they are actually wolves. The repeated attribution to themselves of the most civic-minded, 
selfless motives by people whose actions belie their words is one of the delights of Garza for the 
inveterate ironist. Fourth, sometimes sheep perversely wish to seem to be wolves, or at least they 
hide a bad motive behind a worse one. When they passed poll taxes, literacy or property tests, and 
white primary laws around the turn of the nineteenth century in the South, upper-class white 
Democratic disfranchisers often concealed their desire to rid the electorate of poorer whites, 
especially Republicans and Populists, behind a cloud of racist rhetoric. To be sure, their principal 
aim was to exclude most African-Americans from the polls, but they hoped simultaneously to 
eliminate all partisan and class opponents--objectives that they rarely paraded.570 Since 
sophisticated and well-counseled politicians such as those in Los Angeles are unlikely to litter the 
area with smoldering guns, the absence of smoke should not be taken to imply that no infraction has 
been committed. 
State policies and formal and informal institutional rules constitute the ninth and last general 
category of relevance. If every city or county in a particular state has exactly the same electoral 
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structure, it is difficult to argue that one locality adopted that structure for a different purpose than 
the rest did. If there is no variation, in other words, there is no variation to be explained. 571 On the 
other hand, if there are diverse electoral setups from place to place, then one may possibly have been 
chosen for racially discriminatory reasons.572 Formal rules, such as the necessity to obtain four votes 
to adopt a redistricting plan in Los Angeles county, and informal rules, such as legislative deference 
to local Democratic delegations in South Carolina in 1967, also help to shape explanations. In the 
former case, the existence of the four-vote rule implies that one should discount much of the pro­
Hispanic rhetoric of supervisors and their operatives in 198 1 as mere posturing, because everyone 
realized that the final plan adopted would have to satisfy incumbents of both political parties.573 The 
tradition of legislative deference in South Carolina suggests that one can concentrate on the intent of 
the local legislative delegation, ignoring that of other legislators, which makes the problem more 
tractable. 574 
V. E. Hypothesis-Testing, Counterfactuals, and Standards for 
Determining the Existence of Racially Discriminatory Motives 
When historians attempt to explain some event, they implicitly or explicitly choose between 
two or more possible explanations on the basis of the extant evidence, relevant theory, and analogies. 
To say that racial or sex discrimination motivated an action is to say that discrimination caused the 
action, in some sense, and that other suggested or possible rationales did not cause it, or were less 
important, or at least do not wholly exclude invidious discrimination as a cause. Explanations 
cannot be assessed independently, but only in relation to other explanations. To ap"'p�rru�·�se�th=e�--------­
evidence for a racially discriminatory motive, arrayed under some or all of the nine rubrics discussed 
above, then, one must also examine the cases for other possible motives. How is this to be done, and 
what weight must be attached to a "bad" motive for it to be sufficiently important to be illegal, or, 
conversely, how powerful an influence does a "good" motive have to be to wash away possible stains 
of a bad one? Answers to these questions offered by courts and commentators have been either 
indeterminate or unsatisfactory. 
One clear, but clearly wrong answer limits a government's actions only by the inventiveness 
of its lawyers. "It will be next to impossible," remarks John Hart Ely, "for a court responsibly to 
conclude that a decision was affected by an unconstitutional motivation whenever it is possible to 
articulate a plausible legitimate explanation for the action taken."575 Applying this principle, Ely 
would have upheld the North Carolina literacy test passed in 1 900. Yet no historian who has 
examined the passage of that provision has ever doubted that it was adopted for a racially 
discriminatory purpose.576 Depending on what different judges considered "plausible" or 
"legitimate," such a standard would either ratify nearly every action or provide no guidance at all. 
Justice Brown in Plessy implicitly accepted the argument that mandatory segregation on railroads 
was a mere incidental regulation, which lacked any discriminatory intent, while the first Justice 
Harlan swallowed the Augusta school board's line that by closing the only black public high school 
in the city, it was merely trying to save money and take better care of black elementary school 
students. 577 A standard that might fail to rule out disfranchisement, segregation, and racially unequal 
exclusion from public services cannot be acceptable. 
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By a similar argument, it is  unreasonable to approve just any rationale first offered in debate 
or reports at the time of adoption of the statute or regulation. Proponents of school segregation from 
the 1 840s on claimed that blacks learned in a different manner than whites did, and that segregation 
was therefore beneficial for children of both races.578 Others contended, often plausibly, that racial 
separation would inhibit violence.579 Accepted at face value, these are unquestionably legitimate 
governmental ends. It follows immediately that if a court is serious about considering intent, it must 
pursue the quest beyond simple assertions of beneficent or neutral purposes, even if these were made 
before the filings of lawsuits. To allow some motive, however worthy, to excuse another motive, 
however harmful, without further attempts to weigh their importance is to abandon a fair and honest 
search for intent, and to countenance policies that nearly everyone would now condemn. 
Two phrases in leading opinions of the Supreme Court reflect somewhat different notions of 
causality, and in idealized cases, may lead to different decisions. In Arlington Heights, Justice 
Powell remarked that once discriminatory purpose had been shown to be "a motivating factor," the 
burden shifted to the agency to prove "that the same decision would have resulted even had the 
impermissible purpose not been considered. "580 In other words, it had to disprove the hypothesis that 
a favorable disposition toward racial discrimination was a necessary condition of its action. The 
formula in Justice Stewart's opinion in Feeney not only swaps the burden of proof, but, somewhat 
surprisingly, may be more favorable to those alleging racial discrimination. "Discriminatory 
purpose," according to Justice Stewart, "implies that the decisionmaker . . .  selected or reaffirmed a 
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects 
upon an identifiable group. "581 
A hypothetical illustration will illuminate facets of these criteria and the roles they might 
play in more realistic situations, and it will make some sense out of the concept of institutional 
intent. 582 Suppose that a legislature consists of five robots, whose agenda is set by some fair 
procedure, such as randomizing the order in which proposals are voted on, and who pass laws by 
simple majority rule with abstention prohibited. Because they are robots, we know the legislators' 
true preferences, the information each has, and the decisionmaking procedure each goes through. 
Suppose that the legislature has selected an electoral law, and that we trying to determine whether it 
acted with a racially discriminatory intent. 
Consider seven cases: 
1 .  Three robots voted for the law solely on the grounds of race. In this example, racial 
feelings clearly caused the outcome, and to a court with any sort of causal intent standard, it would 
not matter what the other two robots did, or why they did it. This is an easy case, so long as we do 
not adopt the Ely rule. 
2. The most important reason that three robots favored the law was their discriminatory 
racial preferences, but other views that they had pointed in the same direction. This transgresses the 
Feeney test, but not Arlington Heights, because, as I have set up the example, the robots would have 
made the same decision even if race had not been taken into account. The counterfactual here 
(assume that race was not a consideration) seems misleading, because we know that race was the 
primary reason for acting. It follows that a legislature that fails the Arlington Heights test is 
unquestionably guilty of discrimination, but that the actions of a legislature that passes that test may 
still have been motivated by a discriminatory intent. If intent is the proper criterion, then Arlington 
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Heights is a decisive test in only one direction. 
The reason for this is that Arlington Heights treats hypotheses assymetrically. It is true, in 
this example, that the law would have been adopted even if race had not been taken into account, but 
it is also true that if the other factors had not been considered, but race had been, the law would also 
have been enacted. The "but for" test requires a necessary condition. The example suggests that 
race need be at most a sufficient condition in order to satisfy intuitive notions of intent. If it is 
appropriate to array the facts of any particular case in a 2 X 2 table, such as Tables 12 and 13, this 
example indicates the necessity of taking into account all four cells of the table, rather than focusing 
on only one of them. 
3. Four robots split evenly, purely on nonracial grounds, but the fifth votes for the law either 
solely or principally out of racist principles, and would probably not have done so had race not been 
a consideration. This is an infraction under Feeney, and the example is consonant with informal 
understandings of causality. After all, a racial motive was decisive. Whether the instance passes 
Arlington Heights or not depends on which side gets the benefit of the doubt in the counterfactual 
thought experiment. It also seems ironic that Arlington Heights might rule the legislature guilty in 
this instance, in which only one robot was moved by racial feelings, while it would sustain the three 
racially-motivated robots in case two, above. 
4. This is the same as case three, except that the fifth robot cannot weigh all of her 
preferences against each other simultaneously (as we have been implicitly assuming so far), but 
makes her decision "lexicographically." That is, she first considers the aspect of the law that is most 
important to her, and tests it by her values and the information at hand. If that decision produces a 
tie, she goes on to what for her is the second most important feature, and so on, until she can make a 
clear choice, at which point she stops. For instance, she may believe that the most significant facet 
of an at-large elections scheme is that it produces a citywide viewpoint in each councilperson, which 
she may favor, but that this is balanced by the fact that such cosmopolitan political figures may be 
too distant from their constituents to respond to their needs. She then turns to another aspect of the 
system, hoping eventually to be swayed. 
Suppose that race is only the tenth most important consideration about the law for the fifth 
robot, but that it is the first one that is decisive for her. Then it was, indeed, a racist opinion that 
caused her to cast her vote for the law, and, since she was pivotal, it was her action that caused the 
legislature to act. Again, this would be an infringement according to the Feeney test, but it would 
also unequivocally breach Arlington Heights, even though race was quite a minor consideration, 
which only one of the robots took into account. As the impact of racial concerns becomes more and 
more attenuated, the examples approach closer and closer to "for want of a nail, the shoe was 
lost, . . .  " yarns, but the situations do seem true to the letter, at least, of Arlington Heights and Feeney. 
5. The law passes by a majority of four robots, and not more than one of them acts for a 
racially discriminatory motive, or unanimously, and not more than two are so infected. This is an 
infringement under Feeney, because the majority acts "in part because of' racism, but is not under 
Arlington Heights, since a majority for the law would have formed regardless of racial 
considerations. In practice, since one would rarely know enough about the motives of the three-
legislatoi majority to discow1t race entirely, Arlington Heights would also probably invalidate U'lis 
law. 
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6. The robots are programmed in such a manner that race cannot be distinguished from 
some other factor or factors, and that complex of factors causes a majority or a pivotal member to 
vote for the election scheme. For instance, non-minority incumbents desire to protect their 
reelection chances, they know that at-large elections disadvantage minority candidates, who might 
threaten their political careers, and they adopt or maintain at-large elections. Suppose further that in 
this instance, racial and non-racial considerations cannot be separated from each other by any 
evidentiary test, because there is no minority incumbent, or at least she is not pivotal in the coalition 
for at-large elections, and the means chosen to protect incumbents necessarily reduce the opportunity 
of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice. This example violates the constitution under 
both Feeney's "in part because of' test, and Arlington Heights's "but for" criterion, since no set of 
motives that excludes race can result in the passage of the law.583 The illustration also begins to 
point to potential difficulties in dealing with mixed motives. 
In certain instances, intertwined motives may be unraveled through the use of 
counterfactuals. For example, suppose that in 1965, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors 
could have accomplished the goal of equalizing population by a means that did not disadvantage 
Hispanics. Suppose, instead, the Board chose a means to population equality that reduced the 
Hispanic proportion in the Third District, instead of increasing it. Then the two motives may be 
separated, for the Board did not have to dilute the Hispanic vote in order to achieve population 
equality. 584 The "reasonably available altemati ves" argument, 585 which gains power when it can be 
shown that the governmental body considered certain alternatives, is just a means of disentangling 
motives by employing counterfactuals. 
7. Three robots either do not realize that the law will hurt minorities, or they know it, but go 
ahead for other reasons entirely. This law would wltllStand an attack under any of the proposed _______ _ 
intent criteria, and represents the situation that sophisticated defendants usually claim to have been 
the case. The example spotlights the importance in intent cases of foreseeability and foresight, as 
well as the necessity of evaluating hypotheses about other potential motives. 
These idealized examples suggest, first, that a disposition to disadvantage voters because of 
their race should be at most a sufficient, rather than a necessary condition, in order for a rule to be 
invalidated. Second, not every legislator, or even every legislator who is a member of the majority 
that passes the law need have been tainted by a racial concern, but only a pivotal member or group of 
them. Third, to determine sufficiency among pivotal legislators, all explanations, not just a racial 
hypothesis, must be examined. Fourth, racial and other considerations may be so intertwined as to 
make it impossible to examine them separately. In such instances, the decision rule must be to treat 
race plus the associated conditions as if they were a single racial concern. Otherwise, the possibility 
of finding a violation is eliminated by assumption. Fifth, since people often have mixed motives, 
and since we nearly always lack full information on legislators' preferences, decision processes, and 
knowledge, their motives in realistic situations will be more difficult to evaluate. 
While Feeney's causal terminology best states the ideal standard, in practice surviving 
evidence will usually be fragmentary, and no one fact will be determinative by itself. As a 
ccr1sequence, a more systematic version of tJ1e "totality of t.'le circw1..stai1ces" or "totality of u.'le 
relevant facts" approaches of White v. Register and Washington v. Davis, such as that offered in 
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section V.D., above, will be unavoidable. The key question, therefore, should not be "If all possible 
evidence relevant to the decisionmakers' motives were available, would we conclude that racial 
feelings were sufficient to have caused the passage of the law?" but, instead, "Given the surviving 
evidence, is the hypothesis that racial dispositions were sufficient to have caused the passage of the 
law better supported than alternative hypotheses are?" 
V. F. Falsifying Competing Hypotheses 
Evidence on the hypothesis of racially discriminatory intent has been reviewed above in 
section V.D. But for a historical explanation to be acceptable, it must not only be shown to be 
plausible. It must be demonstrated to be better warranted than other analyses, especially those that 
contradict it, in whole or in part. As a final demonstration of the workability of the multi-factor 
intent approach and of the feasibility of proof of intent in general, we must evaluate competing 
hypotheses explicitly. 
Rather than put on a full-scale intent case themselves, the defendants in Garza, in essence, 
posed three fragmentary, contradictory hypotheses about the county government's motives in 
reapportionment through their criticisms of MALDEF's arguments. The first might be termed the 
civic virtue hypothesis, with a corollary about the constraints inherent in legal requirements. The 
second stressed good will toward minorities. The third admitted that partisan, ideological, and 
personal self-interest shaped the lines between supervisorial districts, but contended that Latinos 
were inadvertently disadvantaged. 
Claims by campaign consultants and former supervisorial deputies that they were motivated 
in reapportionment only by a sense of civic responsibility, or that they cared less for the political 
welfare of the supervisors whom they represented than for that of millions of anonymous members 
of minority groups are not credible. Common sense, the history of anti-minority gerrymandering in 
California and elsewhere, and modem political theory, which begins with the assumption that 
politicians consult their self- interest first,586 all undermine such claims. 
The effect of their actions casts further doubt on the contention that all they wanted was "to 
do a noble and good thing. "587 District lines proposed by Ron Smith and Allan Hoffenblum, with the 
assistance of Joseph Shumate, protected their Republican sponsors by ridding their districts of areas 
that had voted against them in previous elections, especially those that were heavily populated by 
African-Americans and Latinos.588 As the testimony of demographers in the Garza case 
demonstrated, it would have been quite possible to draw a district in 1980 that contained a much 
higher percentage of Hispanics than either the Smith or Hoffenblum plans did, but no one, 
Democratic or Republican, attempted to do so. 
Democrats claimed to be responsive to minority concerns, but repulsed all efforts to raise the 
number of Hispanics in Edmund Edelman's Third Supervisorial District in 1981.  Edelman made 
much of his friendliness toward Hispanics and the fact that, as CFR asked, he opposed the 
Hoffenblum plan. But Edelman never took CFR's own plan seriously, even though CFR leaders 
rightly considered it a moderate compromise, he never negotiated with CFR, and his final proposal 
barely changed the status quo, which CFR had worked for months to overtum.589 Furthermore, in 
reapportionments from 1959 through 1971, Edelman's predecessor, Ernest Debs, had added large 
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numbers of Anglos, but very few Hispanics to his district. 590 
The historical context also counts against the civic virtue and minority concern theses. 
Ideologically committed Republicans had, in 1981,  just taken over the Board in a racially-tinged 
campaign. Aggressive and temporarily unified, they wanted to guarantee their shaky new-found 
supremacy in a predominantly Democratic county in which members of minority groups 
overwhelmingly identified with the Democrats. By contrast, the Democrats stolidly resisted, 
refusing to compromise. In the partisan trench warfare, members of minority groups were cast into 
no man's land. 
The defendants argued that CFR should have abandoned its own compromise proposal in 
1981 and joined the Republicans in support of the Smith Plan, possibly pressuring Edelman to accept 
a district with a very slight Hispanic population majority. Consequently, they asserted, the 
Hispanics themselves were responsible for the continuation of the division of Hispanic voters 
between the First and Third Districts. But in 1981, Smith and Hoffenblum were so unconcerned 
with conciliating CFR that they did not even inform them that it was the Smith Plan, not the 
Hoffenblum Plan, that they really favored, and instead of trying to negotiate with CFR leaders, they 
heatedly denounced them--which took off any pressure that Edelman might have felt to bend to 
CFR 's demands. In fact, both Republican plans, by reducing the Hispanic percentage in the district 
with the fastest-growing Hispanic population, Schabarum's, was unattractive to Hispanics, and the 
four-vote rule prevented its adoption anyway, since Edelman and Hahn had no reason to accept a 
plan that made their partisan opponents more secure. Far from showing that the Republicans acted 
with good will, this counterfactual merely displays their heavy-handed and inept attempt to conscript 
Hispanics in their partisan war, their unwillingness to offer Hispanics a winnable district, even at the 
-------<>.xpense-of-the-Democrats.-andtheiLliesire_to_reduce_the_opportunit)'_foLHispanicuo_intluem;e _______ _ 
politics in any seat currently held by a Republican. 
Other actions of the same people likewise belie their statements about their motives. Both 
Smith and Hoffenblum had directed extremely rough campaigns against prominent minority 
politicians, and after 1981, along with Shumate, they spearheaded the Sebastiani Initiative, a state 
reapportionment proposal that would have sharply reduced the number of black and Hispanic 
officeholders. 591 
Although legal rules did affect the outcome of redistricting, they did not prevent the 
supervisors or their allies from constructing a local governmental system that would have made it 
easier for Latino voters to elect candidates of their choice. No state law set the number of 
supervisors for the county, and, as Latino activists, a blue ribbon commission, and all of the 
supervisors recognized from at least 1970 on, expansion of the number of seats on the Board would 
have greatly increased the possibility of minority representation.592 According to the state election 
code, the Board may reapportion itself at any time within one year of a general election, and it did so 
three times in the 1950s and twice in the 1960s. Although overall population growth in the 1970s 
was spread relatively evenly across the districts, that was not the case during the 1980s,593 and the 
supervisors, who had authorized the establishment of a sophisticated demographic estimate unit, had 
the information on population inequalities and ethnic imbalance at hand. Why, in the face of 
massive, uneven growth, did the supervisors not take steps to equalize the districts during the 1980s? 
Why, if any of them really wanted to facilitate minority representation or even to undercut legal 
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challenges, did they not propose to redraw lines before the Garza case was filed? 
Neither the state election code's guidelines for redistricting, which emphasize geography, 
cohesiveness, and community of interests, nor the local criteria, which stress preserving traditional 
boundaries and not splitting cities, are legally binding, and all have been sacrificed in the past to the 
greater goals of incumbent or ideological advantage. 594 County Charter provisions that have been 
held to require four-vote majorities to adopt a redistricting plan and maintenance of each 
supervisor's residence in his new district may not have been correctly interpreted, and, in any case, 
would allow incumbents to draw districts more favorable to minorities. This last point is supported 
by the counterfactual scenario concerning what the Democrats would have done in 1981 had they 
won all three seats that were up for election in 1980, a thought experiment whose realism was 
validated by the seeming willingness of the supervisors to sacrifice the splenetic Pete Schabarum in 
December, 1989.595 Any suggestion that the Board has been constrained by the national 
constitutional requirement of "one person, one vote" will not survive a perusal of Table 5.  
If the first two apologias fit the facts so poorly that they cannot be taken seriously, what of 
the third, the unintended consequences thesis? This view implies either that the effect of the line 
drawing on Hispanics was not reasonably foreseeable or was unforeseen; or, even if foreseen, it was 
not a reason for adopting the policy, but merely a side effect Neither contention squares with the 
facts in this case. 
That theory, common sense, and historical experience discredit contentions that politicians 
who design electoral structures do not understand the consequences of what they are doing, 
especially when these structures disadvantage minorities, does not need to be expounded at length 
------<ig�ainin this paper But it is the pattem_oLthellQumfary lines that most convincingly undermines the 
inadvertency thesis. The best way to visualize the series of institutional decisions at issue in Garza 
is to imagine a split-screen movie showing, on one side, the demographic spread of the Hispanic 
core during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, when it grew primarily in an easterly direction out the San 
Gabriel Valley and established a satellite population concentration in and around the city of San
Fernando. On the other side of the screen would be a movie of the geographic extension of the Third 
Supervisorial District from 1959 to 1981 ,  an expansion in almost completely the opposite direction­
-north and west, away from East Los Angeles, into the Anglo suburbs. Similar patterns in school 
segregation cases have led courts to infer discriminatory motivation. If, over a period of time, 
schools were located in places that maximized the degree to which they were racially segregated, the 
Supreme Court decided in Keyes v. Denver, then it is proper to assume that discrimination was 
intended, and that remedies to repair the past violation are appropriate.596 The Denver school board 
and the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors had available numerous choices that would have reduced 
segregation, in the first instance, and reduced the division of the Hispanic vote, in the second. That 
they instead made decisions that increased segregation and maintained the fragmentation of the 
Hispanic community supports the inference that they meant to do so. 
To contend that ethnicity was a mere incidental consideration to the 1981 redistricters would 
be ludicrous. Democrats and Republicans, county computer programmers and Rose Institute 
mapmakers, CFR and Joseph Shumate all used ethnic data at the precinct, neighborllood, and city 
levels. No plan was complete without its ethnic tally, and charges of packing, stacking, or cracking 
the Latino population constantly flew back and forth.597 The consequences for Hispanics of every 
67 
proposed plan were foreseeable and foreseen. The Republican plans sought to bolster Dana and 
Schabarum by shifting African-Americans and Hispanics out of their districts. Democrats wished to 
protect their own seats and to threaten Republican seats by refusing to take more minorities. Both, it 
is true, wished primarily to keep their seats safe and to make trouble for their enemies. But for both, 
the necessary means to do so were minority voters. The only way to accomplish the goal of 
incumbent protection was through anti-minority gerrymandering. 
1 867-73 
1 873-75* 
1 875-83 
1885-93 
1 867-73 
1 873-75* 
1875-83 
1885-93 
1 869-73 
1 873-77 
1877-83 
1885-94 
1 869-73 
1 873-77 
1877-83 
1 885-93 
Table 1: Packing, Stacking, and Cracking 
Districts in South Carolina and Mississippi, 1867-1893 
Years Districts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Panel A-1 :  % of Population Black By District, 
South Carolina 
59.9 68.4 58.3 46.7 
60.6 69.6 59.0 46.1 
59.6 64.5 51 .6 51 . 1  67.5 
** 63.0 52.3 56.9 57.1 56.6 
7 
81 .7 
Panel A-2: % of State's Population in Each District, 
South Carolina 
24.5 26.0 24.8 24.7 
24.2 25.3 26.8 23.8 
19.6 18.8 20.2 21.8 19.6 
20.1 14.2 13.7 12.6 12.6 13.4 13.3 
Panel B-1:  % of Population Black By District, 
Mississippi 
47.9 49.0 52.9 63.3 58.2 
21 .9 56.1 59.4 57.1 56.4 54.4 
45.0 52.5 40.9 52.0 52.0 77.5 
49.2 53.7 80.4 53.8 51 .6 52.6 64.5 
Panel B-2: % of State's Population in Each District, 
Mississippi 
17.7 16.! 18.7 26.9 20.5 
16.3 17.8 16.1  17.6 15.2 17. 1  
20.8 15.5 15.2 15.4 15.9 17.2 
12.3 14.9 1 1.5 17.3 17.0 1 1 . 1  15.9 
* Also one at-large district.
** Figure unavailable because county lines crossed. 
Table 2: Party and Race of Congressmen in South Carolina and 
Mississippi, 1868-86 
Panel A: South Carolina 
Year Took Republicans Democrats (All White) 
Office White 
Panel B: Mississippi 
Year Took 
Office 
1 869 
1871 
1 873 
1 875 
1 877 
1 879 
1881  
1 883 
1 885 
1868 4 
1869 3 
1871 1 
1873 1 
1875 3 
1877 0 
1879 0 
1881  1 
1 883 1 
1885 0 
Republicans 
White Black 
5 0 
5 0 
4 1 
2 I 
0 0 
0 0 
0 1 
I 0 
0 0 
Black 
0 0 
1 0 
3 0 
4 0 
2 0 
3 2 
0 5 
1 3 
0 6 
1 6 
Democrats (All White) 
0 
0 
1 
3 
6 
6 
6 
5 (1 Greenback) 
7 
Table 3: Los Angeles County Supervisorial Tenure, 1945-89 
District Supervisor Years Served 
1 William A. Smith Dec.5, 1938 - Dec. 4, 1950 
Herbert C. Legg Dec. 4, 1950 - March 27, 1958 (died) 
Frank G. Bonelli June 10, 1958 - Feb. 14, 1972 (died) 
Peter F. Schabarum March 6, 1972 - present 
2 Leonard J. Roach Jan. 9, 1945 - Dec. l ,  1952 
Kenneth Hahn Dec. 1 ,  1952 - present 
3 John Anson Ford Dec. 3, 1934 - Dec. 1 ,  1958 (resigned) 
Ernest E. Debs Dec. 1, 1958 - Dec. 1 ,  1974 (resigned) 
Edmund Edelman Dec. 1 ,  1974 - present 
4 Raymond V. Darby Dec. 4, 1944 - March 5, 1953 (died) 
Burton W. Chace March 20, 1953 - Aug. 22, 1972 (died) 
Jam es A. Hayes Aug. 31 ,  1972 - June 5, 1978 (resigned) 
Yvonne B. Burke June 14, 1978 - Dec. l ,  1980 (defeated) 
Deane Dana Dec. 1 ,  1980 - present 
5 Roger W. Jessup Dec. 5, 1932 - Dec. 3, 1956 
. arren-M�Dorn Dec.-3,-l-9-56--0€C.-1-�W-12-(-0cleare4' 
Baxter Ward Dec. 1 ,  1972 - Dec. 1 ,  1980 (defeated) 
Michael Antonovich Dec. 1 ,  1980 - present 
Overall Average 14 years 
Table 4: Incumbency Advantage on the Los Angeles County Board of 
Supervisors: Percentages of the Vote Received by First 
and Second-Place Finishers, 1970-88 
Year, Month District Candidate Percent 
1970 June 3 Debs (I) 58 
Rutledge 16  
1 Bonelli (I) 72 
Ruggles 28 
1972 June 1 Schabarum (I) 50 
Campbell 20 
2 Hahn (I) 85 
Taylor 15  
4 Hayes 36 
Braude 22 
5 Dom (I) 47 
Ward 46 
1972 November 4 Hayes (I) 57 
Braude 43 
5 Ward 45 
Dom (I) 55 
1974 June 1 Schabarum (I) 71  
Ruggles 20 
3 Edelman 33 
Ferraro 26 
1974 November 3 Edelman 57 
Ferraro 43 
1976 June 2 Hahn (I) 8 1  
Taylor 7 
4 Hayes (I) 59 
Gallagher 13  
5 Ward (!) 62 
Rudell 22 
1978 June 1 Schabarum (I) 56 
Donaldson 28 
3 Edelman (I) 74 
Molina 14 
1980 June 2 Hahn (I) 88 
Taylor 9 
1980 June 4 Burlce (I) 42 
Dana 2 1  
5 Antonovich 44 
Ward (I) 41 
1980 November 4 Dana 53 
Burke (I) 47 
5 Antonovich 55 
Ward (I) 45 
1982 June 1 Schabarum (I) 64 
Dunn 25 
3 Edelman (I) 72 
Munoz 12 
1984 June 2 Hahn (I) 86 
Bracey 4 
4 Dana (I) 57 
Pope 36 
5 Antonovich (I) 62 
Woodlock 28 
1986 June 1 Schabarum (I) 100 
3 Edelman (I) 84 
Venus de Milo 7 
1988 June 2 Hahn (I) 84 
Smith 4 
4 Dana (I) 75 
Drobman 13 
5 Antonovich (I) 45 
Ward 22 
1988 November 5 Antonovich (I) 64 
Ward 36 
Average Margin Incwnbents 36 
Average Margin Open Seats 12 
Average Percentage of Vote Incwnbents 65 
Table S: Percentages of Los Angeles Population in Each Supervisorial
District, Before and After Each Reapportionment, 1950-81.' 
Year % of Population in District 
1 2 
1953 28.4 13.3 
reapportionment, 
1953 22.0 18. 1
1955 22.6 17.4 
reapportionment, 
1956 23.6 17.0 
1958 24.4 16.5 
reapportionment, 
1959 25.1 16.4 
1962 26.7 15.6 
reapportionment, 
1965 26.4 17.1 
reapportionment, 
1966 21 .6 18.3 
1968 21 .7 17.9 
1970 22.0 17.6 
reapportionment, 
1971 20.0 20.0 
+s------20.4 } .  
1980 20.3 19.0 
reapportionment, 
1981 20.0 20.0 
1985 20.8 19.8 
1989 21.3 19.9 
Bates numbers for sources of population estimates 
1953'1 102382 1966 
1953'2 102296 1968 
1955 102365 1970 
1956 103688 1971 
1958 102296 1975 
1959 102269 1980 
1962 102207 1985 
1965 102161 1989 
3 4 
10.7 24.8 
1953 
18.1 21.8 
17.0 21.8 
1955 
16.2 21 .9 
15.3 21 .7 
1959 
18.4 18.2 
17.2 18.2 
1963 
18.3 17.3 
1965 
20.3 18. 1 
20.5 18. 1 
19.4 18. 1 
1971 
20.0 20.0 
19o-1---20.3 
21 .1  19.3 
1981 
20.0 20.0 
20.4 18.9 
21 .0 18.0 
s 
22.8 
19.9 
21.0 
21 .2 
22.1 
21 .9 
22.3 
20.9 
21 .7 
21.8 
22.9 
20.0 
20o! 
20.2 
20.0 
20.1 
19.8 
102139 
102128 
101376 
101807 
102051 
100215 
103018-103019 
Los Angeles Times 
June 5, 1990, at A27. 
District 
I .  
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
District 
l. 
2. 
3 .  
4 .  
5. 
Table 6: Ethnic Percentages in Supervisorial Districts 
(using 1971 Boundaries), 
1970, 1980, and 1985 
Percent White Percent Latino 
1970 1980 1985 1970 
74.2 55.9 47.9 22.2 
39.6 23.6 20.6 14.0 
61 .4 45.8 39.5 31 .6  
77.6 66.6 61 . l  12. 1  
82.7 72.7 67.4 1 1 .7 
Percent Black Percent Asian & Other
1970 1980 1985 1970 
3.� Y.� . � L /  • •  v 
40.5 42.2 39.8 4.7 
1 .4 2.4 3.0 4.3 
7.0 9.5 9.5 2.3 
3.6 4.8 5 . 1  1 .2 
1980 
36.2 
26.5 
41 .8  
1 6.6 
16.9 
1980 
4.1 
6.7 
8.7 
6.2 
4.6 
Table 7: Percent Change in Latino Percentage by Supervisoral District 
District 1970-80 1970-85 
I .  14.0 1 8 . l  
2. 12.5 15.5 
3. 10.2 12.2 
4. 4.5 5.7 
5. 5.2 7.6 
1985 
40.3 
29.5 
43.8 
17.8 
19.3 
1985 
o �  
- · -
10. 1
13.6 
1 1 .6 
8.2 
Table 8: City and Community Gains Under Three Major Plans 
District Smith Hojfenblum CFR 
1.  Alhambra Alhambra 
Monterey Park Monterey Park 
San Gabriel San Gabriel San Gabriel 
East San Gabriel* East San Gabriel* 
Eagle Rock* 
Artesia 
Paramount Paramount 
Bellflower 
Montebello 
2. Santa Monica 
Compton Compton Compton 
Venice* 
Huntington Park 
South Gate 
Walnut Park* 
Hancock Park* 
P1lfitl.aBri!i 
Hollywood (part)* 
West Los Angeles (part)* 
Long Beach (part)* 
3.  Huntington Park Huntington Park 
Pico Rivera Pico Rivera 
San Fernando San Fernando 
Pacoima Pacoima 
Lake View Terrace* 
Pico-Union* 
Sylmar* 
North Hollywood (part)* 
District Smith Hoffenblum CFR 
4. Culver City Culver City 
Downey 
La Mirada La Mirada 
Lynwood 
South Gate 
Hawthorne 
Lawndale 
Hidden Hills* 
Bel Air* 
Mat Vista* 
Westchester* 
Lennox* 
Alondra* 
Westlake Village* 
Agoura* 
Calabasas* 
Santa Monica Mountains* 
5. Malibu 
Pacific Palisades* 
Los Feliz* Los Feliz* 
Van Nuys (patt)* 
mnan-Oaks-{pa * 
Sun Valley* 
Mission Hills* 
Sepulveda* 
Eagle Rock* 
Atwater* 
Arcadia 
Bradbury 
Oaremont 
Glendora 
La Verne 
Momovia 
San Dimas 
Temple City 
* not a separate incorporated area. 
Table 9: Cities and Communities Lost Under Three Plans 
District Smith Hoffenb/um CFR 
1 .  Huntington Park Huntington Park Huntington Park 
Pico Rivera Pico Rivera 
South Gate South Gate 
Downey 
La Mirada La Mirada 
Walnut Park* 
Arcadia 
Bradbury 
Claremont 
Glendora 
La Verne 
Monrovia 
San Dimas 
Temple City 
2. Culver City Culver City 
Lynwood 
Westchester (part)* Westtirester(part)* 
Hawthorne 
Lawndale 
Mar Vista* 
Barnes City* 
Lennox* 
Alondra* 
Downtown* 
Westlake* 
Wholesale* 
Central* 
University* 
Santa Barbara* 
Pico Union* 
3. Monterey Park Monterey Park 
Eagle Rock* Eagle Rock* 
Los Feliz* Los Feliz* 
Van Nuys (part)* Van Nuys* 
Shennan Oaks (part)* Shennan Oaks* 
Bel Air* Bel Air* 
o,....t,. T " t:l 'N'>'.ll ..l U..LA. .A..<U. .&.>.L'-'U. 
Hancock Park* 
District Smith Hoffenblum CFR 
Sun Valley* 
Mission Hills* 
Sepulveda* Sepulveda* 
West Los Angeles* (part) 
Hollywood (part)* 
Atwater* (part)* 
Downtown (part)* 
Westlake (part)* 
Wholesale (part)* 
Central (part)* 
University (part)* 
Santa Barbara (part)* 
Arleta• 
Beverly Glen* 
Century City* 
Panorama City* 
Studio City* 
Montebello 
4. Santa Monica 
Compton Compton 
Venice* 
Malibu 
Pacific Palisades* 
Artesia 
Bellflower 
Paramount Paramount 
Carson (part)* 
Long Beach (part)* 
Unspecified Los Angeles (part)* 
5. San Gabriel San Gabriel San Gabriel 
Alhambra Alhambra 
East San Gabriel* East San Gabriel* 
San Fernando San Fernando 
Pacoima 
Westlake Village* 
Agoura* 
Calabasas* 
Santa Monica Mountains 
Unspecified Los Angeles (part)* 
Table 10: The Potential Influence of Minorities: Percentages of 
Each District's Population Comprised of African-Americans 
and Hispano-Americans, 1968-81 ' 
Year or Plan 
District 1971 1980 1981 
Smith Hof. Final 
Panel A: Hispanics 
I 22.2 36.2 34.7 3 1 .3 36.2 
2 14.0 24.9 20.6 25.7 26.4 
3 31.6 42.4 50.2 50.2 41.8 
4 12.1 16.4 17.6 15.5 16.5 
5 1 1.7 16.9 15.0 15.4 16.9 
Panel B: Blacks 
1 1.7 3.1  3.7 3.3 3.1  
2 40.5 44.7 46.7 46.2 42.9 
3 1.4 2.8 4.6 3.4 2.6 
4 7.0 9.7 5.2 5.4 9.7 
5 3.6 5.0 3.1 4.8 5.0 
' The figures in these columns represent the percentage of each district's population that is Hispanic 
or black. For instance, 18% of the 1st District's population was Spanish-surnamed in 1968, 6.7% of 
the Second's was, etc. Sources and definitions for the table are the same as those for Table 10. 
Sources: 
197 1 :  Report, March 1972, Regional Planning Dept., Bates No. 101669-101686. 
1980 and 1981 Final: Memo from James Mize to Supervisors, Sept. 25, 1981, Bates No. 100182. 
Note that the 1980 percentages are for the districts as drawn in 1981, not 1971. 
1981 Smith and Hoffenblum Plans: Boundary Commission Final Report, Bates No. 1213-1215. 
Table 11:  Packing and Cracking Minorities: Percentages of the County's Total 
African-Americans and Hispano-Americans in Each District, 1968-81 ' 
Year or Plan 
District 1971 1980 1981 
Smith Hof. Final 
Panel A: Hispanics 
1 24.2 26.4 25.1 22.7 26.3 
2 15.4 18.2 14.9 18.6 19.2 
3 34.6 31 .0 36.3 36.4 30.3 
4 13.2 12.0 12.7 1 1.2 12.0 
5 12.6 12.4 10.9 1 1.2 12.3 
Panel B: Blacks 
1 3.1  4.8 5.8 5.3 4.9 
2 74.7 68.5 73.8 73.2 67.8 
3 2.6 4.3 7.3 5.3 4.1
4 12.9 14.9 8.2 8.6 15.3 
5 6.6 7.7 4.9 7.6 7.9 
• This table adds to 100% down columns. For instance, in the first column, the entries mean that 
30% of all the Spanish-surnamed people in Los Angeles County lived in District 1,  9.3% of them 
lived in District 2, and so on. It does not mean that 30% of the people in District 1 in 1968 had
Spanish surnames. 
Table 12: Laundry License Approval and Race of 
Ownership in San Francisco, 1880's 
Race of Laundry Operator 
License Granted 
Decisions Not Granted 
Chinese 
0 
201 
Source: Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 6 S.Ct 1064, 1066 (1886) 
Other 
80 
1 
Table 13: Sex, Veteran Status and Appointment to Public 
Employment in Massachusetts, 1963-1973. 
Status 
Sex 
Male Female 
Vet 54% 2% 
Non-Vet 46% 98% 
Source: Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, at 
27 (1979). 
1867-73 1 8 7 3-75 
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75 
"leave Alh[ambra] & S[an] Gabriel alone for time 
being - (until after 1966 elections) 
Then Debs will go from 18.2% to 19 % 
(1 ,256,000 pop[ulation] to 1,3 1 1 ,000 pop[ulation]) 
Bonelli will go from 26.3% to 22.97% 
(1,813,000 pop[ulation] to 1 ,582,000) 
If Bonelli would give, instead 
83,000 people in Lakewood to Chace, 
he would then have 21.8% inst[ead] of the rec[commended] 21 .7% 
Chace would have 19.5% instead 
of the rec[ commended] 18.3% 
To Burbank [Blvd.J 43,000 between S[an] Diego Freeway & Hollywood 
Freeway extension 
To Oxnard [St.] 44,000 
87,000 
[The above two areas were unincorporated parts of the City of Los Angeles proposed to be 
switched from Dom to Debs.] 
If Bonelli gives direct to Debs 
It results in: 
Alhambra 
San Gabriel 
Debs - Now 1 ,256,000 population 
18.2% of total Co. pop[ulation] 
64,000 
26,000 
90,000 
Monterey P[ar]k 
So[uth] San Gabriel 
(uninc[orporated] area) 
+47,000 pop[ulation] 
+30,000 " 
76 
Area So[uth] of Venice -22,000 " 
Blvd to Hahn 
Alhambra 
San Gabriel 
+64,000 
+26,000 
+145,000 Net 
Then Debs has 1 ,401,000 pop[ulation] 
20.3% 
And I have now 1,450,000 pop[ulation] 
21 . 1  % of pop[ulation] 
+ 12,000 Sierra Madre 
- 8,000 Agoura-Calabasas 
+19,000 Uninc[orporated] area east of San Gabriel 
___ and So[uth] of Hunt[ington] Dr[ive] 
or 1 ,473,000 
21.4% 
Which is bad enuf- i.e. adding to an already 'high' district. 
But not as bad as 
a) They propose - which is ridiculous 
b) Doesn't give me a new 90,000 
(San G[abriel] & Alhambra) and then 
take off 68,000 in S[an] F[emando] Valley 
for Debs - why shift areas between 
3 districts - (Bonelli to Dom to Debs) 
when you can go direct from Bonelli to Debs 
c) Debs is already taking Mont[erey] P[ar]k & 
uninc[orporated] area east of that (So[uth] San Gabriel), 
and Alh[ambra] and city of San Gab[riel] make 
a total square continuous 
compact area with Mont[erey] P[ar]k 
and So[uth] San Gabriel" 
77 
The use of the first person pronoun twice and the focus on the Fifth District, which was 
Dom's, make it appear likely to me that the notes are, indeed, Dom's. Even if they were 
made by the chief of staff of that year's reapportionment, Leach, their importance in 
showing a departure from a normal or reasonable outcome and in casting doubt on non­
selfinterested reasons for the particular lines drawn is unimpaired. 
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Third District did move east into Monterey Park and unincorporated south San Gabriel. The 
77 ,000 people in this area, however, were more than offset by the 87 ,000 in the San 
Fernando Valley. 
104. These figures were calculated in the same manner as in note 80, supra. 
105. For the League of Women Voters' protest, see John Leach to Emmett Sullivan, Nov. 10, 
1965, B ates # 000190--000191.  For the apparent openness in 197 1 ,  see 1971 Boundary 
Commission summary report, Bates # 1 10325. 
106. 1971 Boundary Commission Report, B ates # 101374-101398; motion by Supervisor Chace, 
June 8, 1 971 ,  Bates # 101400; Boundary Commission minutes, 1971, Bates # 000358, 
101452, 101807. 
107. Schoeni deposition transcript, 54-55, 245-46. 
108. Los Angeles Daily News, Sept. 23, 1 98 1 ,  Bates # 1 1 0424. 
109. Jackie Knowles in Pasadena Star-News, Aug. 9, 1981, Bates # 1 10450. 
1 10. Schoeni deposition transcript, at 36-43, 54-62, 303--05; Jeff Seymour to Ed Edelman, May 
1 1, 198 1 ,  Bates # 1 10317; Marlow deposition transcript, at 61-63. 
������lulul�_..B"'ounctacy_Cornmissio!Llllinutes,BatCS-it-OOOJSR--lill452.������������������ 
1 12. Schoeni deposition transcript, at 42. 
1 1 3. Minutes of Board of Supervisors' meeting of Sept 22, 198 1 ,  Bates # 100044. 
1 14. Boundary Commission Final Report, 1971, Bates # 101374-101398; Los Angeles Times, 
July 16, 1971. part II, at 1 .  Alternative plans in the files of the Boundary Commission would 
have shifted some of the territory that Bonelli lost to Hahn, instead ofto Chace. 
1 15. These calculations are based on a comparison of maps supplied by the County and printed 
population figures by census tract in U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1 970 CENSUS OF 
POPULATION AND HOUSING: CENSUS TRACTS: LOS ANGELES- LONG BEACH, 
CALIF. STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA (1972), at Tables P-1, 
P-2. 
1 16. For instance, when discussing whether a Hispanic district could easily be formed in Los 
Angeles, former Antonovich chief deputy Kathleen Crow remarked: "Art Snyder was in a 
city councilmanic district which was predominantly Latino, yet he was reelected time and 
again." Crow deposition transcript, at 222. 
1 17. 93 Cal. 361 (1971). 
1 1 8. R. Santillan, The Chicano Community and the Redistricting of the Los Angeles City Council, 
1971-1973, 6 CHICANO L. REV. 122 (1983).
1 19. Id., at 127-28. 
78 
120. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 14, 1972, part II, at 6. 
121.  Edelman deposition transcript, at 154; Fitch deposition transcript, at 62. 
122. Santillan, supra, note 107, at 133-34; statement of Edelman to Los Angeles City Council 
Charter and Administrative Code Committee, August 10, 1972, no Bates #. Edelman's aide 
Alma Fitch, who was to be Edelman's first appointee to the Boundary Commission in 198 1 ,  
compiled the population figures for Edelman in this reapportionment, and she negotiated 
with aides of other councilmen to determine what changes were acceptable to their bosses. 
Fitch deposition transcript, at 41-49; Edelman deposition transcript, at 145. 
123. Edelman statement, Aug. 10, 1972. 
124. Id. 
125. Santillan, supra, note 1 1 8, at pp. 130-3 1 ;  Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1972, part II, at I ,  10;
Alatorre deposition, at 70. Snyder did not give the source of the citizenship figures that he 
used. Further, it is not clear whether he meant that 85% of the Hispanic population (45% + 
40%) was ineligible, or that 67% (45% + 40% of the remaining 55%) was. In either case, a 
substantial, though smaller, percentage of non-Hispanics would have been ineligible because 
they were underage or non-citizens, as well. One thing his statistic cannot mean is that the 
14th district's voting age citizen population was only about a quarter Hispanic (68% * 15%) 
I ((100% - 68) + (68% * 15%)) = 24.3%.
126. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1972, part II, at I, 10.
127. Santillan, supra, note 1 1 8, at 130-131;  Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1972, part II, at 1, 10. 
128. Los Angeles Times, Sept 16, J 972,_parUI.-at-l,;Wc---------- --------
129. Id., Sept. 16, 1972, part II, at 1 ,10; Sept. 20, 1972, Part I, at 3, 24. 
130. Santillan, supra, note 118,  at 128-29, for the participation of the Beverly Hills Bar 
Association in CFR. Braude had voted against expanding the Los Angeles City Council, a 
move that was explicitly designed to make it possible to elect a Hispanic, in 1970. See Los 
Angeles Times, July 28, 1970, part II at I ,  and July 31,  1970, part II, at 1 .  By 1972, the 
chief issue between him and Hayes was expanding the Board of Supervisors to make it 
easier to elect members of racial and ethnic minorities. Braude by 1972 favored expansion. 
See Los Angeles Times, Sept. 16, 1972, part J, at l ,  10.
1 3 1 .  Castorena v. City of Los Angeles, 34 C.A. 901, 915-16 (1973). 
132. On the shifting of districts, see Los Angeles Times, Mar. 5, 1973, part II, at 1 .  
133. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 3, 1985, part I, at l, 3; Oct. 3, 1985, part II, at l, 4.
134. Reuben Jacinto, who ran against Snyder for the city council in 1967, described Snyder as "a 
masterful politician" who developed "a strong following in the Hispanic community" in his 
deposition transcript, at 29-30. Snyder was "extremely responsive" to Hispanics in his 
district, according to Los Angeles Vice-Mayor Grace Montanez Davis's deposition 
transcript, at 46-48. On his fundraising, see Los Angeles Times, Mar. 16, 1974, part I, at 18; 
Jan. 3, 1985, part I, at 1 ,  3. 
79 
135. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 13, 1974, part I, at 3; March 20, 1974, part I, at 1,3, 19; Feb. 24, 
1975, part I, at 3; April 2, 1 975, part I, at 3; November 13,  1973, part II, at 1 ;  Oct. 3, 1985, 
part II, at I, 4; Davis deposition transcript, at 46-48.
136. The Garza trial's  opening date was put off during the month of December, 1989, for 
negotiations between attorneys of the County and the plaintiffs. The County offered to settle 
the lawsuit, on the basis of a plan drawn by Joseph Shumate, that targetted the sttident Pete 
Schabarum, raising the percentage of Hispanic population and Hispanic registered voters in 
his district to 63% and 36.5%, respectively. Bitterly denouncing Deane Dana, who had 
teamed with Democrats Edmund Edelman and Kenneth Hahn to approve the proposal, 
Schabarum contacted Republican leaders throughout the state to crack the party whip over 
Dana. Under Shumate's plan, Dana shed heavily black Compten and anti-developer Malibu 
from his district, and Mike Antonovich picked up ten wealthy Republican suburbs to pad his 
majorities. Talks collapsed when the County refused to negotiate after the plaintiffs made a 
counterproposal that would have raised the Hispanic population percentage in Schabarum's 
disttict to 70 and the Hispanic registered voter percentage to 47. See Los Angeles Times, 
Dec. 6, 1989, at B 1 ,  B6, BS; Dec. 7, 1989, at B 1 ,  B4; Dec. 1 3 ,  1989, at A l ,  A35-36; Dec. 15, 
1989, at B3, B6; Dec. 16, 1989, at B3, B4; Dec. 19, 1989, at B l ,  B3; Dec. 20, 1989, at A l ,  
A26; Dec. 22, 1989, at B2; Jan. 3,  1990, at B l ,  B 8 ;  Pasadena Star--News, Dec. 1 3 ,  1989, at 
A l ,  A l  1 .  The episode perfectly supports the referenced sentences in the text, which were 
written two months before it happened. 
137. STERN, supra, note 72, at Ch. 1 1 ;  U.S. Bureau of the Census, COUNTY AND CITY 
DATA BOOK, 1988 (1988), at xxii, 2, 42. 
138. All population estimates except for New York City were taken from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, supra, note 137. New York's is from that city's election office. 
139. Report of Committee on Governmental Simplification, at 12. 
140. Untitled report, dated Dec. 15, 1 953, Bates # 102402-23. 
141.  Untitled work sheet, Bates # 101242-101245, dated June 26, 1962; memo from George Marr 
to Arlyn V. Weber, a deputy to Hahn, July 3, 1962, B ates # 101246. The board voted July 17 
to put the expansion measure on the ballot in November. 
142. Charter Study Committee Report, 1958, Bates # 104029-104127. 
143. Los Angeles Newsletter, April 28, 1962, Bates # 0001 17-000 1 18.  
144. Charter Study Committee Report, 001390-001402; returns, Bates # 002917; transcript of 
Board Meeting, June 6, 1962, B ates # 104254- 104276. 
145. R. Zeman, Realignment of Supervisors' Districts Pushed Through by County Board, Los 
Angeles Times, May 15, 1963, part I, at I .  3. 
146. Transcript of Board Meeting, July 17, 1962, at 104357- 104489, at 62. 
147. Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1970, part 2, at 1 .  
148. Id. 
149. Id., July 3 1 ,  1 970, part 2, at 1 .  
150. Id., July 29, 1970, pan 2, at I .  
80 
151 .  Report of the Economy and Efficiency Commission, Los Angeles County, July 14,  1970, 
Bates # 001921 -002009, at 001948-001949. 
152. Id., at p. 001954; Report of the Economy and Efficiency Commission, Los Angeles County, 
1974, at Bates # 002964. 
153. Economy and Efficiency Commission, supra, note 151.  at Bates # 001946. 
154. Public Commission on Los Angeles County Government, To Serve Seven Million, 
(February, 1976), Bates # 1341-1389, at 1357. 
155. Id., at 1357, 1380, 1381.  
156. Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1976, part 2, at 6. 
157. Charter Amendment Task Force, Bates # 104642. 
158. Los Angeles Times, October 31, 1976, part 8, at l; November 1 ,  1976, pan l,  at 24; and the 
ballot arguments for the change by Supcivisors Hahn and Edelman, at Bates # 2916. 
159. Los Angeles Times, November4, 1976, part 2, at ! .  
160. Burke deposition transcript, at 8-16. 
1 6 1 .  Id., at 19-22. 
162. Los Angeles Times, June 15, 1979, pan I, at 1 ,  26. 
163. On ethnic crossover politicians, see Boyarsky, supra, note 77, at 8-18. For Burke's self­
consciously framed role, see Burke deposition transcript, at 79-80. 
164. Los Angeles Times, December 1, 1979, part l, at 28; December 9, 1979, part II, at 1; January 
28, 1980, pan l, at 3, 2 1 .
that the poll had been run fo r  someone who was not a potential candidate in the Fourth 
District. In his deposition transcript, at 307, Ron Smith reported a rumor that Schabarum 
had paid for a poll in the Fourth District in 1979, which found, in Smith's words, that Burke 
"could not be beaten." As Smith remembered it, Burke 's "favorable/unfavorable" ratio was 
"extremely highly favorable." Id., at 309-10. 
166. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 9, 1979, part II, at I .  
1 67. At the beginning of the campaign, less, perhaps much less than a majority of a sample 
recognized Dana's name. Shumate deposition transcript, at 378. 
168. Burke deposition transcript, at 56. 
169. Los Angeles Times, December 9, 1979, part II, at I .  
170. Los Angeles Times, January 28, 1980, part I, at 3, 21 ;  April 26, 1980, part I, at 16; May 29, 
1980, part II, at 1, 5; June 5, 1980, part l, at 3, 25. 
171 .  Los Angeles Times, May 6, 1980, part II, at 1 ;  Sept. 22, 1980, part II, at 1 ,  3; Oct. 17, 1980, 
pan II, at I, 7. Although he had huffily refused to appear at a television debate hosted by
CBS newsman Bill Stout because Stout had editorialized against his billboards as "close to 
racism," Dana later blithely denied that he had "ever" heard anyone suggest that "by raising 
the issue of forced busing, there would be a concern that you were appealing to racial 
sentiments." Los Angeles Times, Sept. 13,  1980, pan Ill, at 14; Dana deposition transcript, 
at 407. Privately, the campaign was even less subtle, one Dana fundraiser reportedly 
pitching for funds to a group of white businessmen with the line "We have to get that black 
81 
bitch out . . .  " Burke deposition transcript, at 41-43. 
172. Smith deposition transcript, at 309- 10, 322. Compare the following statement of the 1988 
Republican national campaign chairman, South Carolina native Lee Atwater: "I, to this day, 
will not acknowledge that the Willie Horton matter had anything at all to do with race." Los 
Angeles Times, Oct. 26, 1989, at A34. 
173. Id., Oct 22, 1 980, part II, at l, 6; Oct. 27, 1980, part II, at l, 10; Burke deposition transcript, 
at 47, 56. Often threatening to crowd the bland Dana out of stories on the campaign, Smith 
arranged elocution lessons for his inexperienced candidate and flashed him hand signals 
during televised debates. "Dana sometimes seems to be a totally managed candidate," 
remarked Los Angeles Times correspondent Bill Boyarsky. 
174. Burke deposition transcript, at 41-43, 49-50; Los Angeles Times, Sept. 13, 1980, part III, at 
14. 
175. Burke deposition transcript, pp.19-22; Schabarum deposition transcript, pp. 341-42. 
176. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 2, 1980, part II, at 1 ,  2.
177. The brochure was not sent to more liberal white westside areas, such as Santa Monica and 
Venice, where Dana was behind and where he eventually lost. Schabarum deposition 
transcript, at 87, I 09- 1 1 1 ;  Burke deposition transcript, at 41-43, 61-62; Los Angeles Times, 
Nov. 1 1 ,  1980, part II, at l ,  2. The Schabarum loan or donation amounted to nearly a sixth 
of Dana's total spending for the primary and general elections. Dana deposition transcript, 
at 232. 
178. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 287, Bates # 170354-170355. 
179. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 2, 1980, part II. at I ,  2: Nov. 6._l2_8ll,_part_l�at_l_7�ox�1�14-, -"19,,.8�0,,_ --- --­
part II, at I ,  2.
1 80. Los Angeles Times, April 26, 1980, part I, at 16; May 29, 1980, part II, at l, 5; June 5, 1980,
part I, at 3, 25. 
1 8 1 .  Antonovich deposition transcript, at 1 1 -14, 22-23, 120-2 1 ;  STERN, supra, note 72, at ch. 
1 1 ;  Los Angeles Times, May 6, 1980, part II, at l ;  May 29, 1980, part II, at 1,5.
1 82.  Baxter Ward Schwellenbach deposition transcript, at  38-46, 57-60, 87-88. 
183. Los Angeles Times, Oct. 16, 1980, part II, at 1 ,  5.
184. Los Angeles Times, May 30, 1978, part 2, at 1 ,  6. Schabarum outspent Donaldson and two 
even more minor candidates by better than two to one. 
185. Schabarum deposition transcript, at 269. 
186. Smith deposition transcript, at 54-57, 139. 
187. Marr Lettergram to Norman Murdock, Dec. 5, 1978, B ates # 103553-103563; Marr 
deposition transcript, at 174. 
1 88. Los Angeles County Regional Planning Commission Report, "Population and Dwelling 
Units," (mimeo, April 1 ,  1962), Bates # 000106-000109, at 000106. 
189. "Study of the Los Angeles County Charter," Report of the Los Angeles County Citizens 
Economy and Efficiency Commission, July 14, 1970, B ates # 1 15722- 1 158 1 1 ,  at 1 15750-
1 15751 .  
82 
190. Regional Planning Commission Report, "Third District Highlights," (mimeo, April 13, 
1984), Bates # 103410. 
191 .  County of Los Angeles, Dept. of Health Services, "Countywide Population Estimate fo r  
1985 and Projections to Year 2000 Most Likely Scenario," Bates # 108075- 108109, at 
108082-108083. 
192. Regional Planning Commission Report, "Summary of Projected Ethnic Composition of Los 
Angeles County, 1980-2000," (mimeo, revised March 26, 1 987), Bates # 1 02946. 
193. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 69-70, 159, 186, 189, 22 1 ,  296-97; Shumate deposition 
transcript, at 226-27; Edelman deposition transcript, at 322-23; Dana deposition transcript, at 
388; Smith deposition transcript, at 50,52; Quezada deposition transcript, at 31-32, 88-90; 
Huerta deposition transcript, at 45; Garcia deposition transcript, at 60. 
194. Edelman deposition transcript, at 326-7; Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 369; Pozorski 
deposition transcript, at 120. 
195. Smith deposition transcript, at 165-66; Quezada deposition transcript, pp. 73, 90-9 1;  Bush 
deposition transcript, at 86-87; San Gabriel Valley Tribune, Aug. 13, 1981 ,  Bates # 100255. 
196. Edelman deposition transcript, at 210, 213, 284; Seymour deposition transcript, at 627-29, 
644; Plaintiff's Exhibit 190, Memo from Jeff Seymour to Ed Edelman, July 24, 198 1 ,  Bates 
# 170244-17025 1.  
197. Both Smith and Hoffenblum asked to serve on the Boundary Commission. Smith deposition 
transcript, at 67; Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 57. 
198. Shumate deposition transcript, at 158, 215, 235-37; Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 70-
71,  280-81;  Dana deposition transcript, at 274, 369; Smith deposition transcript, at 89, 223. 
199. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 67, 157; Shumate deposition transcript, at 222-23, 358-
59; Edelman deposition transcript, at 244-45; Quezada deposition transcript, at 48-50. 
200. Shumate deposition transcript, at 214, 219, 272. 
201 .  Huerta deposition transcript, at 40; Huerta testimony before Boundary Commission, Bates # 
100028-100029. 
202. Heslop deposition transcript, at 178, 203; Quezada deposition transcript, at 24-26; Uranga 
deposition transcript, at 72; Huerta deposition transcript, at 37-38; Santillan deposition 
transcript, at 17-20, 3 1-32. 
203. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 245; Smith deposition transcript, at 44-46, 104; 
Quezada deposition transcript, at 75, 1 14,  1 1 8; Uranga deposition transcript, at 67-69. 
204. Dana deposition transcript, at 1 64-65, 174-76, 179, 182; Smith deposition transcript, at 72-
73, 77-78, 8 1 ,  85-87. 
205. Heslop deposition transcript, at 137, 331-333. 
206. The lettergram is B ates # 161084, and a proposed "letter of agreement" on the letterhead of 
Shumate-Smith and Pike, dated March 9, 198 1 ,  carries the Bates # 1 61085-161086. 
207. Dana to Schabarum and Antonovich lettergram. For the widespread knowledge of Rose's 
"heavy business and Republican backing," see Los Angeles Times, Aug. 17, 1981,  part I, at 
26. Savvy former County demographer George Marr believed that the supervisors employed 
Rose because it was " a  Republican think tank." Marr deposition transcript, at 162.
83 
208. "Letter of Agreement;" Lewis deposition transcript, at 70, 75, 133; Shumate deposition 
transcript, at 53, 55. 
209. Heslop deposition transcript, at 362; Walters deposition transcript, at 69. 
210. Rose Institute Proposal, Bates # 1003 15-100317; 100339-100340. 
2 1 1 .  Walters deposition transcript, at 36-37. 
212. Schoeni deposition transcript, at 1 12-1 17; memo, Schoeni to Schabarum, Bates # 100352. 
Schoeni noted in his memo that the "flashing lights and color video display terminal would 
be fun to have," but useful only "if the Board wished to pursue a radical realignment" of 
districts. 
213 .  Schoeni deposition transcript, at  130. 
214. Heslop claimed that the County contract came to Rose unsolicited. Smith, Shumate, Heslop, 
and Tom Hofeller, then Heslop's second in command at Rose and shortly to become the 
national Republican party 's reapportionment director, had all worked on statewide 
reapportionment for the Republican State Central Committee in the early 1970s. In light of 
these chummy relationships and the fact that Shumate's use of Rose was never questioned, 
although as a person without a contract with the Institute, he had no right under the 
Institute's policies to use its facilities, it seems likely that the initiation, award, and 
implementation of the contract were carried out informally by friendly agreement. For the 
factual basis of this guess, see Heslop deposition transcript, at 133-37, 141, 180, 188, 208-
09, 2 1 1 - 12, 298, 371 ;  Walters deposition transcript, at 120-2 1;  Shumate deposition 
transcript, at 160-61, 1 64-66, 174-76. 
215. Schoeni deposition transcript. at 133-34;_Seymour_udeqpxa>Ssui11u· omnutnra1Ini.sc1n:JJ·p;nt�, L12t..2"'-�24"';�--------­
Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 78; Bush deposition transcript, at 46,48; Turner 
deposition transcript, at 234-35; Fitch deposition transcript, at 164, 168, 194; Crow 
deposition transcript, at 37; Lewis deposition transcript, at 78; Smith deposition transcript, at 
138, 150-53, 157, 160, 164. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 47. 
2 1 6. Shumate deposition transcript, at 225-27. 
2 1 7. See Table 4. 
218.  STERN, supra, note 72, ch. 1 1 ; Crow deposition transcript, at 98; Los Angeles Times, Nov. 
2, 1980, part II, at 1-2. 
219. People involved in the redistricting process in 1981 sometimes reflected on what 
philosophers would term a "counterfactual" in exactly this way. For example, Bob Bush, 
Hahn's longtime chief deputy and his appointee to the 1981 Boundary Commission, noted in 
his deposition: "If the redistricting would have taken place a year before, the structure of the 
supervisors would probably be different today than it is . . . .  we had a minority supervisor. 
We probably could have readjusted the district somewhat to make sure she [Burke] got 
reelected. Bush deposition transcript, at 38. 
220. B. Boyarsky, "Government by Five Soloists," Los Angeles Times, Sept. 29, 1989, part II, at 
2.
84 
221.  Baxter Ward Schwellenbach deposition transcript, at 38. "Soon after it  [the referendum that 
allowed the County to "contract out" work to private companies] passed Mr. Schabarum 
proposed that a contract be awarded to a contributor of his, and I was stunned." Id., at 64-
65. 
222. No one associated with Hahn or Edelman drew a plan during the 1981 redistricting, except 
for the minor shift of territory at the very end of the process. Seymour deposition transcript, 
at 93-94, 682; Fitch deposition transcript, at 168, 219. 
223. Fukai deposition transcript, at 64-65, 67. Edelman felt the same way. See Fitch deposition 
transcript, at 177-78. 
224. Los Angeles Daily News, July 9, 198 1 ,  Bates # 1 10472. 
225. Seymour deposition transcript, at 85. 
226. Smith deposition transcript, at 1 1 .  
227. Edelman deposition transcript, at 260-65. 
228. Seymour deposition transcript, at 21-26, 163; Fitch deposition transcript, at 202. 
229. Seymour deposition transcript, at 43. 
230. Bates # 1 10317. Although he did not in 1989 remember details, Edelman acknowledged in 
his deposition that he had been generally aware of what Seymour had done in 1981 and that 
he approved of using party registration and past election data in analyzing the effects of 
reapportionment plans. Edelman deposition transcript, at 260-72. 
23 1 .  B annister deposition transcript, at 75; Seymour deposition transcript, at 300-01.  
232. Handwritten sheet, attached to letter from Hayes and Panish to Seymour, B ates # 109371; 
--------�-e_)'lllonr deposition transcript.at 155, 1'7--3-'74,-; 
233. Gilbert was borrowed for the project, on which he remembers working for from two to six 
months. Gilbert deposition transcript, at 13-14. 
234. Fonda-Bonardi deposition transcript, at 23-24. 
235. Marr deposition transcript, at 144-48. 
236. Fonda-Bonardi deposition transcript, at 50-52. Both Gilbert and Fonda-Bonardi have vague 
memories of running similar programs for other supervisorial offices during the 1981 
reapportionment, but no one in those offices recalls asking for or receiving them. Existing 
evidence therefore suggests that this was wholly a Seymour-Edelman project. Gilbert 
deposition transcript, at 20; Fonda-Bonardi deposition transcript, at 29, 8 1 ;  Bannister 
deposition transcript, at 59, 69, 85-86, 89, 91 ;  Marlow deposition transcript, at 94-95. 
237. "Third Supervisorial District Voter Analysis," Bates # 1 1 1272- 1 1 1607. 
238. Motion, Bates # 100383. 
239. Transcript of March 17, 198 1 Board of Supervisors' Meeting, Bates # 1 00055. 
240. Sanborn deposition transcript, at 8-10 and passim. Allan Hoffenblum, however, 
remembered that Sanborn was "every bit as involved [in the redistricting] as any of us were 
[sic]." Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 35 1.  Ron Smith, however, does not recall ever 
meeting Sanborn outside Boundary Commission meetings. Smith deposition transcript, at 
177-80. 
24 1 .  Bush deposition transcript, at 9-14. 
242. Bush deposition transcript, at 68. 
85 
243. Bush deposition transcript, at 73, 81;  Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 69-70, 1 86, 292; 
Smith deposition transcript, at 50. 
244. Fitch deposition transcript, at 40-49, 78-84. 
245. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 157, 159; Smith deposition transcript, at 52, 272-74. 
246. Fitch deposition transcript, at 151 ;  Turner deposition transcript, at 123-24. 
247. Smith deposition transcript, at 8-9, 285, 291. 
248. Burke deposition transcript, at 56. 
249. Smith deposition transcript, at 4 1 .  
250. Smith deposition transcript, at 139. 
25 1.  Smith deposition transcript, at 171,  212-213. 
252. Smith deposition transcript, at 67, 54-57. 
253. Smith deposition transcript, at 65. 
254. Smith deposition transcript, at 220-21 .  
255. Smith deposition transcript, at 108, 136. 
256. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 9- 1 1 , 384. 
257. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 12; Alatorre depo�ition transcript, at 16; Los Angeles 
Times, Nov. 17, 1 97 1 ,  part I, at 19. 
258. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 405-07. 
259. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 405-07. 
260. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 16, 1971 ,  part I, at 3. 
261.  Alatorre deposition transcript, at  72-73. 
262. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 17, 1 97 1 ,  part I, at 19; Nov. 1 8 ,  197 1 ,  part I, at 23. 
263. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 18,  1971, part I, at 3; Alatorre deposition transcript, at 72-73.
264. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 12, 405-07. 
265. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 17, 1 971 ,  part I. at 19. 
266. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 1 8 ,  197 1 ,  part I, at 23. 
267. Alatorre deposition transcript, at 72-73. 
268. Shumate deposition transcript, at 27, 30, 47-48, 136. 
269. Shumate deposition transcript, at 158, 219-20. 
270. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 423-27. 
271. Los Angeles Times, July 7, 1983, part I,  at 24; July 10, 1983, part I, at 1 ;  Aug. 27, 1983, part 
I, at 25; Sept. 1 3, 1983, part II, at 5. 
272. When Pete Schabarum announced in March, 1990, at the last possible moment that he would 
not seek reelection, it was already too late for the leading prospective Hispanic contenders to 
enter the contest for his seat. either because they did not live in the First District or because 
they had already qualified for election to other offices and could not legally run for two 
posts. In an effort to derail the Garza case, Supervisors Dana and Antonovich threw 
fundraising support to Schabarum deputy Sarah Flores, a conservative Republican Hispanic, 
who acquired the services of Ron Smith as campaign manager and Allan Hoffenblum as 
direct-mail consultant. Flores finished first in the primary over Schabarum-backed Superior 
86 
Court Judge Gregory 0 'Brien, and faces a runoff in November, 1990. Los Angeles Times, 
June 7, 1990, at B I ,  B4. 
273. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 277. 
274. City News Service report, July 9, 198 1 ,  Bates # 1 00279. On the Californios group, see 
section IV.E .• below. 
275. Minutes of Board meeting, July 9, 1 98 1 .  
276. Perkins deposition transcript, at 155-57. 
277. Perkins deposition transcript, at 74, 67-68. 
278. Smith deposition transcript, at 200-01 .  
279. Quezada deposition transcript, at 71.  
280. Lear and Melendez deposition transcripts, passim. 
281.  Quevedo deposition transcript, at 2 1 .  
282. Quevedo deposition transcript, at 23, 25-27, 5 1 -53, 80-81 ,  91-92,1 37. 
283. Neri deposition transcript, at 10- 1 1 ,  15- 1 6, 47, 59-60, 85-87. 
284. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 329. The order of the quoted sentences has been 
changed. 
285. Neri deposition transcript, at 60; Schabarum deposition transcript, at 2 1 1 .  
286. Schoeni deposition transcript, at 8-12, 36-4 1 ,  303-04. 
287. Schoeni deposition transcript, at 82-83. 
288. Schoeni deposition transcript, at 107. 
289. Jeff Seymour remembers seeing plans newly drawn up by the Executive Office of the Board 
after the report of the Boundary Commission, but before the Board's final vote. Seyn1m1�------­
deposition transcript, at 524, 536. 
290. Schoeni deposition transcript, at 395. 
291 .  Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 179. There was also a plan E and at least a map of a 
plan G (which implies the existence o f a  plan F, as well), but no precise records of these 
seem to have survived. See Turner deposition transcript, at 1 14-15; Perkins deposition 
transcript, at 140. 
292. Turner deposition transcript, at 4 I . 102-04, 106-09, 1 1 1 -12,  ! 16; Boundary Commission 
Final Report, Bates # 12 10-122 1 ,  at 1 2 15-1217.  
293. Turner deposition transcript, at 130-3 1 ,  136. 
294. Turner deposition transcript, at 246-8, 260-61 .  
295. California State Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 
"Political Participation of Mexican Americans in California." (mimeo., August, 1971), p. 
25, hereinafter referred to as Advisory Committee, "Political Participation." 
296. Id., p. 26. 
297. Id., pp. 30-33, 49, 5 1 .  
298. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 9, 1978, part I, pp. 19-20; Nov. 6, 1 980, part I, pp. 3, 14. 
299. As Professor Heslop of the Rose Institute told an August, 1981 hearing of the California 
Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission: "This is how Republicans deal 
with minorities. They put them in as few districts as possible so they can waste their votes." 
See the Advisory Committee 's Access to Political Representation: Legislative 
87 
Reapportionment in California (mimeo, May, 1982), at 8. R. Johnson, in Symposiwn: 
Reapportionment, 6 CHICANO L. REV. 34, at 60 (1983). 
300. C. Navarro and R. Santillan, The Latino Community and California Redistricting in the 
1980s: Californiosfor Fair Representation, in Santillan, supra, note 36, at II, 53-55. 
301. Heslop deposition transcript, at 270. 
302. Heslop deposition transcript, at 277-79, 360-62; Hofeller, deposition transcript, in Jordan v. 
Winter (Dec. 13, 1983), at 5-8; Shumate deposition transcript, at 365. 
303. Los Angeles Times, Feb. I ,  198 1 ,  part II, at 4; Heslop deposition transcript, at 178. 
304. Los Angeles Times, Feb. I ,  198 1 ,  part II, at 4; Navarro and Santillan, supra, note 299, at 
53-55. 
305. M. MEIER and F. RIVERA, THE CHICANOS : A HISTORY OF MEXICAN 
AMERICANS (1972), at viii. 
306. Id. 
307. Quezada deposition transcript, at 128-30. 
308. Santillan deposition transcript, at 17-24; Huerta deposition transcript, at 38. 
309. Uranga deposition transcript, at 9-27; Quezada deposition transcript, at 6-18. 
3 10. Santillan deposition transcript, at 31 -32. 
3 1 1 . After Assembly Speaker Willie Brown made some impolitic remarks about the 
unwillingness of the legislative leadership to disadvantage incumbents in order to draw 
minority seats, CFR did hold a sit-in at his office and rejected an offer to meet with Brown. 
Los Angeles Times, Ap. 30, 1981,  part I, at 3, 22; Navarro and Santillan, supra, note 299, at 
--------�6=2�. �B�u�t bm!Lsides_.<hortly coolecLdow11-aml-rntiraG-ID-tlleciHeSpeetive-eili!lpttte-. ----------
312. Gloria Molina, now a member of the Los Angeles City Council, was in 198 1 a Southern 
California representative of Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, as well as a CFR activist, but 
she worked on the County reapportionment, not the state, where her connections might have 
compromised her with one side or the other. Molina deposition transcript, at 7-8, 14. 
3 1 3. Huerta deposition transcript, at 58-59. 
314.  See "Open Lener to Residents of Los Angeles County," Bates # 1 1 035 1-1 10352. 
315.  Santillan deposition transcript, at 66-67. 
3 16. While CFR leaders remember pressure from Smith and Hoffenblum - e.g., Quezada 
deposition transcript, at 48-50, 60 - they mention none from Heslop or other Rose people, 
and Heslop denies having anything to do with County redistricting. See Heslop deposition 
transcript, at 208- 1 1 .  
317. Largely on the basis of a sequence of educated guesses, Carlos Navarro, a graduate student 
working under Heslop's direction, and, at the same time, key member of CFR's redistricting 
effort, estimated that for an open seat in the legislature to be safe for a Hispanic, it had to be, 
on average, 72.6% Democratic. After winning the nomination, he expected the Latino 
Democrat to beat a Republican by 58-42. Navarro, A Report on California Redistricting and 
Representation for the Los Angeles Chicano Community, in Santillan, supra, note 36, at I, 
148-52; Heslop deposition transcript, at 179. Such a "waste" of Democratic votes, which, as 
section I.C. above shows, was not necessary to elect Hispanic legislators in open seat, 
partisan contests, would have filled Republicans with glee. 
88 
3 1 8. Leticia Quezada saw the effort of Hoffenblum and Smith as a partisan attempt to strengthen 
the Republican supervisors' seats. See Quezada deposition transcript, at 48-50, 60. Smith 
and Hoffenblum put a slightly different "spin" on these same events, but if one allows for 
different biases, their versions confirm Quezada's. See Smith deposition transcript, at 46; 
Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 70-7 1 ,  92. 
319. Handwritten notes by George Marr on agenda for Boundary Commission meeting of July 8, 
Bates # 100884. 
320. Seymour deposition transcript, at 400-02; Edelman deposition transcript, at 322-27; 
Schabarum deposition transcript, at 341-2; Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 369. 
32 1 .  Torrance Daily Breeze, July 10, 1981, Bates # 100276; Bush deposition transcript, at 86-87. 
322. Marr notes, Bates # 100884; Bush deposition transcript, at 19. 
323. Bush deposition transcript, at 3 1 ;  Daily News, Aug. 25, 1988, at 4; Los Angeles Times, 
April 21,  1988, part II, at l ;  July 27, 1988, part II, at 1 ,  4. Before the Board rejected Hahn's 
proposal in 1988, he stressed that "at least one of the new districts could contain a majority 
of Latino voters," according to the Times reporter's summary. 
324. Final Report of the Boundary Commission, Bates # 100191. 
325. Minutes of Boundary Commission meeting, July 8, 198 1 ,  Bates # 1 10510; Powrski 
deposition transcript, at 60-61 .  
326. Minutes of Boundary Commission meeting, July 15, 1981,  Bates # 100245. The criterion 
was drawn from a Schoerli memo of July 14, Bates # 10035 1 ,  but its ultimate origin is as 
unknown as what the Commission members thought it meant. 
327. Daily News, Aug. 6, 1981,  Bates # 1 1 0453. 
328. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 69-70, 159, 177-79, 186. 
329. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 179. 
330. Memo from Huerta to "Members of Hispanic Coalition for Fair Representation," Feb. 2, 
1 9 8 1 ,  Bates # 1305. 
331.  Quezada deposition transcript, at 31-32; Uranga deposition transcript, at 35-36. 
332. Santillan deposition transcript, at 61.  
333. Santillan deposition transcript, at 62-63; Garcia deposition transcript, at 58. "Had the 
protection of incumbents not been such a realistic and primary consideation," Garcia, the 
state chair of CFR noted, "our plan would have been with greater population numbers of 
Hispanics in both Mr. Schabarum's and Mr. Edelman's districts." 
334. Huerta deposition transcript, at 46. Cf. Quezada deposition transcript, at 1 15-16. 
335. Huerta deposition transcript, at 58-59. 
336. E.g., compare statements by Santillan and Quezada in Los Angeles Times, Aug. 4, 1981,  
Bates # 100262, 100266, with Santillan deposition transcript, at 62-63, and Quezada 
deposition transcript, at 3 1 -32. 
337. Huerta statement to Boundary Commission, July 29, 1981,  Bates # 100222-100234, at 
100228-100229. 
89 
338. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 94-99; Crow deposition transcript, at 214. 
339. Santillan deposition transcript, at 59-61. 
340. With Willie Brown Speaker of the Assembly and Tom Bradley Mayor of Los Angeles, and 
with Kenneth Hahn of the Board of Supervisors impregnable, blacks could well assume that 
any activism on their part would be superfluous. 
34 1.  Perkins deposition transcript, at  56; Marshall deposition transcript, at 38. 
342. Marshall deposition transcript, at 42-69, 75-76. 
343. Daily News, July 30, 1981,  section I, at 4, Bates # 100270; Quezada deposition transcript, at 
38; Uranga deposition transcript, at 40-4 1 .  
344. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept. 24, 198 1 ,  part II, article by Gail Diane Cox. 
345. Quoted in Pasadena Star-News, Sept. 25, 1981,  Bates # 100301. 
346. Hoffenblum, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Aug. 4, 1981, B ates # 100262, 100266. 
347. Smith deposition transcript, at 102-04. 
348. Smith deposition transcript, at 223. 
349. Smith deposition transcript, at 227. Cf. Quezada deposition transcript, at 60. 
350. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 70-7 1 .  Cf. Quezada deposition transcript, at 48-50. 
351.  Seymour deposition transcript, pp. 625-28; Edelman deposition transcript, at  240-45. 
352. Seymour to Edelman memo, July 24, 1981,  Bates # 170244-170245; Edelman deposition 
transcript, at 3 15-19. 
353. Seymour deposition transcript, at 630-3 1.  
354. Seymour deposition transcript, at 642; Los Angeles Times, Aug. 4, 1981,  B ates # 100262, 
100264. 
355. Seymour to Edelman memo, July 24, 198 1 ,  Bates # 170244-170245; Edelman deposition 
transcript, at 3 15. 
356. Seymour deposition transcript, at 205-07, 644; Edelman deposition transcript, at 209; 
Quezada deposition transcript, at 85-86; Uranga deposition transcript, at 61 -63. 
357. Los Angeles Daily News, Sept. 25, 1 98 1 ,  Bates # 100302. Similarly, see Hoffenblum 
deposition transcript, at 120. 
358. The minimal change plans were staff plans A, B, C, and D, and the final plan. 
359. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 74-8 1,  153-54; Smith deposition transcript, at 160; 
Heslop deposition transcript, at 180, 186-87. Shumate denied paying Olsen, and said Olsen 
only performed clerical computer tasks under his supervision in 1981.  Shumate deposition 
transcript, at 38, 58, 275. Olsen later went to work for Hoffenblum, and played a role in the 
Sebastiani Initiative. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 338-40. 
360. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 1 10- 1 1; Shumate deposition transcript, at217, 3 14, 
323, 36 1 ;  Smith deposition transcript, at 150-52, 163. Smith identified the "Shumate Plan" 
as being the same as the "Smith Plan." 
361.  Shumate deposition transcript, at 188,  225-27, 276, 289; Smith deposition transcript, at 153, 
157. 
90 
362. Rose Institute Draft Contract, July 15, 1981 ,  Bates # 000546: " . . .  no person under the 
employment of the Institute will participate in drafting and designing any plans for use by 
the [Boundary] Committee . . .  " According to Hoffenblum, "Rose Institute was drawing the 
plans . . .  " Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 338. 
363. Smith deposition transcript, at 168; Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 155. 
364. Smith deposition transcript, at 50; Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 151 .  
365. Schoeni deposition transcript, at 304-05. 
366. See section III.B., above. 
367. Smith deposition transcript, at 150-52, 185-86; Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 193. 
368. Smith deposition transcript, at 94-95. 
369. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 87. 
370. Smith deposition transcript, at 145. 
37 1 .  Smith deposition transcript, at 324; Hayes deposition transcript, a t  22-23, 58-59. 
372. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 23, 1981,  part II, at 1 ,  Bates # 107942. 
373. San Gabriel Valley Tribune, Sept. 23, 198 1 ,  B ates # 100300. Dana did not recall any such 
negotiations and denied that he tried to jettison Compton in 1981.  Dana deposition 
transcript, at 245, 247, 256-57, 270-71. 
374. Dana deposition transcript, at 369. 
375. Dana deposition transcript, at 274. 
376. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 222. 
377. Letter from Bush to Supervisors, Bates # 1280-1281;  Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 
186; Bush deposition transcript, at 69-74, 81 -82. 
378. Bush deposition transcript, at 86-87. 
379. Smith deposition transcript, at 1 65-66. 
380. Los Angeles Daily News, July 30, 198 1 ,  section I, at 4, Bates # 100270. 
3 8 1 .  Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 157-59. 
382. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 193; Bush deposition transcript, at 84. 
383. Boundary Committee Minutes, Aug. 10, 1981, B ates # 100207. 
384. Boundary Commission Final Report, Aug. 24, 1 98 1 ,  Bates # 1210-122 1 .  
385. San Gabriel Valley Tribune, Aug. 13, 198 1 ,  Bates # 1 00255; Los Angeles Daily News, Aug. 
27, 1981,  B ates # 1 10445. 
386. Edelman deposition transcript, at 213. 
387. Edelman deposition transcript, at 223-225. 
388. Transcript of Supervisors Meeting, Sept. 24, 198 1 ,  Bates # 100248- 100250. 
389. Boundary Commission Fund Report, Aug. 24, 198 1 ,  Bates # 100199. 
390. Hoffenblum deposition transcript, at 245. 
391.  Smith deposition transcript, at 43-44. 
392. Turner deposition transcript, at 141. 
393. Schoeni deposition transcript, at 392-95; Turner deposition transcript, at 357-58, at 372-73. 
The calendar of Schabarum 's chief deputy, Mike Lewis, indicates that Lewis met with 
Shumate on Sept. 1 and Sept. 2 1 ,  1981 ,  presumably about reapportionment, but Lewis 
remembers no details. Lewis deposition transcript, at 1 98-99. 
91 
394. Seymour deposition transcript, at 524, 536. 
395. Seymour deposition transcript, at 520-2 1;  Turner deposition transcript, at 357-58; Schoeni 
deposition transcript, at 399. 
396. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept. 24, 1981, part 2, article by Gail Diane Cox; Pasadena 
Star-News, Sept. 23, 1981, at A-14, Bates # 100304. 
397. Schoeni deposition transcript, at 392-94. 
398. Pasadena Star-News, Sept. 25, 1981,  Bates # 100301; Los Angeles Times, Sept. 23, 1981,  
part II, at  1 ,  Bates # 107942; Schoeni deposition transcript, at  374-77. 
399. "Open Letter to Residents of Los Angeles County," Bates # 1 1035 1 - 1 1 0352. 
400. Transcript of Board of Supervisors' Meeting, Sept. 22, 1 98 1 ,  Bates # 100014- 100047. 
Espofino's statement is on at 100036-100037. 
401. Schoeni deposition transcript, at 365-413; Turner deposition transcript, at 3 1 1 -4 12; Seymour 
deposition transcript, at 389-402; Lewis deposition transcript, 208-10. 
402. Suggestively, Edelman misremembered the nature of the final plan, and of his actions, 
saying he thought that the percentage of Hispanics in his district was increased over what it 
had been using the 1971 lines. Edelman deposition transcript, at 284, 3 1 3. 
403. Memo from James Mize to Supervisors, Sept. 25, 1981, B ates # 100182; and map, Bates # 
106746- 106754. 
404. Transcript of Board of Supervisors' Meeting, Sept. 24, 1981, Bates # 100248- 100250. 
405. CFR, "Statement to the Press After the Status Quo Plan Passes," Bates # 1 1 87; Uranga 
deposition transcript, at 67-69; Quezada deposition transcript, at 1 14, 141- 144. 
406. Uranga deposition transcript, at 67-69. 
------.c,,,.,--r.:M.. Kousser, Expert Witnesses, Rational Choice and the Search/or Intent, 5 Con. Comm.
349, at 352-53 (1988). I have also discussed the historical development of court opinions on 
intent and effect in voting rights cases in Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on 
Objectivity in Scholarship and Expert Witnessing, 6 Pub. Historian (1984), 5, at 7-12. 
408. Cf. Simon, supra, n.3, at 1 1 30. 
409. Barbier v. Connolly, 1 13 U.S. 27 (1884); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 1 13 U.S. 703 (1 885); Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 1 1 8 U.S. 356 (1 886). 
410. On the efforts of the Workingman's Party and others to eliminate Chinese laundries in San 
Francisco through regulation, see W. ISSEL and R. CHERNY, SAN FRANCISCO, 1865-
1932 (1986), at 125-30; R. DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA (1988), at 39; A. SAXTON, THE 
INDISPENSABLE ENEMY (1971), at 1 1 3-156. 
4 1 1 . DANIELS, supra, note 410, at 39. 
412. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 5 S.Ct. 730, at 734-35. 
4 1 3. See G. Baker, Representation and Apportionment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL 
HISTORY (J. Greene, ed.) (1984), at 1 128. 
4 14. See Section I.C., supra. 
4 15. 1 1 8  U.S. 356 (1 886). 
416 6 S.Ct. 1064, at 1068. 
417. 6 S.Ct. 1064, at 1068-73. 
92 
418. 6 S.Ct. 1 064, at 1073. An obvious misprint ("appliance". instead of "appearance" is printed) 
in the Supreme Court Reporter edition of the opinion has been corrected. 
419. Newman v. Spencer, Ratliffv. Williams, and Brown v. Allen, H.R. Rep. Nos. 1536, 1537, 
and 1538, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. (1896). Interestingly enough, the civil rights forces that 
brought a parallel challenge in 1965 were unaware of Jones's and succeeding efforts. See 
Contested Elections in the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Districts of the State of 
Mississippi: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the Comm. on House Adm . .  89th 
Cong .. !st Sess. (1965); M. Stavis, A Century of Struggle for Black Enfranchisement in 
Mississippi: From the Civil War to the Congressional Challenge of 1965--and Beyond, 57 
Miss. L.J. 591 (1987). 
420. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
421. Id. Interestingly, Jones rested his case entirely on the Fourteenth Amendment. 
422. Ratliffv. Beale, 20 So. Rep. 865 (1896). 
423. Perhaps Jones thought that demonstrating their absence from the jury panel was sufficient 
and more relevant than their exclusion from the state's voter rolls, which would have been 
difficult to demonstrate, anyway, since no official records of registration by race were kept in 
Mississippi at that time. 
424. 1 8  S .  Ct. 583, at 588.
425. C. WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913 (1951), at 322-23. 
426. W. Oates, in 2 Ala. Con. Con. Off. Proc. (190ll. at 2790-9!;_1._Dafilel.JnJla�CmLCuu. ______ _ 
Proc. and Debates (1901 -02), at 2947-48. Cf. Crumpacker, in Cong. Rec., 56 Cong .. 2 Sess., 
Appendix, at 71.  
427. KOUSSER, supra, note 12, at 58-62, 162-7 1 .  
428. See the extensive reports in the Montgomery Advertiser during 1902: March 7, at 3; March 
15, at 3; March 19, at 2; March 21, at 3; March 26, at 3; March 29, at 7; May 6, at 6; May 
17, at 3; June 3, at 10; June 4, at 3; June 22, at 3; June 24, at 1 .  
429. A. MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1 880-1915 (1957), at 1 1 1 .  
430. Montgomery Daily Advertiser, May 7, 1902, at 3; June 25, 1 902, at 5; July 2, 1902, at 9; 
Sept. 4, 1 902, at 3; W.H. Smith, ls the Negro Disfranchised?, 79 THE OUTLOOK (April 
29, 1905), at 1047-49. Elbert Thornton of Barbour County swore that he was able to answer 
all of a series of questions about government except the following: "What are the 
differences between Jeffersonian Democracy and the Calhoun principles as compared to the 
Monroe Doctrine?" Montgomery Advertiser, May 7, 1902, at 3. 
431. 74 THE OUTLOOK (July 1 1, 1 903), at 634-35; Montgomery Daily Advertiser, Nov. 29, 
1 902, at l ;  Nov. 30, 1902, at l ;  Dec. 14, 1902, at l ;  Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147
(1904); Selden v. Montague, 194 U.S. 154 (1904). 
432. Montgomery Daily Advertiser, Oct. 13, 1902, at 18. 
433. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
434. Id. 
93 
435. A. BICKEL and B. SCHMIDT, THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 
1910-21 (1984), at 927-49. Whereas Giles had been argued on 14th and 15th Amendment 
grounds, attorneys for the government in Guinn and Beal added a reference to the 
Reconstruction Enforcement Acts. thus paralleling the arguments about the Voting Rights 
Act in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
436. Guinn and Beal v. U.S., 238 U.S. 347 (1914), Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1914). 
437. KOUSSER, supra, note 12, at 1 64-65. 
438. Guinn and Beal v. U.S., 35 S.Ct. 926, at 931;  Myers v. Anderson, 35 S.Ct. 932, at 935. 
439. Plessy v. Ferguson, 165 Ct. 1 1 38, 1 143 (1 896).
440. Id., at 1 145; italics supplied. 
441. See the briefs in the files of the Plessy case in the National Archives, and references to the 
literature in J.M. Kousser Separate but not Equal: The Supreme Court's First Decision on 
Racial Discrimination in Schools, 46 JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 17-44 (Note 
2) (1980). The best study of the Plessy case is C. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE (1987).
He treats the briefs extensively in Chapters 3 and 7. 
442. 175 U.S. 528 (1 899). Other facts about the Cumming case are taken, without further 
citation, from Kousser, supra, note 444. 
443. 175 U.S. 528, 544-45. 
444. Quoted in KOUSSER, supra, note 12, at 164. 
445. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
446. 16 S.Ct. 1 138, at 1 145. 
447. LOFGREN, supra, note 441, at 157-58. 
448. See Washington, Alexandria, and Georgetown Railroad Company v. Brown, 17 Wallace 445 
(1 873). 
449. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). The best study of racial discrimination in Tuskeegee politics is R. 
NORRELL, REAPING THE WHIRL WIND: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN 
TUSKEEGEE (1985). 
450. 364 U.S. at 340-41 .  
45 i .  Id., at 342. 
452. Id., at 340, 347, quoting U.S. v. Reading Co . . 226 U.S. 324, at 357, Western Union 
Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, at 1 14. 
453. Id., at 349. 
454. Ely, supra n.3, at 1252-53 (1970); NORRELL, supra, n. 449, at 1 19, 124. 
455. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
456. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
457. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
458. Blacksher and Menefee, supra, n.3 at 14-18 (1982); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, at 
635-36 (1982) (dissent). 
459. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
460. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
461 .  391 U.S. 367, at 388. 
462 Id. 
463. 403 U.S. 222, at 21 8-19. 
94 
464. Id., at 224-25. Earlier in his career, Justice Black had not been so reticent about detennining 
the purposes of legislators. See Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46, at 54-125 (1947). 
465. 403 U.S. 2 1 8, at 240-4 1 .  
466. Brest, supra, n.3. 
467. Id., at 1 19-20; cf. Ely, supra, n.3, at 1267-68. 
468. Brest, supra, n.3. 
469. Id., at 124-27. 
470. Id., at 128-30. 
47 1 .  They were Justices Black, Burger, Blackmun, and Stewart. Justice White pointed this out in 
his dissent in Palmer, at 242. 
472. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
473. Id., at 149. 
474. Id., at 133-63, especially 134, n. 1 1 .  
475. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
476. Id., at 766-70. 
477. Id., at 769, 766-67. 
478. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir., 1 977). 
479. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
480. Id., at 241. 
481. Id., at 240. 
482. Id., at 249. 
483. Id., at 244, italics supplied. Note the close connection of the italicized phrase with the 
"totality of the circumstances" phrase in White v. Regester, 4 12 U.S. 755, at 768. 
484. Washington v. Davis, at 254-55. 
485. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977). 
486. Id., at 267. 
487. Id., at 266, 271, n. 2 1 .  Cf. Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274. 
488. Arlington Heights, supra, n. 482, at 268-69. 
489. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
490. Id., at 279-80, italics supplied. Although the sexually differentiated consequences of the 
veterans' preference were foreseeable, Justice Stewart continued in a foomote to the 
sentence quoted in the text, the fact that veterans' preferences had allegedly always been 
considered legitimate and that "the statutory history and all of the available evidence 
affinnatively demonstrate[d]" that there was no discriminatory intent were sufficient in this 
case to undercut the inference of deliberate disadvantage. Assuming the truth of the facts as 
Justice Stewart stated them, the argument for intent in Garza is on much more solid grounds, 
95 
for racially discriminatory gerrymandering has long been recognized and condemned, and 
the administrative history and other available evidence affirmatively supports inferences of 
discriminatory intent and undercuts other explanations. 
49 1.  Id., at 280, n.  24. This statement, as well as the court's reliance on the facts of impact 
encapsulated in Table 13, seems to me to undercut the interpretation of Feeney as enshining 
"subjective intent" in Weinzweig, supra, n. 3, at 288-89, 3 1 8-19. 
492. Id., at 27 1 ,  282. 
493. Anthony v. Commonwealth, 415 F.Supp. 485, at 496 (D. Mass. 1 976). 
494. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
495. Id., at 56-81. 
496. Id., at 8 1 -84, 95-142. 
497. Id., at 84-95. 
498. Soifer, supra, n. 3, at 390, 400, 404. Similarly, see Sen. C. Mathias, quoted in Boyd and 
Markman, supra, n.3, at 1 390. 
499. Parker, supra, n. 3, at 744. Similarly, see L. McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority 
Voting Rights, 42 Vand. L.R. 1 249, at 1263-64 (1989). 
500. For a sample, see Parker, supra, n. 3, at 737-46; Boyd and Markman, supra, n. 3, especially 
at 1404-05. 
501. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, at 636, 638, 643-44 (dissent). 
502. Bolden, supra, note 494, at 63-64. On Guinn and Gomillion, see supra, text at notes 433-36, 
447-51. In U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, at 385, Chief Justice Warren had denied that 
Gomillion was a purpose case. 
503. Bolden, supra, note 494, at 71 .  Italics supplied. 
504. Id., at 74-76, notes 20-2 1 .  
505. Id., at 96 (dissent). A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987), at 75, unaccountably refers to
Stewart's opinion as "principled, simple, and tight." 
506. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, at 768. 
507. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, at 243. 
508. Mobile v. Bolden, at 74-75. 
509. Parker, supra, n. 3, at 742-45; Weinsweig, supra, n. 3, at 322-29. 
5 10. P. McCrary, History in the Courts: The Significance of Bolden v. The City of Mobile, in 
Davidson, supra, note 20, at 47-63. 
5 1 1 . Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F.Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1 982); Brown v. Board of School 
Commissioners of Mobile County, 542 F.Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982), affd 706 F.2d 1 103 
( 1 1 th Cir. 1983), aff'd 474 U.S. 1005 (1983). 
5 12. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). The Rogers opinion was actually made public two 
days after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, but is discussed first for convenience. 
5 13. Id., at 624-28. 
96 
514. See S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 27. 
5 15. Id., at 27, n. 108. 
5 1 6. Id., at 29-3 1 ;  Rogers v. Lodge, at 624-28. 
517. One commentator even goes so far as to say that in Rogers, Justice White "rendered the 
inquiry into discriminatory purpose somewhat obsolete by replacing the purpose 
requirement with a results test." P. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic 
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 Harv. CR-CL L.R. 173, at 193, n. 77 
(1989). 
5 1 8. Weinzweig, supra, n. 3, at 322-35; Ortiz, supra, n. 3. 
519. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S., 464, 101 S. CT. 1200 (1981). 
520. Id., at 1 206, n. 7. 
52 1 .  Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S. CT. 1916 (1985). 
522. Id., at 1 922. 
523. 106 S. CT. 2752 (1986). 
524. Id., at 2766-67. 
525. See, e.g., R. Engstrom and M. McDonald, The Election of Blacks to City Councils: 
Clarifying the Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the Seats/Population Relationship, 75 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 344 (1981); Idem., The Election of Blacks to Southern City Councils: The
Dominant Impact of Electoral Arrangements in BLACKS IN SOUTHERN POLITICS (L. 
Moreland, R. Steed, and T. Baker, eds., 1987), C. Davidson and G. Korbel, At-Large 
Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Re- Examination of Historical and 
Contemporary Evidence, 43 J. of Pol. 982 (1981). 
526. See, e.g., P. Argersinger, Electoral Processes, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN 
POLITICAL HISTORY 489 (J. Greene, ed., 1984). 
527. Supra, section I.C. 
528. 442 U.S. 256, at 262. Note that this was the first sentence in Stewart's opinion after his 
statement of the facts. 
529. 1 00  S.Ct 1490, at 1501,  n. 15, citing E. BANFIELD and J. WILSON, CITY POLITICS, at 
151  (1963). In his dissent, 100 S.Ct. at 1520, n. 3, Justice Marshall gave much fuller and 
more representative citations, including some to other pages of Banfield and Wilson's book 
that contradicted Justice Stewart's statement. 
530. 106 S .Ct at 2808. 
531. Simon, supra, n. 3, at 1070-71. 
532. Mccrary and Hebert, supra, n. 5, at 107. 
533. J. Kousser, supra, n. 12, at 165-71.  
534. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, at 231-32 (1985). 
535. Mccrary and Hebert, supra, n. 5, at 109-12. 
536. 544 F. Supp. 1 122, at 1 1 27-28 (1982). 
537. See supra, section III.B. 
538. Id., sections III.B., III.D., IV.E.-F. 
97 
539. E.g., Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (1947); S. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING 
RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976), at 49-52. 
540. U.S. v. Marengo Co. Comm., 731 F. 2d 1546, at 1571 ( ! I th Cir., 1984). 
541 .  Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, at 1301 (5th Cir., 1973). 
542. See Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (1966). 
543. See City of Pon Anhur v. U.S., 517 F. Supp. 987, at 1020 (1981). 
544. 1901 Ala. Acts 890, No. 328, Sec. 6 (Feb. 8, 1901). 
545. Trial Transcript at 3326 and 3659, U.S. v. Dallas Co. (Testimony of Peyton McCrary and J. 
Morgan Kousser, respectively). 
546. 471 U.S. 222, at 226-28. 
547. "Single-shot" or "bullet" voting takes place in multi-member constituencies, when each 
member of the electorate may vote for more than one candidate. Members of political or 
social minorities often cluster their votes on one or a few candidates, hoping that the 
majority group will spread its votes, thereby allowing candidates favored by the minority 
group to be elected. An anti-single shot law prohibits this practice. 
548. J. Kousser, supra, n. 12, at 5 1-56. 
549. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
550. Trial Transcript at 3588-3600, U.S. v. Dallas Co. (Kousser testimony). 
551. McCrary and Heben, supra, n. 5, at 109-1 12. 
552. See supra, especially section III. F. 
553. See J. Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second, in 
Davidson, ed., supra, n. 20, at 36. 
554. Sumter S.C. Daily Item, Nov. 3, 1978; Declaration of J. Morgan Kousser, in County Council 
of Sumter County, S.C. v. U.S. (District Coun, D.C., 1982), at 25-26. 
555. Plaintiff's Exhibit 461, Brown v. Board of Commissions of the City of Chatanooga, 
Tennessee (D. Tenn., 1989). 
556. See supra, section I.D. 
557. M. MCMILLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ALABAMA, 1798-1901 ,  at 
275, n. 76, (1955). 
558. Hunter v. Underwood, 47i U.S. 222, at 231. 
559. Quoted in MCMILLAN, supra, n. 557, at 225, n. 49. 
560. Supra, sections III. D., IV. E., and IV. F. 
561.  471 U.S. 222, at 230. 
562. Sections IV. D. - IV. G. 
563. E.g., Defendant's exhibits 109-1 10, County Council of Sumter County, S.C., v. U.S. 
(District Coun, D.C., 1982). 
564. Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, at 1375 (CA5 1981). On this point, the Supreme Coun 
reversed the Appeals Coun, in Rogers V. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.  CT. 3272, at 3280, n. 
9 (1982). 
565. See Weinsweig, supra, n. 3, at 333. 
98 
566. See J. Gross, Alabama Politics and the Negro, 1874-1901 (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Ga., 
1969), at 244. 
567. Quoted in McCrary and Hebert, supra, n. 5 at 105. 
568. For example, Richard K. Simon, an attorney for Los Angeles County, and Ron Smith 
performed the following call-and-response during Smith's deposition: "Mr. Simon: If you 
don't remember, that's fine. [Smith]: I don't remember." Smith deposition transcript, at 98. 
569. Supra, text at notes 385-88. 
570. KOUSSER, supra, note 12, at 238-65. 
571.  Of course, one could investigate why the state as a whole adopted the policy in the first 
place. 
572. Trial Transcript at 3529-42 (U.S. v. Dallas Co.) Cf. the discussion of Dillard v. Crenshaw 
Co., 640 F. Supp. 1347 (M.D., Ala., 1986), in Mccrary and Hebert, supra, n. 5, at 1 1 8-21. 
573. Supra, sections I.B., IV. A., IV. D. 
574. Mccrary and Hebert, supra, n. 5, at 1 13. 
575. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980), at 
138. Even more extreme versions of the statement appear in Ely, supra, n. 3, at 1215, n. 31 ,  
and 1278-79. 
576. Id., at 1275-79. For an assessment of the historical evidence, see Kousser, supra, n. 12, at 
182-93. 
577. See text, supra, at notes 439-44. 
578. See, J. Kousser, "The Supremacy of Equal Rights": The Struggle Against Racial 
Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 82 N.W.U.L.R. 941, at 973-74 {1988). 
579. That school desegregation caused white violence against blacks, for instance, was used as an 
argument for segregation by the racist school board in New Orleans in 1877. See R. 
FISCHER, THE SEGREGATION STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1862-1877 (1974), at
138-39. 
580. 97 S.Ct at 563, 566, n. 2 1 .  Italics supplied. This "but for" test is enshrined in Simon, supra, 
n. 3, at 1043, 1065.
581.  99 S.Ct. at  2296. 
582. Some commentators, such as Miller, supra, n. 3, at 733-34, have in effect given up any effort 
to deal with mixed motives or institutional intent. I do not think the situation is quite that 
desperate. 
583. In Rybicki v. Board of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, at 1 1 10  (1982), Judge Cudahy of the 
Circuit Court ruled on this issue that white incumbency preservation "was so intimately 
intertwined with, and dependent on, racial discrimination and dilution of minority voting 
strength that purposeful dilution has been demonstrated . . .  "
584. See text, supra, at notes 97-104. 
585. Simon, supra, n. 3, at 1 122-23. 
99 
586. E.g., J. ENELOW and M. HINICH, THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING (1984), at 2. 
587. Supra, at n. 14. 
588. Supra, section IV. F. 
589. Supra, sections IV. E - IV. G. 
590. Supra, section III. B.  
591 .  Supra, sections Ill. E. and IV. D. 
592. Supra, section III. D. 
593. See Table 5, supra. As the last row on Table 5 shows, any redistricting to promote 
population equality during the 1980s would have added territory to the Board's weakest 
Republican, Deane Dana. It is also interesting to consider the ethnic population estimates of 
the County's Department of Health Services. Briefly, they show an across-the-Board 
increase in Hispanic percentages, with the First District continuing the pattern of the 1 970s 
and gaining Hispanics fastest In 1989, the figures indicate that 47.0% of the population in 
the First District is Hispanic. The figure is 48.7% in the Third District. 
594. Supra, sections II, Ill. B.,  and IV. F. 
595. Supra, sections II and IV. C. 
596. Keyes v. School District, 413  U.S. 189 (1973). On Keyes, see Jessica Pearson and Jeffrey 
Pearson, Denver: Keyes v. School District No. I, in LIMITS OF JUSTICE: THE COURT'S
ROLE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (H. Kolodner and J.  Fishman, eds.) (1978), at 
1 67-222, 1 8 1 ,  193. 
597. Supra, part IV. 
